SOVIETICA

CONTEMPORARY MARXISM

Essays in Honor of J. M. Bocheński

Edited by James J. O'Rourke, Thomas J. Blakeley, and Friedrich J. Rapp

VOLUME 46

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PART I

INTRODUCTION

J. M. BOCHEŃSKI

NICHOLAS LOBKOWICZ

J. M. BOCHEŃSKI, THE TEACHER: A PERSONAL REMINISCENCE

Thinking about the teachers who contributed to our academic development opens up a treasury of memories. The first university at which I studied philosophy was Erlangen, where I enrolled in the Fall of 1950. I was spellbound by Professor Helmut Kuhn's immense wealth of knowledge and the special aesthetic touch he lent to the presentation of his ideas. But Erlangen was not to be my principal place of study. At the end of the Winter semester my mother wrote me that she had visited the Dean of Philosophy at the University of Fribourg, in Switzerland, and that he had promised to look after me if I wanted to study there. Being Catholic, I had always wanted to study philosophy at a Catholic university. Since the only languages I had mastered besides my mother tongue – Czech – were French and German, only two universities could be considered, Louvain and Fribourg. In this way I came to Fribourg. The dean to whom I was introduced turned out to be the man from whom I was to learn more than from any of my other teachers, the *Doctor philosophiae et theologiae* J. M. Bocheński.

At that time Bocheński held the chair for contemporary philosophy and in addition found the time to lecture to a small circle on symbolic logic and to serve as pastor to the rather numerous congregation of Poles living in Switzerland. As was the case with all the professors who were Dominicans, we addressed him as *'mon père'*, and when we spoke of him in the third person he was *'le père Bocheński'*.

Already after a few days I noticed that Bocheński was quite different from the other Dominicans who either ran the theology department or who taught philosophy. Although I came to respect and like many of the Dominican professors I had during the eight years I spent in Fribourg, Father Bocheński was the only one I revered. His exterior appearance was in itself extraordinary: tall, with huge hands and a gigantic gait, almost never without a cigarette. I remember his eyes most vividly: they cast a strict, almost angry glance, as if to say "Am I going to hear nonsense again?" Nevertheless, Bocheński could be extraordinarily congenial. The only time he became impatient was when he had the impression that his discussion partner could not think clearly. I will never forget the time when in the course of a seminar on Heidegger's *Being and Time* a student who had just come from Freiburg (in Germany)

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and was obviously under the spell of Heideggerian jargon put up his hand to speak. He uttered only one sentence. Before he started the second, Bocheński interrupted him and said: "Dear sir, you have just finished a sentence of fourteen words. I have not as yet understood a single one. Please begin by explaining the meaning of the first."

If I remember correctly, the first seminar I had with Bocheński was devoted to Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*. Each participant had to purchase his own copy. Bocheński asked us to open the book to the first page (with other authors it could equally well have been the beginning of a chapter in the middle of the book), and one of us began to read aloud. After a few sentences, Bocheński would interrupt and ask for an explanation of the sentences just read. Out of this came a discussion in which the students hardly had an opportunity to speak. Bocheński explicated, sketched the background and context of what had been read, and raised one problem after another. By the end of the semester we had hardly progressed beyond ten or twenty pages in the text itself. Later I repeated the same experience in seminars on Whitehead's *Process and Reality*, Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, Galileo's *Dialogues*, Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, and the early writings of Karl Marx. It should be added however that Bocheński presupposed that we would not only read the entire text on our own but would also find our way through the secondary literature.

Perhaps the reader – especially if he happens to have studied at a European university – has the impression that this was a very primitive way to conduct a seminar. Actually, the opposite was the case: here we learned something even more important than to be able to penetrate the intricacies of a text. Bocheński compelled his students to read the text exactly and to be clear about whether the text had been understood or not. This sounds obvious, but it really is not. Not just students, but even professors are able to speak about a philosophical text or a philosopher without ever pausing to consider whether they have really understood what was meant, whether what was meant was really meaningful, and finally – assuming it was meaningful – whether it was true. From the first day in class Bocheński's students learned that philosophy could concern itself with many kinds of states of affairs and with practically any text, provided that a twofold goal was kept in view: to bring whatever we were considering into a clearer light and to discover what was really true. Although Bocheński possessed an immense store of historical knowledge and even considered himself first of all a historian of philosophy, he did not rate historical knowledge *per se* very highly. It was for him only the material from which to begin the search for truth.

This was the outcome of an insight Bocheński never grew tired of instilling in us: that it is nonsense to maintain that truth is historical, let alone relative. Basing himself on a foundation which was considerably broader than neo-Thomism, Bocheński always remained of the opinion that truth has nothing to do with history and that the claim that truth is relative is almost always a sign of unclear thinking. Accordingly, he used to read with us authors of many centuries past as if they were standing there right before us and as if we were able to converse with them as our contemporaries. The same attitude prevailed in Bocheński's lectures. Except for his introduction to logic he always lectured on individual thinkers or on a clearly defined school of thought. He would lecture freely on the basis of a few notes. When he thought that the topic he was explaining was particularly difficult, he would start pacing back and forth behind the wide lectern. Bocheński had a great gift for simplifying: he was able to bring the most opaque problematic into a sharp and clear focus, although he freely admitted that he was not absolutely sure of the meaning of some of the theses and claims made by the authors he was considering. Often he would enter the lecture hall and begin to discuss a problem he had just considered a class before, because he felt he had reached a higher level of clarity about it.

Some of Bocheński's students and colleagues claimed that he was a *terrible simplificateur*. I never shared that opinion, though I often asked myself whether or not he in fact saw things in too simple a way. However, every time I asked myself this question, I was astonished to discover what a differentiated process of thought lay behind each one of his 'simplifications'. What to all appearances was an over-simplification turned out to be the result of a profound labor of thought. It was certainly no accident that Bocheński used to quote one of his Polish teachers who was supposed to have said: "An inexperienced teacher teaches what he has not himself understood; an experienced teacher teaches what he has understood; but the wise teacher teaches only what he feels his students ought to be taught."

That Bocheński was no oversimplifier became clear to his students when they saw that he thought as an analytic philosopher but was certainly not a positivist. Bocheński possessed a sense for high quality, which he communicated to others. He often compared two authors by saying that although one of them might be right, his thinking lacked quality, whereas the other who was wrong in almost everything he said yet displayed a much higher caliber of thought. In this way, in spite of his relentless precision in evaluating arguments, Bocheński instilled in us a reflective tolerance towards other thinkers. I have never met a philosopher who was able to appreciate the

grandeur of others to such a degree, even though he disagreed with them on many fundamental issues.

Bocheński had a secret love for metaphysics. In his lectures and seminars he was not able to give this inclination very much expression, since the philosophers he dealt with – with the exception of Hegel and Whitehead – had either rejected metaphysics or had little to do with it. And yet it was in his lectures on formal logic that he made it clear to all his listeners that for him the most appropriate way to grasp the final mysteries of reality consisted in clarity of thought and the quest for truth. He vigorously opposed Hegel's claim that only the totality is absolutely true; for, as a logician, he saw the paradoxical nature of the assertion that we can only arrive at the truth via a set of partial truths which are supposedly false in the final analysis. Nevertheless, he was always in search of the totality.

That Bocheński never grew weary in his search nor ever lost his pre-eminent sense for detail (for which he was famous) was a result of his simple yet profound religious faith. For many of his colleagues it was a bone of contention whether a Dominican could be a rationalist and a radical empiricist, a thinker who always started with experience and then discovered the rational structure behind it. People did not seem to understand that the strictness of his method of thinking never hindered him for one moment from being a humble Christian who was faithful to the teachings of the Church and obeyed the injunctions of his superiors without grumbling. For this reason he was not affected by the crisis in the Catholic Church which has been going on for the last twenty years. The major part of modern theology seemed to him to be irresponsible chatter. He was preserved from any confusion by his conviction that although different truths make themselves manifest at different times, nevertheless their validity remains non-temporal.

After obtaining my doctorate, I saw Bocheński time and again – usually in the United States but also when I was passing through Fribourg. I was no longer his student, and yet I have always remained his student. Once in a while I feel sorry for the younger generations, who do not have the opportunity to orient their own intellectual lives with as a model such a consummate master of his field, and to see that a truly creative thinker never stands still but is always in the process of working on new problems.

With this last point I am touching on the last and probably most important of Bocheński's characteristics, which has made him one of the greatest teachers of philosophy of our time – his originality. Many of his contemporaries saw him above all as an eccentric: a clergyman who by some historical accident happened to be wearing the Dominican cowl; a preacher who derived

a special pleasure from delivering his sermons in more than half a dozen languages; a priest who at the same time loved fast automobiles and at an advanced age obtained a pilot's license; a poised and witty public speaker who never missed an opportunity to introduce a remark into one of his lectures which made the lecture hall resound with laughter. For those of us who knew him better, it was obvious that behind all this lay a fascinating originality of thought. Bocheński did not belong to the school of analytic philosophers, which maintains that the method of the natural sciences is the only one which is successful and hence that philosophy too must strive to comply with this standard. On the other hand, he possessed a quality which I have encountered only in scientists of the caliber of a Heisenberg: when confronted with a problem he recoiled instinctively from the temptation (to which most of us succumb) to try to follow in the footsteps of those who have preceded us. Indeed, Bocheński read more, and more widely than most of the philosophers of our time; his knowledge of the secondary literature was amazing. But he did not read all this, as most of us do, for the purpose of discovering new ideas. On the contrary, he turned and twisted a problem around until he thought he had found a key, a model as it were, which fit the problem perfectly. Then he proceeded to work out all the intricate details of this model through a tremendous labor of thought. Later, as I studied the works of Aristotle more intensively, I was always reminded of Bocheński when reading the pages in Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* which describe how the intuitive power of the *nous* collects and analyzes a manifold of experiences and inferences pertaining to a particular subject until it suddenly seizes the first premises from which everything becomes intelligible.

This way of thinking was very fascinating for Bocheński's students. First of all, it continuously opened up new vistas; the study of philosophy turned out to be rewarding not only because of a sense of mastery over a particular area, but also because of the unexpected comprehensive insights which waited for us like so many adventures. Secondly, we learned from *one* teacher that it could not be correct to commit ourselves to one way of thinking, one style of thought alone. The master himself showed us by his example that there were many different ways to approach the truth, and we only needed to have the courage to depart from the beaten path of previous thought. Naturally, the consequence of all this was that Bocheński never offered us a complete, self-contained system of thought, the way most of the European philosophers still do today. He used to say that this was not possible today, in an age in which the most we can do is to clear away the rubbish produced by past centuries in order to discover the few jewels that had been covered

over in the process. In reality, what Bocheński gave us was much more valuable than a closed system: the confidence to find our way amidst a confusing array of opinions, with the conviction that in the final analysis the truth will turn out to be compatible with simplicity. He possessed this confidence with an unswerving conviction which we, his students, tried to emulate but never succeeded in attaining.

In the autobiography which appeared in 1975 in the first volume of *Philosophie in Selbstdarstellungen*, Bocheński wrote that his lasting contributions consisted in a comprehensive history of formal logic and the logical analysis of a few individual problems. This may be true if we are talking about Bocheński the research scholar. However, if we consider Bocheński as teacher, as his students are apt to do first and foremost, then we find something which is rarely mentioned and is yet more important than all of his other scientific achievements: he showed by his example how it is possible to philosophize in the twentieth century without suffocating under the long history of philosophy or without falling prey to an over-refinement with regard to irrelevant detail (as is the case with many of the analytic philosophers). Every day we had the opportunity to learn from Bocheński that, although the daily work of the philosopher consisted in the investigation of tortuous and in the final analysis boring problems of detail, nevertheless this chore could be carried out with reference to vistas and perspectives which reached the most basic and deepest roots of our thinking. This might appear mysterious, but for a student of Bocheński it is almost self-evident: it is the willingness to think painfully through the small amount we know, think we know or just suppose and believe as Christians, without ever losing sight of the goals of clarity and consistency of thought and taking care not to entrust ourselves blindly to the paths others have followed.

I have written these words in the past tense because it was over thirty years ago when I first became a student of Bocheński. But I wish to express my thanks, on behalf of all his students, in the future tense: he will always remain one of the most fascinating teachers we have ever known.

University of Munich

RICHARD T. DE GEORGE

THE CRITIQUE OF MARXIST PHILOSOPHY: 1956–1981

The period from 1956 to 1981 forms a quarter century in the life of a philosophical enterprise worthy of acknowledgement and reflection. In 1956 Khrushchev made his famous speech denouncing the crimes of the Stalin era. For Marxist, and even more importantly for Marxist-Leninist, philosophy the speech was a call to renewed activity. From 1931 until 1956 Stalin had dominated Marxist interpretation. Wherever Marxism had been joined to power, it was a Stalinist version of Marxism, called Marxism-Leninism, that was adopted. Stalin, until 1956, was the unchallenged interpreter of Marx and Lenin in the Soviet Union, as well as in the so-called satellite countries. Just as the U.S.S.R. dominated the politics of the Eastern bloc and exercised undisputed political hegemony, so Stalinist Marxism-Leninism held philosophical hegemony. The official Soviet Marxism-Leninism was dogmatic, despite claims to the contrary. It was also pedestrian. Large, verbose volumes were based on Stalin's sparse philosophical writings. They did not command respect in philosophical circles outside of the countries in which Marxism-Leninism was the official doctrine. Often they commanded only little more respect in those countries.

Khrushchev's speech was a signal permitting some change in the philosophical dogma molded by Stalin. The change in some domains was swift in coming. Stalin's views of dialectics, for instance, were quickly and quietly dropped in favor of the formulations of Engels and Lenin. In the area of historical materialism change was less swift and radical, for the actions of the CPSU could not be repudiated, though the actions of Stalin against the Party were denounced.

Aside from the philosophers in various parts of the world who had followed the Stalinist party line and continued to take their philosophical lead from the CPSU, hardly any philosophers paid serious attention to Soviet and East European philosophy during the Stalinist period. Only a handful started studying this philosophy after 1956. Most did so on their own, and the names of Gustav Wetter and George Kline come to mind as two independent observers of this school of thought. Only one, J. M. Bocheński, broke through the conspiracy of silence surrounding this philosophy, and organized an intensive and large-scale study of Soviet and East European philosophy. The

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work he started was taken up by others through the force of his personality, the supportive ambiance he established for such study at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland, and the conviction he was able to transmit to beginning philosophers that this was an area worthy of study.

The period immediately following 1956 was a period in which Bocheński led the work necessary to document serious study of Soviet philosophy. Bibliographical tools were non-existent, and he produced or led the production of them. He made available to the non-Russian reader a summary of the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism as it emerged shortly after 1956. Most importantly he trained a generation of scholars who would devote themselves to documenting the twists and turns, the changes and subtle nuances in the development of Soviet philosophy. Himself a member of the first generation of Western philosophers to take Soviet philosophy seriously, he trained a second generation that filled in his broad view of the field. We now have volumes and articles being produced by a third generation of scholars trained in turn by those whom Bocheński trained.

The period after 1956 through the early 1960s was a period marked in the United States by the growth of an end-of-ideology view propounded by Daniel Bell and others. The view that Soviet philosophy was important and worth studying was a minority view, held by only a handful of people. With the advantage of hindsight we can see that the handful who maintained that ideology was important and by no means dead were correct, though their view was almost completely ignored twenty years ago.

One reason for the Western and especially the Anglo-American philosophers ignoring Soviet philosophy was the fact that since it was published in Russian, they could not read it. No one thought it sufficiently important to translate. The few items that had been translated from the Stalinist version of Marxism-Leninism were, moreover, ample evidence that one did not have to bother about what Soviet philosophers thought or said. The stolid line that Soviet philosophers pronounced at international meetings was final confirmation that Western philosophers had nothing to gain by spending time reading or listening to their Soviet counterparts. Those non-Soviets who followed the Soviet line were, if anything, worse.

The lack of ability in Russian prevented some budding Western philosophers from responding to Bocheński's call to man the philosophical barricades. Those who did answer the call in the sixties – among whom I include myself – and those who have come to form the third generation of scholars in the area of Soviet and East European philosophy have shared three qualities. The first is an infinite capacity for dullness and the ability to sustain

one's attention in the face of repetition, nonsense, distortion, prosaic style, and banality after banality. The capacity not to be bored by the boring is a virtue those of us in the field must have, for what we read is characteristically dull and stupefying. I was surprised on first visiting the Soviet Union to learn that many of the philosophers with whom I spoke in Kiev, in Kharkov, in Odessa, and even in Leningrad and Moscow did not know the Soviet literature on ethics as well as I did. In retrospect I understand, however, why they did not think it was necessary to read everything in order to keep up in the field. They knew that most of it was repetitious and not worth following.

The second quality someone specializing in Soviet philosophy must have is eternal optimism. For the only thing that really keeps us going is the excitement of the quest. Will I find something new and interesting in the next article or book I read on dialectics or on theory of knowledge or on ethics or aesthetics? Will I find some hint of a thinking mind behind the grey pages? Can I uncover some nuanced change of a stereotyped phrase which indicates a slightly new view? Without the hope and the antecedent belief, even in the face of overwhelming counterevidence, that we might find something new, we could not face the next article or book. Eternal optimism is essential.

The third quality we need is a large amount of indifference to the opinion of our philosophical colleagues who think we are wasting our time, doing something that is not quite intellectually respectable, something odd and arcane. In this time of tightening tenure, it takes a certain particular type of younger person to pursue Soviet philosophy.

The development of a non-Stalinist version of Marxist-Leninist philosophy was a slow, laborious process. The changes I noted in dialectical materialism were made quickly. But they were simply a return to an earlier, established position. The return indicated no new thought, no vigor or daring on the part of Soviet philosophers. Slowly, discussions emerged and by the mid-1960s there was a perceptible rift between the dialectical materialists and the historical materialists. Philosophical publication had multiplied, specialists had increased in number and were pursuing their chosen portions of the Marxist-Leninist system. But specialization had its drawbacks. For changes that take place in a system in one area have repercussions in others areas, if consistency is to be maintained. The rift, once perceived, was the subject of a number of conferences. The impetus toward specialization had led to the development of areas that once had been completely dominated by historical materialism. Ethics, aesthetics, and the beginning of a theory of value became subjects of monographs instead of sections of discussions

of histomat. Sociology as a subject of empirical investigation began to develop, as did several branches of social psychology.

The changes were noted and followed by the growing second generation of Western scholars of Soviet philosophy. Even more interesting than the development of Soviet philosophy, however, was the development of a variety of types of Marxism in countries in Eastern Europe. Though each of these countries had its core of philosophers who followed the Soviet line – with a delay of about six months – some independent figures and groups emerged. The most notable of the groups was the *Praxis* group in Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia had not followed the Soviet line politically, and had been freer than those countries that followed the Soviet political line. Yugoslav philosophers travelled to Western Europe, England and the United States. They studied in these countries, read the philosophical literature coming from there and started developing a humanistic form of Marxism. Their approach was inspired by the early works of Marx, ignored by the Soviet philosophers.

The flowering of these currents of Marxism added diversity to the study of Soviet and East European Marxism. The writings of some of the young Marxists were of interest in their own right, as well as of interest because of the replies they drew from Soviet philosophers. Soviet refutations of idealism and of the standard Western philosophical positions were of little interest. But their refutations of other Marxist positions forced Soviet philosophers to handle thinkers within their own framework and so forced them to face issues within their framework.

In Poland, attacks on Soviet Marxism-Leninism, especially of the Stalinist variety, were led after 1956 by Leszek Kołakowski. He too based his view on the early writings of Marx, looked to the theme of human liberation and attacked the dogmatism of the official line and its attempts to justify the most atrocious actions by their historical necessity.

In Czechoslovakia Karel Kosík emerged as an original thinker whose book *Dialectics of the Concrete* attempted to fuse Marx and Heidegger in the search for a social ontology. Ivan Sviták joined the movement of Socialism with a Human Face, the brave attempt by Dubček and others to form a new model of socialism.

In Hungary the followers of Lukács also discovered the humanistic aspect of Marx and attempted to develop it. By the late 1960s Marxism seemed alive and well in much of Eastern Europe.

In the West Herbert Marcuse, an early member of the Frankfurt School, and a vitriolic critic of bourgeois society and culture became the guru of the New Left. Marxist terminology was taken over by students in the United

States, Germany, France, and Italy, and Marxism became an ideology to be taken seriously. The attraction of Marxism in its original variety or in its Maoist interpretation filtered down into the world of academic respectability. Professors of philosophy who had long ignored Marxism in any of its varieties responded to student demand by bringing it into the classroom. Some student radicals of the late sixties went on to graduate school and either pursued their study of Marxism there or turned to a serious study of Marx once they began teaching. In any event the study of Marxism in American universities became somewhat fashionable in the early 1970s. The works of Petrovič, Markovič and Stojanovič from the Praxis group became available in English, as did the works of Lukács, his student and disciple, Agnes Heller, the book of Karel Kosík, and some works by Ivan Sviták, as well as collections of the writings of Kołakowski and Adam Schaff of Poland. Habermas drew attention to the rekindling of the Frankfurt School in Germany.

Throughout the period the scholars trained by Bocheński or by his students continued the work he had begun. By the mid-1970s they were no longer academic outcasts, even though they were not in the mainstream of the current of interest in Marxism beginning to flow through American universities and professional philosophical meetings. The main American trend went to Marxology, the study of the works of Marx. The analytic tools that many philosophers had learned in graduate school were turned on Marxist texts. Some tried to adapt Marxism to the present; but most treated the texts of Marx as they did those of Plato or Aristotle or other figures in the history of philosophy.

The original thrust of the Bocheński enterprise was on Soviet Marxism-Leninism because that was a live doctrine, and one joined with enormous military and state power. The Marxist variants in Eastern Europe were also notable because they too were joined with or flourished beside the source of power in the respective states. In all these countries the governments were Communist, Marxism or Marxism-Leninism was the official ideology, and philosophy was closely linked with the political scene. In the United States Marxism was not linked with power but was the base for a protest against power and its uses – a protest that was short-lived, that had as its support students rather than the workers or the intellectuals as a class, and that had little theoretical foundation.

The Soviet reaction to the study of its philosophy by Westerners from the fifties through the present has been two-sided. The official position has always been one of refutation of Western criticism, though privately Soviet philosophers have been pleased to have their work noticed in the West. In the

fifties and early sixties there were few enough Western critics that any article or book at all critical of Soviet philosophy was condemned as anti-Marxist, as the work of bourgeois idealists and defenders of the ruling class, and sometimes as falsifiers of Marxism. The names of J. M. Bocheński, Gustav Wetter and Sidney Hook came in as the trio of philosophers to be attacked routinely and at length in any book or article refuting Western philosophers.

As one read these broadside replies to and attacks on Western philosophy it became clear that many of them were borrowed from other Soviet authors. The number of Soviet philosophers who had actually read the works of Bocheński or Wetter or Hook in the early days after Stalin was very small. Similarly the number who had read any contemporary Western philosophy or who had read much in the history of Western thought was also very small. The books had not been available to Soviet philosophers or students during the Stalin years, and were not readily available, even to scholars, for a good number of years afterwards. Even today most Soviet philosophers do not have access to many of the standard works in the history of philosophy, much less to the writings of contemporary Western philosophers. Yet by the mid-1960s some Soviet philosophers were beginning to cite original writings by contemporary Westerners. Specialists developed who knew American philosophy, or contemporary analytic philosophy, or phenomenology and existentialism, or Thomistic philosophy, and who clearly had access to the works they cited. In the early 1960s there was still a paucity of information about philosophy in the United States, and very minor figures were cited together with major figures, such as Quine, as if they had equal importance. It took a while for the Soviet philosophers to learn who was important and who less important in the American literature, just as it took time for the Western specialists to learn who was important and who not among the Soviet philosophers. The task for both sides was complicated. It soon became evident that the Soviet spokesmen at international philosophical congresses were always the same and they always had more or less the same line. The more innovative Soviet philosophers were not allowed to attend the international meetings, even when invited by name, perhaps because they lacked seniority and perhaps because they were not sufficiently trusted. The Soviets, however, could not tell which Westerners were important by attendance at philosophical congresses because Americans appeared in great numbers and their faces from one meeting to the next were frequently different. If Soviet authors based their assessment on books they happened to get in the Soviet Union, there was no indication of the number of copies in which they were printed or any other extraneous information of that type. Nonetheless, by

the mid-1970s both sides had become sufficiently familiar with the workings of the other side for the specialists to know who was who, at least in general.

The Soviet philosophers officially refuted their Western critics. But they were not personally antagonistic to them. The critics served them in two ways. The first is the more obvious. Until philosophers like Bocheński started writing about their work, the articles and books of Soviet philosophers were almost totally ignored in the West. Bocheński started training a group that took the Soviet work seriously. No one likes to have his work criticized. But most authors prefer to have their work criticized rather than ignored. Soviet philosophers grew to know the names not only of Bocheński but also of his students, at least of those who wrote for *Studies in Soviet Thought* or who published in the *Sovietica* series. Oddly enough they came to treat these Western philosophers, as I can attest from my own experience, as colleagues – colleagues with whom they disagreed, of course, but colleagues nonetheless.

It was a number of years before I understood another function the Western critics of Soviet philosophy served for Soviet philosophers. The insight came in my own case as I puzzled over a reply in *Voprosy Filosofii* to a review article I had written in *Studies in Soviet Thought*. The reply was longer than my article. It made little sense to me that a Soviet philosopher should spend so much space replying in the major Russian language philosophical periodical to a review that had appeared in English and which only a handful of his audience could have seen. Furthermore, the reply was somewhat beside the point. My major criticism was sloughed off, while some minor points were answered at great length. The latter fact was what helped me to see what was really going on. The author in question had had his book reviewed in various Soviet periodicals and some of his Soviet reviewers had criticized him. From my point of view these criticisms were minor squabbles and though I raised some similar weaknesses, my major thrust was elsewhere. What I came to realize was that my review was simply a pretext for the Soviet author to answer his Soviet critics. The issues he developed were issues that I had mentioned but that his fellow Marxist-Leninists had raised as central. The fact that his work was reviewed by a Westerner increased his prestige, since he *ipso facto* had an international reputation because of my review, and it served as a vehicle for him to answer his Soviet critics indirectly. They would never read my review and so he need not worry that he failed to answer my major criticisms.

The excitement for those who followed Soviet and East European philosophy after 1956, however, was short-lived. The period of innovation lasted scarcely fifteen years. The year 1968 marked the high point and the

beginning of the end of originality in both Soviet and East European Marxism. The events in Paris in which the students were joined by the workers passed without serious effect. The young Marxists in Paris were replaced by the anti-Marxists who came to dominate the scene. Marcuse's influence lasted a few years but then dissipated as suddenly as it had risen to prominence. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia served as a signal that Marxist theory could develop only so far without provoking political power to prevent its further development. The Czech philosophers were the first to be silenced. Kosík was removed from his position at Charles University in Prague, given a job as a menial laborer, and not allowed to write. His manuscripts were confiscated and presumably destroyed. Ivan Sviták, who happened to be outside of Czechoslovakia when the Russian troops entered, chose not to return, sought refuge in the United States, and presently teaches philosophy at California State University, Chico, California.

In Poland the situation was not as dramatic. But Kołakowski was forced to leave, found his way first to Canada, then to the University of California at Berkeley, and finally to All Souls College, Oxford, where he has given up on Marxism. Adam Schaff, an intelligent defender of the orthodox position, was ousted from his position of power within the Party and teaches part time in Vienna while officially holding his position at the University of Warsaw. But he has not published any significant work since the mid-seventies.

In Hungary Lukács died. Not long after that, his followers were in one way or another silenced. Agnes Heller was forced to leave the country and sought refuge in Australia.

The situation in Yugoslavia has been equally tragic. The members of a group known as the Belgrade Eight – a group which includes Markovič and Stojanovič – were forced from their teaching positions at the University of Belgrade. Tito personally applied the pressure necessary to circumvent the laws guaranteeing the autonomy of the university. Accused of the old philosophical charge of corrupting the youth, the eight professors of philosophy and sociology were not allowed to teach or publish. They are allowed to travel abroad (where they can teach and publish) and have been maintained on the salaries they received when dismissed. The journal *Praxis* was suspended. Though members of the Praxis group who teach at the University of Zagreb have not lost their jobs, they too have been effectively silenced.

By the end of the quarter of a century with which we are concerned the flowering of Marxism in Eastern Europe had been crushed. The shining lights have all been darkened. Those of us who saw in the writings of these people a resurgence of Marxism have seen the hope they represented lost. The years

have tended to show that Marxism cannot survive as a freely developing system of thought within a Communist regime. The danger that free thought, even within the Marxist framework, poses to entrenched political parties is too great to be tolerated.

The story is the same, if less dramatic in the Soviet Union. There have been changes since 1956. The Soviet Marxist-Leninist position has been developed to some extent in the areas of ethics, theory of knowledge, philosophy of science, aesthetics, and logic. But the changes are comparatively minor. Those who study them still report hopeful signs – that some Soviet philosopher has read and understands Hegel, is familiar with the writings of Foucault or Althusser, knows the work of Quine and Rawls. Such news was notable twenty years ago. It is no longer noteworthy. The pity is that these major Western figures are not thoroughly known by large numbers of Soviet philosophers, just as large numbers of Western philosophers know the works of Marx and of some of the major Marxists. The fact that Soviet philosophers admit in print that they have serious philosophical problems yet to solve is refreshing. They did not do so twenty years ago. But there is little reason to hope that even the best of them will dare publish or be allowed to publish a strikingly original philosophical solution. There is no Soviet philosopher to whom one can point as we point to Heidegger, Sartre, Quine or Russell – nor even as we could point to a Maritain or a Gilson to take two figures identified with a school of philosophy. There are no Soviet philosophical giants or luminaries known for their original thought.

Soviet philosophy develops new positions gingerly, slowly, carefully, and usually not very fully. Caution is the watchword a quarter of a century after Stalin, just as it was during his reign. It is also ironical that some of the arguments raised against the development of physics in the early 1950s have now found their way back into Soviet discussions of genetic engineering and the new advances in biology. The lesson that philosophy should not dictate to science, a lesson that many Soviet philosophers and leaders had learned by 1956, seems on the way to being forgotten.

The third generation (as well as some of the second generation) scholars of Soviet philosophy are ably continuing the work begun by J. M. Bocheński a quarter of a century ago. Their work is important, even if the results of their investigations are negative. For one never knows when something new will emerge, when something important will be forthcoming, when something from which we can learn will come forth from Soviet and East European philosophers.

The past quarter-century of such studies has had its ups and downs. It is

to the credit of J. M. Bocheński that he had the vision to see the need for the study of this area, and that he had the prestige, energy and enthusiasm to enlist and train those who would join him in the endeavor and continue the work he began. If we seem to be in an infertile period of Soviet and East European Marxism, we might reflect on the fact that the works now published far surpass in quality those that appeared in the period prior to and immediately following 1956. With the optimism that those of us who engage in Soviet philosophical studies necessarily have, we must look forward to the field possibly becoming interesting once again at some time in the future. We can be consoled that at least the quality of what we read is unlikely to get worse.

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PART II

MARX-INTERPRETATION

KARL G. BALLESTREM

KARL MARX AND ADAM SMITH: CRITICAL REMARKS ABOUT THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

If we compare, with regard to method, Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* with Karl Marx's *Capital*, the decisive and also most obvious difference is this: while the former is an attempt to generalize from experience (as found in historical and statistical records, but also in conversations with Glasgow merchants) and to check those generalizations by trying to explain an ever wider range of empirical phenomena (according to the canons of Newtonian science), the latter is – as the subtitle indicates – a *Critique of Political Economy* which starts from the theoretical presuppositions of bourgeois economists in order to show how their categories and laws partly reveal and partly hide, but are essentially unable to explain, the reality of the capitalist economic system. For Smith, the reading of earlier and contemporary economic treatises served to clarify his own views, but he had no need of mercantilist or physiocratic ideas in order to explain his own theory. When rather late in his work (in Book IV) he discusses those ideas, it is only to show the superiority of his own system. Marx, on the contrary, carefully studied two hundred years of economic literature in order to discover the "anatomy of bourgeois society" and introduces as premises of his critical theory (at the beginning of Book I) what he takes to be the basic categories and principles of "classical political economy".

In view of the importance of classical political economy for Marx's understanding and critique of bourgeois society, it seems to be a question of particular relevance whether he was interested in the historical James Steuart or Adam Smith or David Ricardo, i.e., whether he intended to give a faithful interpretation of their ideas or whether he used their work selectively in order to arrive at a construct which could then be shown to be partial and self-contradictory. However, this question has not received much attention. Among Marxist scholars, the ideas of bourgeois economists are usually presented from the point of view of the Marxian critique and often in Marx's own words.[1] For the non-Marxist historians of economic thought, Marx is primarily an economist, not a critic of economic theories.[2] The Marxologists who understand the methodological structure of Marx's critical theory are usually neither inclined nor competent to argue against his interpretation of the bourgeois "classics".[3]

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This article is, of course, no attempt to challenge Marx's critique of political economy as a whole. I wish to compare in one instance what Marx says about bourgeois economic theories with what a careful study of these theories in their historical and systematic context reveals.[4] Since Marx considered Adam Smith, together with Ricardo, as the "classic" of political economy *par excellence*, the instance is a very important one. But even if I can show that his view of Smith is partial and unhistorical, I cannot presume that the same would be true about his views of Ricardo and others. And even if this were the case, it would not follow that his conclusions concerning the capitalist economic system would be wrong.

Although I am setting myself a limited task, the relevance of the kind of criticism I offer is nevertheless quite clear. To be able to show that Marx misread Smith or Ricardo has an entirely different critical weight than to show, say, that Smith misread the physiocrats. This can be appreciated from the following example. Let us presume that the bourgeois "classics" never meant to say that labour and the exchange of equivalents are the typical modes of appropriation and distribution in "civil societies". Now the main point of analysing value and exchange at the beginning of *Capital* is to show that labour and the exchange of equivalents (*Äquivalententausch*) "necessarily appear" as the typical principles of appropriation and distribution in capitalist (as against feudal) societies and that only by moving attention from the surface (the sphere of circulation) to the deep structure (the sphere of production of capital) can one understand the nature of surplus and profit. However, Marx gives no empirical evidence for his assumption that bourgeois society "necessarily appears" in this light to its members. His only evidence is that the "classics of political economy" said so. And this is the reason why the explanation of surplus and profits takes the form of a critique of political economy. Now if the "classics" meant to say something quite different, Marx's account of surplus and profit may still be correct (*ex falso sequitur quodlibet*), but his particular form of argument is no longer convincing.

The article is divided into two parts. The first discusses how far Marx understood the general outline of Smith's theory of society. The second deals with the question whether Marx does justice to Smith's theory of value and distribution.

1. ADAM SMITH'S THEORY OF SOCIETY

To the modern historian Adam Smith is, above all, one of the leading figures of the "Scottish Enlightenment".[5] Together with his friend David Hume he

belonged to that extraordinary group of scholars in whose works we can trace the transformation of thought about man and society from the traditional normative disciplines to the modern social sciences. The beginning of this transformation can be seen in Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature* (1739/1740), especially in its third book *Of Morals*, which contains a naturalistic interpretation of natural law and a criticism of the social contract. It becomes very obvious in Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759) which treats the problems of moral philosophy as objects of social psychology. Adam Ferguson's *Essay on the History of Civil Society* (1767) and John Millar's *Origin of the Distinction of Ranks* (1771) are early examples of empirical social studies generally considered as precursors of modern sociology. Adam Smith's *Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (1776) is the first empirical and scientific system of political economy.

It is a common characteristic of these authors (with the partial exception of David Hume) that they try to explain social phenomena in a historical context, more precisely within the framework of a "natural history of civil society". Historians of ideas have pointed to the similarities between the "natural history" approach of the Scottish Enlightenment and Marx's "materialistic conception of history". The first similarity can be seen in the conception of man as an active being striving to satisfy his ever increasing needs through labour. Secondly, the Scottish authors suppose that societies have a tendency to develop through definitive historical stages characterized by different modes of production and ownership (as hunters, shepherds, farmers, merchants). Thirdly, they try to explain social and political institutions by reference to modes of production and ownership. Adam Smith's friend, the historian William Robertson, expressed this principle in the following concise form: "In every inquiry concerning the operation of men when united together in society, the first object of attention should be their mode of subsistence. Accordingly as that varies, their laws and policies must be different."[6]

History is not generally considered by the Scots as progressive: progress in one domain is often paid for by calamities and conflicts in other domains. Thus, the general increase of productivity which follows on the private appropriation of land, the development of the division of labour and the introduction of commerce and manufacturing, goes hand in hand with an increasing misery of the working population, social conflicts and a degeneration of public morale. While Ferguson can see no solution to this dialectic of progress and decline and is therefore quite pessimistic in his estimation of modern societies, Smith and Millar believe they have discovered a tendency of history

to reduce relations of domination and to increase individual liberty. Adam Smith's "system of natural liberty" is the model of a future society in which the forces of the market tend to raise wages and lower prices and therefore to realize the interests of the large majority of the population.

Marx was in a position to interpret Smith within the context of 18th-century Scottish thought. He read not only Smith's *Wealth of Nations* and Hume's *Essays*, but also Ferguson's *Essay on the History of Civil Society* and Millar's *Origin of the Distinction of Ranks.*[7] His remark about Smith being a student of Ferguson, though wrong, shows some awareness of personal relations within the group ([2], 23, p. 383). From reading Marx, however, nobody could get the impression that Smith belonged to a Scottish school of thought. He is usually mentioned together with Ricardo, though historically one would not expect many similarities between the Glasgow professor of moral philosophy and the London stockbroker who wrote half a century later in a very different social and theoretical environment.

If Marx had only been a historian of economic thought, one might not expect him to take into account the general outline of Smith's theory of society and the historical context of the Scottish Enlightenment. Marx, however, treats bourgeois economic theories as ideologies, i.e., as systems of ideas which can be shown to embody the outlook and interest of the bourgeois class in a particular social and historical context. To show this, in the case of Smith, Marx not only interprets his views on profits and wages in a special way (cf. next section), but also makes remarks about his individualistic anthropology, the essentially unhistorical character of his theory and his function as a spokesman of the bourgeoisie toward the end of the 18th century. I will try to show that these remarks grossly misrepresent Adam Smith's theory of society.

At the beginning of the *Grundrisse* Marx states that Smith and Ricardo conceived of society in an atomistic and unhistorical way. According to Marx, they mistakenly assumed the modern individual, the result of a long historical development, to be natural man. When they write about the "individual and isolated hunter and fisherman", they follow the example of

> eighteenth-century prophets, in whose imaginations this eighteenth-century individual – the product on one side of the dissolution of the feudal forms of society, on the other side of the new forces of production developed since the sixteenth century – appears as an ideal, whose existence they project into the past. Not as a historic result but as history's point of departure. As the Natural Individual appropriate to their notion of human nature, not arising historically, but posited by nature. This illusion has been common to each new epoch to this day ([1], pp. 5f.; cf. also p. 74).

Unlike modern historians of ideas, Marx did not interpret Smith as a leading representative of the "natural history" approach. In the context of Marx's critique, Smith appears as a bourgeois economist, and it is supposed to be a characteristic feature of bourgeois economic thinking to imagine the mode of production of modern civil societies to be "eternally fixed by Nature for every state of society" ([2], 23, p. 95). As Marx writes in *The Poverty of Philosophy*: "The economists represent the bourgeois relations of production: division of labour, credit, money etc. as fixed, unchangeable, eternal categories. . . . [They] explain to us how one produces under these given conditions. What they don't explain is how these conditions were themselves produced, i.e., the historical movement that brings them to life" ([2], 4, p. 126). Among the "classics of political economy", only James Steuart is excluded from this charge: "Steuart avoided this simple-mindedness because as an aristocrat, and in antithesis to the eighteenth century, he had in some respects a more historical footing" ([1], p. 6). When Smith and Ricardo occasionally look at history, it is only to show the superiority of the bourgeois present over the feudal past. This – according to Marx – was "their mission" as "scientific representatives of the bourgeois class" ([2], 4, pp. 142f.).

Marx makes no attempt to show from the texts the ideological character of Smith's theory. Smith is rather subsumed under the general criticism that bourgeois economic thinking is unhistorical and apologetic. This charge, however, is differentiated: unlike later apologists, Smith and Ricardo are considered as "classics" because they "have the strength openly to describe the relations of production in their pure form" ([1], p. 917). Writing at a time when the class struggle between bourgeoisie and proletariat had not yet become obvious, they clearly articulate the problems of the capitalist system, even though their own theoretical assumptions do not seem to allow for these difficulties ([2], 23, pp. 19f.). They do not deny the extreme poverty of those who produce the wealth in bourgeois societies, but accept it fatalistically as a by-product of an essentially progressive system. "Misery is in their eyes only the pain that accompanies every birth, in nature as well as in industry" ([2], 4, p. 142).

The curious thing about Marx's criticism is that he must have known that Smith, far from sharing any illusions about the individualism of bourgeois societies being "eternally fixed by nature", was one of those who first explained (in the third book of the *Wealth of Nations*) how the modern individual emerged from the dissolution of feudal relations as a result of new forces of production which developed since the end of the Middle Ages. Marx must also have known that it is *not* "the individual and isolated hunter and

fisherman, with whom Smith and Ricardo begin" ([1], p. 5). The *Wealth of Nations* begins with an analysis of the modern division of labour and the comparative remarks about "savage nations of hunters and fishers" give not the least indication that Smith was thinking about isolated individuals. When he once uses the example of two hunters exchanging their booty "in that early and rude state of society which precedes both the accumulation of stock and the appropriation of land" ([3], I, 6, p. 65), he does not suggest that the forms of labour, property and exchange found in modern times are also present in primitive societies. On the contrary, the example serves to stress the difference between exchange in bourgeois societies (where there is usually a difference between worker and owner) and in more primitive societies (where those who do the work also own and occasionally exchange the product).

Marx's assertion that Smith and Ricardo had a fatalistic and apologetic attitude toward the misery of the working population has no foundation in Smith's works. Although the natural history approach is less openly normative than traditional natural law doctrine, Smith was critical of a society in which "the people who clothe the whole world are in rags themselves" ([4], p. 540), and left no doubt that policies intended to restrict the chances of labourers to earn higher wages were to his mind "an evident violation of natural liberty and justice" ([3], I, 10, p. 157). Statements like the following give a clear indication of his sympathies: "All for ourselves, and nothing for other people, seems, in every age of the world, to have been the vile maxim of the masters of mankind" ([3], III, 5, p. 418).[8]

It is, in fact, difficult to see in which sense Smith could be characterized as a "scientific representative of the bourgeois class". Despite what Marx says about Steuart being an aristocrat, the question of ideology has obviously little – if anything – to do with personal social background (otherwise Marx and Engels would be bourgeois ideologues *par excellence*). It is rather a question of sharing the outlook and defending the interests of a particular class. I have already shown that individualism and lack of historical consciousness, which Marx takes to be typical features of bourgeois economic thinking, are not to be found in Smith. It is even more obvious that Smith nowhere defends the particular interests of the bourgeoisie. In the *Wealth of Nations*, no group – not even the "unproductive" traditional élite – is criticized with such frequency and consistency as the "merchants and manufacturers": due to their small number and great financial means, their living in towns and near the centers of power, they are – according to Smith – in a position to interfere with the forces of the market and to influence politics in order

to serve their particular interests. They conspire to lower wages and raise prices; they support laws (like the laws of settlement and apprenticeship) that prevent competition; they introduce duties and taxes to preserve their advantages against international competitors; they influence foreign policy in the direction of colonial adventures and wars, thereby accepting enormous losses to the country for the sake of private advantages.

Smith's criticism of mercantilism must be seen in this general context. It is by no means only a criticism of a foreign economic policy based on wrong theoretical assumptions. It is essentially directed against a type of policy which is quite consistent and often successful from the point of view of the particular interest of the "merchants and master manufacturers", but which is detrimental to the labourer and the consumer, i.e., to the large majority of the population. Smith takes it for granted that no civil society could exist and prosper without this group whose many initiatives for the profitable employment of capital can play a productive role. But he warns that the particular interests of that group are fundamentally opposed to those of all the other orders of society. It can only play a consistently positive role if it has to follow the rules of a free market which it has, however, a tendency to defy.

> The proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce which comes from this order, ought always to be listened to with great precaution, and ought never to be adopted till after having been long and carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous, but with the most suspicious attention. It comes from an order of men whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the publick, who have generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the publick, and who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it ([3], Bk. I, Ch. 11, p. 267).

These remarks must suffice to show that by treating Smith as a "scientific representative of the bourgeois class" Marx misrepresents the general outline of Smith's theory of society. Instead of being unhistorical, this theory attempts to explain social phenomena within the context of a "natural history of civil society". Instead of simply accepting the misery of the workers, Smith pleads for an economic policy that would induce relatively high wages and low prices. Instead of defending the interests of the rich and powerful, Smith is openly critical not only of traditional élites, but also of the new bourgeoisie. It remains to be seen how this misrepresentation, which is due to the premises of Marx's critique of ideology, affects the content of his critique of political economy.

2. ADAM SMITH'S THEORY OF VALUE AND DISTRIBUTION

For those who have learned to read *Capital* through the perspective of the *Grundrisse*, Marx's method has lost some of its enigmatic character. His own methodological remarks in the works published during his lifetime offer little help. The program of the materialistic conception of history, as outlined in the famous preface of 1859 ([2], 13, pp. 7ff.), seems to have no direct application to the critique of political economy. Marx's appreciation of Hegel's dialectic and his intention to turn it "right side up again" are clearly stated in the afterword to the second German edition of the first volume of *Das Kapital* ([2], 23, p. 27). But his attempts to explain his materialistic dialectic by reference to physics and biology ([2], 23, pp. 12, 26) tend rather to obscure the methodological features of a critical social science.

We may interpret the *Preface* of 1859 – to take up one of Marx's own distinctions – as a general outline of his *method of inquiry* (which "guided his studies"). It is certainly not the model for his *method of presentation. Capital* does not start from an analysis of the modes of production preceding capitalism and of the developing forces of production which lead to capitalistic forms of ownership in order to derive the institutions and ideology of bourgeois society. Marx did not choose a genetic method of presentation. As most Marx-scholars are now agreed, the first chapter of *Capital* does not refer to historical instances of "simple commodity-producing societies". Even more obviously, the work does not try to explain the "superstructure" through an analysis of the "real foundation" of bourgeois society. On the contrary, as a "critique of political economy", it starts from an analysis of representative forms of bourgeois consciousness in order to show their necessary limitations and contradictions.

The *Grundrisse* abound with Hegelian categories and distinctions and many of them reappear, though in a less openly Hegelian manner, in *Capital*. Most important is the distinction between *essence* (*Wesen*) and *appearance* (*Schein, Erscheinung*). Without going into the difficult question as to how far Marx follows the example of Hegel's *Logic* in this regard,[9] I want to indicate in which sense this distinction is constitutive of his critique of political economy.

The task of science, as Marx conceives it, is to proceed from an analysis of phenomena as they immediately present themselves to consciousness, to their underlying essence, in order to explain the phenomena as "forms of appearance" (*Erscheinungsformen*) of their essence. "All science would be superfluous", says Marx, "if the form of appearance were to coincide

immediately with the essence of things" ([2], 25, p. 825). Science would take on a critical form in so far as it is able to explain not only that the phenomena, as they appear to common sense, are not true – a mere semblance (*blosser Schein*) of reality, forms of perverted consciousness (*verkehrtes Bewusstsein*); – but also that, due to the structure of reality, they must necessarily appear (*notwendiger Schein*) to the uncritical mind in this perverted form.

The critique of political economy starts from an analysis of phenomena which appear in the bourgeois mind as average forms of thought (*gang und gäbe Denkformen*; [2], 23, p. 564) and are articulated and systematized in the categories and laws of political economy. "The wealth of bourgeois society appears at first sight as an immense accumulation of commodities, the single commodity as its elementary existence" ([2], 13, p. 15). Thus the critique begins by analysing the category "commodity" (in terms of value, labour, money) and the "law of value" (commodities are exchanged according to their value – value being determined by the average necessary labour-time). It proceeds to show that the specific feature of a capitalistic economy, i.e., the production of capital, cannot be explained on the level of the "simple circulation of commodities" according to the law of value.

> Accompanied by Mr. Moneybags and by the possessor of labour-power, we therefore take leave for a time of this noisy sphere, where everything takes place on the surface and in view of all men, and follow them both into the hidden abode of production. . . . Here we shall see not only how capital produces, but how capital is produced. We shall at last discover the secret of the production of surplus ([2], 23, p. 189).

The theory of surplus value explains the essence of the capitalist economic system. From there, the critique can return to the surface in order to explain the phenomena of profit, wages and rent – first in general, later under the concrete conditions of time and competition. At the beginning of the third volume of *Capital*, we therefore find the following statement: "Thus the formations of capital, as we elaborate them in this book, gradually approach that form, in which they appear at the surface of society, in the interaction of different capitals as competition and in the common consciousness of the agents of production" ([2], 25, p. 33).

"Appearance" is a category of consciousness: something can only appear in the consciousness of a subject. When Marx sets out to analyse critically and finally to explain appearances at the surface of bourgeois society, he sometimes mentions "average forms of thought", "the common consciousness of the agents of production", or the opinions of the "free-trader

vulgaris" ([2], 23, p. 190). The specific object of his critique, however, is not the consciousness of the average bourgeois, but the ideas of the "scientific representatives of the bourgeois class", in particular of the "classics of political economy". In the section on wages (*Capital*, I, Ch. 17) Marx indicates the close relation between scientific economic theories and the consciousness of the average bourgeois:

> On the surface of bourgeois society the wage of the labourer appears as the price of labour. . . . Classical political economy borrowed from everyday life the category 'price of labour' without further criticism, and then simply asked the question, how is this price determined. . . . Classical political economy nearly touches the true relation of things, without, however, consciously formulating it. This it cannot so long as it sticks in its bourgeois skin ([2], 23, pp. 557, 559f., and 564).

To say that the specific object of Marx's critique are the categories and laws of capitalism as articulated by classical political economy seems to encounter the difficulty that it is only in the fourth volume of *Capital*, in the so-called *Theories of Surplus-Value*, that the theories of bourgeois economists are dealt with in any detail. The short discussions of their ideas, as found in the theoretical sections of *Capital* (usually in footnotes) could easily be eliminated without disturbing the arguments. It would, however, be a grave mistake to consider the *Theories of Surplus-Value* as a kind of historical afterthought without theoretical relevance. They were the first part of the entire work to be written ([2], 34, p. 235). It was here, in this extensive discussion of bourgeois economic theories (socialists and communists were explicitly excluded: [2], 26.1, p. 320), that Marx came to articulate fully his own theory of surplus.[10] He first planned to insert this "historical review" into the corresponding theoretical sections ([2], 26.1, pp. 389ff.). Only when it grew in size, did he decide to turn it into a separate volume which would be a "repetition in historical form" of the problems discussed and solved in the preceding volumes" ([2], 31, p. 132).

The subtitle of *Capital* does not refer to any particular section of the work. The whole from beginning to end is meant to be a 'Critique of Political Economy'. Between the first and the last volume there is only this difference, that the first achieves *in abstracto* – as a critique of the central categories and laws of bourgeois society as they appear in bourgeois consciousness – what the last attempts *in concreto* – as a critique of particular bourgeois theories. The object of the critique is in each case fundamentally the same: Marx supposes that these theories, in spite of differences and changes in perspective between the 17th and 19th centuries, repeat in various degrees

of depth and sophistication the general features of bourgeois consciousness (cf. [2], 32, p. 553).

As Marx stresses repeatedly in the *Grundrisse*, bourgeois societies – unlike the slave-owning societies of antiquity and the feudal societies of the Middle Ages – appear as a form of cooperation between free and equal owners of commodities. Nobody is forced to work for another, nobody gives without taking. Due to the division of labour, each can specialize in the production of a particular type of commodity and yet – through the exchange of equivalents – profit from the labour of other ([1], pp. 152–159). Whatever somebody possesses, must therefore either be the product of his own work or that of another who freely parted from it and received something equivalent for it.

> In circulation itself, the process of exchange, as it appears on the surface of bourgeois society, everybody gives by taking and takes by giving. To do one or the other he must *have*. . . . All modern economists have therefore declared one's own labour as the original title to property . . . and ownership of the result of one's own labour as the basic presupposition of bourgeois society (. . . see also A. Smith), ([1], p. 903).

But what about the inequality between rich and poor, what about the poverty of the working class within bourgeois society? What makes the 'classics' so interesting to the critique of political economy is that they – unlike later apologists – do not deny the facts of poverty and inequality, nor do they try to "explain" them through laziness and similar psychological or moral factors. They accept them as necessary consequences of bourgeois societies, yet want to maintain that appropriation through one's own labour and the exchange of equivalents are the constitutive principles of these societies. This involves them in contradictions: "all the classical economists down to Ricardo", says Marx ([1], p. 904), maintain that the principles which they themselves consider as constitutive of bourgeois societies were only realized in the early times before private property existed. When they try to explain the production and distribution of commodities within bourgeois societies, they vacillate between attempts to accommodate the facts to the "law of value" and intimations of force and fraud as the source of profit and rent.

According to Marx, the errors and contradictions of even the most perceptive bourgeois economists are understandable. There is no immediate way to discover the source of inequality and domination in a society in which social relations appear on the one hand as the result of contracts between legally free and equal individuals, and on the other hand as objective relations between products having a particular value ([2], 23, pp. 85–98). Only by

understanding the function of money in a society based on the division of labour and the exchange of commodities; only by grasping the necessary transformation of money into capital; only by examining the peculiar use made of the commodity "labour-power" in the process of production is it possible to explain how in a system apparently based on the exchange of equivalents social wealth is increased and divided unequally.

> This exchange of equivalents . . . is only the surface layer of a production which relies on the appropriation of another's labour *without exchange* but *seemingly by exchange*. This system of exchange is based on *capital* as its foundation and when it is considered apart from it, as it shows itself at the surface, as an *independent* system, it is pure semblance, but necessary semblance (*notwendiger Schein*). Therefore it is now no longer astonishing that the system of exchange values . . . shows as its hidden background *appropriation of another's labour without exchange*, total separation of labour and property ([1], p. 409; cf. also [2], 23, pp. 161–191, esp. pp. 189–191).

To understand what Marx says about Adam Smith's theory of value and distribution, it is necessary to keep in mind this general outline of the critique of political economy. For in his eyes Smith offers a particular example of the insights and errors of classical political economy. Smith is credited for being the first to articulate clearly some of the basic features of an economic system based on the division of labour and the production of commodities. Smith distinguished not only between use-value and exchange-value; he also saw that it is not any particular form of labour, but labour in general, "abstract labour", which constitutes the value of commodities ([2], 26.1, p. 56). Only on the basis of this insight ("an immense step forward" ([1], p. 24) was it possible to arrive at the general law of value. And Marx tries to show that Smith usually supposed this law to be at work in commodity-producing societies ([2], 26.1, p. 42). Yet, on the other hand, Smith was ambiguous in his analysis of value ([1], pp. 504ff.) and found it impossible to believe that an exchange of equivalents took place between capitalist and labourer. He therefore denied that the general law of value ruled in capitalist societies ("the general law is immediately abolished", [2], 26.1, p. 43) and suggested its field of application in primitive societies or "pre-Adamite" times ([2], 13, pp. 44f.).

According to Marx, the basic contradiction in Smith's theory of value and distribution consists in supposing that the general law of value which he implicitly takes to be constitutive of bourgeois societies as commodity-producing societies does not rule the cooperative relation which is the essential source of wealth in those societies.

It is the great merit of Adam Smith that he . . . feels that there is a rupture at this point [in the relation between capital and labour], that . . . the law [of value] is practically abolished in its result . . . and is actually puzzled how with the accumulation of capital the law of value is reversed into its opposite. It is just as much his theoretical strength that he feels and stresses this contradiction, as it is his theoretical weakness, that it makes him doubt the general law, even for the simple exchange of commodities; that he does not understand how this contradiction occurs through labour-power itself becoming a commodity and that the use-value of this specific commodity – which has nothing to do with its exchange value – is itself the energy creating exchange-value ([2], 26.1, p. 59).

In the following remarks, I do not intend to show that Adam Smith's theory of value and distribution is without fault or ambiguities. I think, on the contrary, that Marx is right when he points to ambiguities in Smith's concept of value and when he accuses him of mixing up problems of value and of distribution. I think, however, that Marx is wrong when he interprets Smith's difficulties as the result of a basic contradiction, i.e., of maintaining that relations in bourgeois societies on the one hand *follow*, on the other hand *do not follow* the law of value; or – in other words – of suggesting both that appropriation in bourgeois societies is a function of one's own labour and the exchange of equivalents, but also a result of force and fraud. For Smith never thought that the law of value is constitutive of bourgeois or – in his terminology – "civil societies", nor did he ever suggest that the distribution of wealth among the three great "orders" or "classes" of society (landlords, owners of stock, labourers) had anything to do with the exchange of equivalents. Smith's theory of distribution in civil societies has much to do with the economic analysis of power and almost nothing to do with the fiction of free and equal owners of commodities. Smith is therefore a very poor authority on whom to rely for the view that bourgeois society appears at its surface as a "very Eden of the innate rights of man" ([2], 23, p. 189). For in his mind there was no need to go beyond appearances to understand the obvious: a society in which wealth was divided unequally according to principles that had little to do with voluntary agreements or the amount of labour contributed by each. To show this, I will summarize some aspects of his theory of value and distribution.

The basic reason why all societies have a tendency to introduce the division of labour and the exchange of commodities must be seen in the fact that in this way men can derive advantages from the work of others and achieve with less effort a greater satisfaction of needs. This is also the reason why Smith defines the exchange-value of a commodity as the quantity of *another's labour* which it allows the owner "to purchase or command" ([3], I,

5, p. 47). It would, of course, be possible to define the exchange-value of a commodity with reference to the quantity of any other commodity (e.g., gold). But since the value of all commodities changes – including the value (=price) of wage-labour – the only stable point of reference seems to be the effort spared or the utility gained by being able to command so much of another's labour-time (*ibid.*, p. 51).

Why does a particular commodity have a particular exchange-value? Why does it allow its owner to purchase or command a certain amount of another's labour-time (whether directly, as hired service or wage-labour; or indirectly, as the time required to produce a desired commodity)? One possible answer – Marx's answer – would be: because this commodity itself embodies (requires to be produced) the same amount of labour-time as it commands. But this is not what Smith says. To his mind, the labour embodied in a commodity would only be equal to the labour commanded by that commodity if those who worked also owned their means of production, i.e., historically speaking, before "the appropriation of land and the accumulation of stock". Only if we suppose hypothetically, that this "original state of things" had continued, can we imagine a society in which "the whole produce of labour belongs to the labourer" and in which "the commodities produced by equal quantities of labour would naturally ... be exchanged for one another" ([3], I, 8, p. 82). But if, as is always the case in civil societies, land has become private property and the means of production are in the hands of the owners of stock, the landlord and capitalist demand a share of the product and the price of commodities must increase. In other words: if commodities are sold not only with the purpose of giving a revenue to the worker, but also to pay profit and rent, the owner of commodities must purchase or command more labour than his commodities embody.

As Marx points out, this view implies a confusion between problems of value and of distribution: (1) whether a commodity, when sold, can command more labour than it embodies; (2) whether the labourer receives the whole produce or has to share it with the landlord (rent) and the owner of stock (profit). "The distribution or appropriation of value is indeed no source of value;... If there were no such appropriation and the worker received as wages the whole produce of his work, the value of the commodities produced would remain the same, though it would not be shared with landlord and capitalist" ([2], 26.1, p. 65). In addition, Marx thinks that the idea of explaining profits by selling at a price above value or cheating is inherently naive. This idea may serve to explain particular profits, but if all the owners of commodities were regularly to cheat each other, nobody could make any

profit in this way. According to Marx, Smith was wrong when he tried to explain profits by analysing the exchange or circulation of commodities, but he was right – and anticipated his own theory of surplus – when he described profit as a deduction from the value produced by the worker ([2], 26.1, pp. 50f.).

Though Smith was confused, the reason for his confusion is understandable: he wanted to maintain that profits had *two* causes – on the one hand that the owners of capital could demand a share of the product, on the other hand that they could influence the market. Or in other words: that profits were *both* a function of wages and of prices. And there is no reason to believe that he was wrong in that regard.

"In that original state of things which precedes both the appropriation of land and the accumulation of stock, the whole produce of labour belongs to the labourer. He has neither landlord nor master to share with him" ([3], I, 8, p. 82). In civil societies, the fruits of labour must be divided because the labourer no longer owns the means of production. Landlord and capitalist only invest in production if they can expect to share in the produce. What part of the whole they can demand does not depend on whether or not they contribute any economically relevant sort of labour, even less on the amount of such labour. Profits "bear no proportion to the quantity, the hardship, or the ingenuity of this supposed labour of inspection and direction" ([3], I, 6, p. 66). This is even more obvious in the case of rent: "As soon as the land of any country has all become private property, the landlords, like all other men, love to reap where they never sowed, and demand a rent even for its natural produce" ([3], I, 6, p. 67).

Profits and wages tend to be in inverse proportion: high profits are usually due to low wages, and vice versa. "High wages of labour and high profits of stock ... are things ... which scarce ever got together ..." ([3], I, 9, p. 109). The exact amount of each depends on the terms of a contract whose parties have opposite interests (one's gain is the loss of the other) and unequal power: masters being fewer in number, more self-relying and more influential in politics, must win over the workmen. They see to it that the law prohibits the combination of workmen, while they themselves "are always in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform combination, not to raise the wages of labour above their actual rate" ([3], I, 8, p. 84).

That wages are ever raised above the minimum required to reproduce the working population, is due to the forces of the market. When the owners of stock rush into what looks like a profitable business, more and more capital is invested, but mutual competition tends to raise wages, lower prices and

diminish profits ([3], I, 9, p. 105). Though the owners expect profits in proportion to their investments, a dynamic and competitive system usually tends to frustrate their expectations. A prospering and expanding economy is, therefore, in the interest of the large majority of the population (labourers and consumers), but not in the interest of the "merchants and master manufacturers" ([3], I, 11, p. 266). This is the reason why this group tries by all means to avoid competition and distort the natural functioning of the market: "People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices" ([3], I, 10, p. 145).

The restrictive policies of the owners of stock do not, of course, depend on such casual occasions. As was mentioned above, their interests find expression in laws and policies – like laws of apprenticeship ([3], I, 10, pp. 135ff.), laws of settlement ([3], I, 10, pp. 151ff.), measures favouring the inhabitants of towns in their dealings with those who live in the country ([3], I, 10, pp. 141ff.; III, 1, pp. 376ff.), manipulations of foreign trade ([3], IV, 2, pp. 452ff.), colonial adventures and wars ([3], IV, 7, pp. 556ff.) – which Smith considered as extremely pernicious to the national economy because they have a tendency to eliminate competition and raise prices as well as profits "above their proper level" ([3], I, 10, p. 132).

So much to indicate why Smith thought that profits were not only a function of wages but also of prices. The "system of natural liberty" which Smith advocates in contrast to the "mercantile system" no longer serves the particular interests of the "merchants and master manufacturers": "every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with those of any other man, or order of men" ([3], IV, 9, p. 687). Smith does not suggest that this system would allow everyone to appropriate goods only by means of his own labour or the exchange of equivalents. The owners of land and capital would still share in the produce, not because of any labour of their own but because they have the power to demand it. Profit would still be a function of wages – but virtually no longer of prices. Prices would tend to be low and wages relatively high. Thus, the "system of natural liberty" is justified on utilitarian grounds: it should serve the best interest of the great majority of the population ([3], IV, 7, p. 630).

I started by raising the question whether Marx gives a faithful interpretation of the classics of political economy. It should now be clear that Marx's view of Adam Smith is not the result of any careful analysis of Smith's ideas in their historical setting and systematic context. Marx takes Smith to be a

"scientific representative of the bourgeois class" whose theory is essentially unhistorical and apologetic, although – as was shown – the historical and critical character of Smith's work is fairly obvious. In spite of what Marx says, Smith was not deceived by any appearances of justice in civil societies. His theory, though ambiguous and confused in some respects, does not contain the basic contradiction that Marx suggests.

Marx's account of Adam Smith is, to a large extent, a construct required by the method and premises of the critique of political economy. "In the tender annals of political economy, the idyllic reigns from time immemorial. Right and 'labour' were from all time the sole means of enrichment . . ." ([2], 23, p. 742). Such statements totally miss the realism of Smith's political economy. But they may appear as an appropriate premise for a theory of capitalism which pretends to be, at the same time, a critique of bourgeois consciousness.

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NOTES

[1] e.g., Jürgen Kuczynski, *Geschichte der Lage der Arbeiter unter dem Kapitalismus*, vol. 26, East Berlin, 1965. A. V. Anikin, *Junost' nauki*, Moskva, 1971.

[2] e.g., Robert, L. Heilbronner, *The Worldly Philosophers*, third ed., New York, 1969, pp. 140ff. Mark Blaug, *Economic Theory in Retrospect*, Homewood, 1962. German ed.: München, 1972, vol. 2, pp. 145ff.

[3] Ronald Meek, who has made important contributions both to Smith- and to Marx-scholarship, would be a competent judge. But he does not seem to appreciate fully the *critical* aspect of Marx's theory. In his article on 'Marx's Economic Method' (in his *Economics and Ideology*, London, 1967, pp. 93–112), he follows Engels' simplified account of Marx's method and thus largely misses the decisive point: that *Capital* is not a historical explanation of the rise and fall of the capitalist economy, but a *Critique of Political Economy*, i.e., a critique of bourgeois consciousness as embodied in the categories and laws of the bourgeois classics.

[4] This article must be seen against the background of my recent work on the Scottish Enlightenment: Karl G. Ballestrem, *Die schottische Aufklärung*, München (Oldenbourg), forthcoming.

[5] e.g., Andrew Skinner, 'Economics and History: The Scottish Enlightenment', in *Scottish Journal of Political Economy* 12, 1965. H. R. Trevor-Roper, 'The Scottish Enlightenment', in *Studies on Voltaire and the 18th Century*, vol. 58, Geneva, 1967, pp. 1635ff.

[6] William Robertson, *Collected Works*, ed. Dugald Stewart, 1809, vol. 5, p. 111. For a short and excellent account of the Scottish conception of history, cf. Andrew Skinner's introduction to the Penguin ed. of the *Wealth of Nations*, 1970, p. 29–43.

[7] Cf. Ronald Meek, 'The Scottish Contribution to Marxist Sociology', in *Economics and Ideology*, London, 1967, pp. 34–50, esp. p. 48.
[8] For a more detailed account of the attitude of the "bourgeois classics" toward the workers, cf. A. W. Coats (ed.), *The Classical Economists and Economic Policy*, London, 1971.
[9] One who thinks that Marx followed Hegel's *Logic* closely in this regard, is Hans-Jürgen Krahl in 'Bemerkungen zum Verhältnis von Kapital and Hegelscher Wesenslogik', in Oskar Negt (ed.), *Aktualität und Folgen der Philosophie Hegels*, Frankfurt (Suhrkamp), 1970, pp. 137–150.
[10] For a detailed and generally convincing account of the development of Marx's theory of surplus, cf. V. S. Vygodskij: *Istorija odnogo velikogo otkrytija Karla Marksa*, Moskva, 1965. German ed.: East Berlin, 1967, esp. ch. 5. The unity of the theoretical and historical parts of *Capital* is discussed and defended in ch. 8.

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[3] Smith, Adam: 1976, *Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (Clarendon Press, Oxford).
[4] Smith, Adam: 1978, *Lectures in Jurisprudence* (Clarendon Press, Oxford).

HELMUT FLEISCHER

MARXISM AS HISTORY – A THEORY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

There is some hope that we are approaching a time when the discussions of the intellectual heritage of Karl Marx will no longer be conducted predominantly in terms of the acceptance or rejection of his teachings (especially as a whole), but will rather be imbued with a spirit of historical insight. Not only can many sanctuaries of Marx-worship still be found all over the world, but even new and quite novel sanctuaries are in the process of cropping up. On the other hand, one is still beset with the never-ending trial in which judgement is passed on the pathological effects and the confusion which Karl Marx brought into our world. It is not to be expected that this trend will suddenly come to an end. But a shift in the assessment may well be in the making.

For all too long, minds have been at odds about the ideas of Marx and their impact. In brief, there has been much division on the pros and cons of Marx and Marxism. It is quite possible that in the future these divisions will increase. There may still be those who will continue to be obsessed by the ideological complex of the pros and cons of Marx; but there will also be others, i.e., those who will have to some extent digested the meanings and repercussions of Marx's teachings and will thereby have come to a point of historical understanding, similar to the way in which Luther is viewed and assessed in Catholic historiography today. It is in this context that the Austrian historian H. Lutz has drawn attention to an important general feature: As is well known to any person versed in historiographical developments, we are still under the spell of approaches that are predominantly conceived in terms of the history of ideas. A long overdue goal is to devise a method that is able to show the change of historiographical conceptions as part of the ever-changing totality of the conditions and forms of human life.[1] As Lutz furthermore points out, there is general uncertainty about a method of historical research that would go beyond a mere history of ideas, by taking into account the sum total of historically relevant facts and interconnections, especially in the case of historical phenomena of an ecclesiastic type.[2] The historical phenomena of Marxism are precisely of this type.

The alternative which is beginning to evolve might be described as follows: Marx and Marxism are, as it were, on trial in the world arena in terms of a

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certain pattern of historical causality. First of all, there is an original historical perpetrator, who set in motion a chain reaction of subsequent actions and responses, the essential – and mainly normative – meaning of which is allegedly to be found in an aggregate of thoughts and ideas which in their turn provide a relevant guide for action. Even if this aggregate of ideas reflects a high degree of confusion and complexity and even if many contradictory elements are incorporated (including some which are very seductive, fascinating and humanely attractive in their appeal) nevertheless – so the story runs – in view of the bad effects in subsequent history, one has to search out unrelentingly the inner and often hidden conceptual points of departure from which the eventual pernicious effects necessarily followed. A recent examination of this type is to be found in a small treatise by K. Hornung, a political scientist, who traces the phenomenon of Marx and the consequences back to what he calls a "fascination error".[3]

Another approach consists of an attempt at a historical *Begreifen der Praxis* and its intellectual manifestations. Here the task is to comprehend Marx and the different forms of Marxism as acting within the moving currents and maelstroms of their times as well as our own. To do this first of all, one has to start, apart from the proclamation of great ideas, with fairly empirical concepts concerning the general and specific motivations behind the actions as well as behind the response behaviour in a given situation. Here, one has to take into consideration that most actions are essentially responses to situations that were brought about by history. Thus every actor appears as a link within a widely ramified chain of impulses from a social field. The reactions and initiatives always derive their origin from practical and existential problems. They refer to the framework of the opportunities, the difficulties, and the constraints to live and to act within the latitude given to each individual actor. The type of reaction or initiative that takes place here involves the vital interests and the 'qualifications' acquired from the social and the cultural heritage as well as in individual lives, i.e., everything that today is called 'social competence of interaction'.

Furthermore, it is highly improbable that these fields of social forces will produce men of monolithic character. As a rule, one would instead expect ambivalent and syncretic personalities with their facets changing according to the given context. A similar approach holds true for the intellectual side of man. Instead of using the model of psychophysical causation (or the interaction model) one has to use as a point of departure a concept of identity, in which the intellectual factors are not considered as the generative element but are rather – put in Hegelian terms – regarded as a *Moment*, i.e., as a

symbolic representation of the qualifications of the subject acting in his particular situation. In the social communication of the intentions of the individuals symbolized in thoughts and in words, the same word may be transferred but the meaning may well be different. Even if the thought remains basically the same, one has to consider the very context into which it is integrated by the receiver, the elements with which it is associated, and the liability it acquires within a new association. An exhaustive reception of the sum total of the thoughts of Marx is probably impossible. Any reception will necessarily be selective and partial and will depend on the practical and existential abilities of the receiver. This model of understanding lacks the clear linearity, uniformity, and transparency of the aforesaid one. Hence it must be admitted that it is much more arduous to find one's way when applying this approach.

The following remarks in this article do not endeavor to give a program to be carried out, but rather intend to give the résumé of several interpretative expositions the author has already published.[4] For this reason the following text consists of a sequence of theses. The main thesis is that from the writings of Marx one cannot construct such a thing as an essential unified 'Marxism', and that the ideas of Marx did not 'make history', but rather have been dragged as amputated parts into histories of many kinds which were in their turn formed by different contexts. On closer inspection it turns out that the focal point of Marx's thinking is not a doctrine ('guide for action'); it is rather a theory about 'real movement' which is independent of any intellectual prescriptions. There is no such thing as 'Marxism' as an authentic systematization of the definitive thoughts of Karl Marx, and there can be no such thing. There is only a sequence of necessarily partial selections from utilizations of the ideas of Marx according to the needs of highly different situations. That the continuation of Marx's thinking has taken the shape of 'Marxism' is not a mark of strength, but rather reveals a notorious weakness of the intellectual consequences emanating from Marx.

I. THE CASE OF MARX: HUMAN, ALL TOO HUMAN

As has already been observed quite appropriately by his biographer, F. Mehring, Marx was not the "boring model schoolboy which some of the high priests (*Marxpfaffen*) make him out to be".[5] He was an extremely talented, unsettled and difficult person, far more disposed to intellectual autarky than to solidarity and co-operation with others. This, however, should not lead us to use a kind of (medical) case-history approach as the decisive key to the

understanding of his personality. Behind the human, all too human and the individual, all too individual in Marx – as, for example, his mannerism of literary style and his ability to promote his own cause – one can recognize a type of personality that belongs to a well-respected 19th-century stratum of society and which can still be encountered even among the present followers of Marx.

Marx stands in the tradition of the educated part of the modern bourgeois class, and he himself represents a milestone in the evolution of the characteristic consciousness of this stratum. For him, as was the case for Descartes, Hobbes, Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, philosophy is politics within the sphere of intellectual, aesthetic, and communicative cultures. Since the cultivation of reason was not restricted to the realm of ideas but rather formed an integral part of the way of life of this class, it produced the basis for contesting and criticizing a state of society shaped by power and domination, suppression and warfare. During the Napoleonic era – which for a time thoroughly and brutally frustrated intellectual hopes for a cosmopolitan, republican community of all men – the political aspirations of the 'idealists of reason' had suffered a severe setback.

Marx appeared at a time when after several decades of restoration a critical and alarmed opposition again formed and generated an independent, self-reliant public opinion that was to oppose 'official society'. It was at this time that the constellation of social classes was changing as a result of industrialization. With a large bourgeois capitalist class and the wage-earning proletariat, new factors of hitherto unknown dimensions entered into the calculus of progress. Marx was one of the first who vehemently reacted against the very fact of the formation of the new class of *haute bourgeoisie*. Being himself a journalist, he stubbornly insisted on his autonomy; and he felt that the guiding principle of the freedom of press was that it should be run independent of business interests (*Rheinische Zeitung*, 15 Dec., 1842).[6] He took this as a paradigmatic protest against a way of life dependent on wages, and he soon extended this principle of independence by insisting that this type of existence represented a totally intolerable situation for intellectual, human beings.

The real wage earners *par excellence*, the factory proletariat, became more visible somewhat later on, and it was from them that one could expect to obtain the most active support and broadest mass basis in the struggle against human enslavement and humiliation. The case of Marx represents a bold and desperate attempt of a man of bourgeois origins and education with extremely high standards and aspirations for individually autonomous and yet

socially relevant self-fulfillment, to establish a social framework with new class combinations in which these goals could be achieved. This attempt resulted in a fluctuating course of events. There were phases of intensive activity in the spirit of storm and stress, marked by soaring expectations, which alternated with and were finally replaced by phases of stoical resignation to the protracted and tedious character of historical processes. That Marx was capable of being highly intolerant and arrogant towards both fellow travelers and adversaries is well-documented. This notwithstanding, one can hardly say that he treated the social movement with which he was associated with the same imperious demeanor. He did not to any significant degree give any directives; nor did he prescribe programmatic goals or rituals of organization and action; nor, above all, did he attempt to school the working-class movement in his own teachings.

On closer inspection doubts may arise as to whether it is possible at all to label the 'practical part' of Marx's production of ideas as constituting a doctrine in the strict sense of the word. Even a text so inflammatory and agitational as the *Communist Manifesto* makes it evident that a combination of catechism and 'guide for action' did not fit into his way of thinking. The result – the *Communist Manifesto* – was a historical sketch, partially retrospective and partially prospective. Furthermore, it would be inadequate to identify Marx by what he 'demanded' or by what he 'preached'. He neither clamored for a society without classes nor did he preach class-struggle as such. Whereas Nietzsche chastised previous modern philosophers for having preached too much and dissected and analyzed too little, one could say almost exactly the opposite about Marx. As to predictions of the future, Marx was cautious. He regarded his declarations about any presumable course of history and the general results of the working-class emancipation movements as "expressions of relationships of real and actual class struggle, of a historical movement that is taking place before our very eyes".[7] Marx assumed as a theoretical premise and at the same time as a practical, almost businesslike rule of the game, that the working-class movement contained within itself its own sufficient conditions, its own motivations, and its own sense of direction as well as its own energetic impulse and intellectual capacity. He took it for granted that this movement would constantly be strengthened by its own practical experience and was therefore not in need of any special guidance. The movement was not in need of encouragement concerning its own affairs, but rather was in need of far-reaching and penetrating knowledge of its immediate social environment, of what surrounded it and what opposed it. It is not by accident that Marx concentrated all his intellectual energy on

dissecting the mechanisms of what actually existed. Marx followed the (slow) progress of the revolutionary movement with a more and more stoical stance rather than with the restlessness of the agitator. He had a good eye for what was in the realm of the possible and hence recognized that the time necessary for the movement would exceed his own life-span. He was realistic enough not to have had any aspirations to be the victorious prophet.

The only thing which hampers a balanced evaluation of Marx's 'teachings' or 'theories' is Marxism itself, the exact opposite of which is anti-Marxism. I have already made an allusion to the tremendous exaggeration in Marxism of the importance of his person. This can be seen as a sign of weakness emanating from those who are continuing his work. All of this may be due to the fact that Marx's intellectual capacities were far beyond the mental reach of his followers. This is true not only for the socialist workers but also for their functionaries and for socialist intellectuals. His intellectual strength is not only in evidence in the analytic *tour de force* of *Capital* but also in his whole way of thinking which has become popular in many dubious variations under the somewhat misleading heading of the 'materialist conception of history' (later called 'historical materialism'). The most important and the least illuminated aspect of the latter doctrine seems to me to consist of a type of reflexive understanding of one's own participation in societal and historical practice.[8] Yet, one should not accuse his followers of being guilty of a new form of original sin just because they were not able to master Marx's method of *Begreifen der Praxis*, and that they rather fell back precisely into the 'ideological' way of thinking which had been so vigorously combatted by Marx himself. One should instead try to understand this phenomenon in terms of Marx's own thinking, namely as resulting from the ensemble of the 'relationships of forces' acting within the social movement as well as from the interplay between this movement and its social environment.

II. FROM MARX TO MARXISM

Marxism came into being because the historical formation of the socialist labor movement had by its whole social essence not attained the strength, breadth and historical impetus that Marx had expected of it. Its 'higher destiny' did not express itself as a real self-reliant force, but rather as a *spiritus rector*, namely as 'Marxism' transformed into a *Weltanschauung* that had to assume the compensatory function of ideology. Marxism consists essentially in a definitive fixation and a positive canonization of what used to be open-ended hypothetical expectations about the evolution and the development of

the proletarian movement. All this was now transformed into a set of normative 'principles' and a binding directive within the context of a teleological system of means and ends.

This change of the theory into a doctrine took place within a situation subject to ever-increasing pressure. The forces that were opposed to the workingmen's emancipation movement were and remained clearly superior to this movement, especially after the formation of mass and parliamentarily successful political parties. It is not just a case that the movement of workers was simply by-passed by virtue of superior 'internal capitalistic' problem-solving methods, although this was to some degree the case. Far more important was the fact that official society as represented in government, business and industry was able to absorb and to integrate socially the main societal energies, which in turn spurred industrial development on towards imperial expansion and finally produced conflicts which in turn provoked an arms race and led to the explosion of both World Wars. To understand Marxism in history one has to take into consideration all the aforementioned elements which constitute the real world as it is. It is this history with its overwhelming production of conflicts which continued beyond the First World War and, above all, produced the crisis of the fascist system with the ensuing revival of the World War. This World War virtually proved to be an insurmountable historical barrier for the older Marxist workers emancipation movements. Original Marxism ended here; it was now that the era of mixed Marxism began.

III. ON THE MARXISM OF THE INTELLECTUALS

As already mentioned, the realm of Marx's thought fits into a history of the formation and association of a faction of intellectuals who had objected to being integrated into a society according to the functional requirements of power, property, acquisitiveness, profit, and competition. These intellectuals made demands that collided with the tenets of the existing society: they unrelentingly strove for personal autonomy; they abhorred naked power and acquisitiveness; they had qualms about the system of competition and about the misery of the poor. It was hard to reconcile these experiences with the positive values manifested in the way of life of the educated strata of society. The turn of the socialist intellectuals towards the working people is not to be explained in terms of strategic and instrumental goals; rather they were motivated by quite positive affinities. One has to take into account that intellectuals opposing bourgeois society found themselves at a disadvantage,

insofar as their own social power was so minimal that they were in sore need of some stronger partner.

But after Marx, the situation of the well-educated bourgeois comrade-in-arms of the working class movements became ever more precarious – within as well as outside of the movements. Within the socialist movement they remained a small minority with very limited power and influence; they lost the little influence they had to socialist functionaries, a group that began to assert its dominance at this time. The adding of these newcomers with their limited education gave rise to various kinds of problem. Above all, there was a radical change in the outer constellation. Marx's attempt to liberate himself from the 'Philistine world' in order to achieve the realm of highest human freedoms could still be regarded as an act of Promethean boldness. But the intellectuals who at the beginning of the 20th century had followed in Marx's footsteps into a radical opposition were mainly disturbed and alarmed by feelings of anxiety and fear. Especially with the assassination of J. Jaures, R. Luxemburg, and K. Liebknecht a state of emergency set in. For a whole generation of Marxist intellectuals, the protest against the mass butchery of war and against the upcoming fascist movements was to become a focal point of their commitment. As a consequence of the obvious weaknesses of the workers' movement, at the end of the First World War there was a split into different (intellectual) Marxisms. On the one side there was the formation of Marxism as 'critique', which no longer believed in the historical dynamics of the working class. There was Marxism as an attitude of 'hope' (*Prinzip Hoffnung*) – and not just a few pinned their hopes for a successful construction of socialism on the Soviet Union. The frustration of these expectations drove many of these people into the camp of sheer critique – where one can find many today, called 'critical Marxists' – who are continually on the look-out for new points of reference for their programs.

In addition to the general lack of impulse, the Marxism of the intellectuals is just as anemic as that of blue-collar functionaries. This manifests itself especially in the fact that the present-day intellectual apostles of Marx can in no way approach the intellectual stature of their master. Thus, radical oppositional thinkers such as the active members of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research no longer thought it possible to identify themselves as denominational Marxists and preferred instead the label 'Critical Theory'. As an intellectual phenomenon, 'Marxism' was by its very nature always highly problematic, insofar as it missed out on the very meaning and thinking of Marx in various respects.

The calamities of Marxist intellectuals are not to be seen as punishment for

caprice; rather they reflect a general predicament and malaise of the educated classes in modern society. The very fact that a faction of intellectuals chose to consider the industrial workers' movement as a sort of power guaranteeing human progress was due, to a considerable extent, to the circumstance that their own social class was not yet able to function as a sufficiently powerful agent to assume the responsibility for a free republican state and for peaceful international politics. The majority of university-educated people remained compliant and obediently conformist, and large numbers of them put themselves at the disposal of the all-encompassing state in the execution of power politics. This educated class was not able to assert its dominance within society as a whole, despite the sociocultural standards which it had cultivated by itself: personal autonomy, solidarity, and rational consensus (combined with reasonable demands concerning material property). Not being capable of launching something by itself, the educated class was confronted with the dilemma of having to chose between two different kinds of subordination, to the top or to the lower end of society. The grand design for 'autonomy' of society developed in the course of history, as described by the post-Marxist Hungarian writer György Konrad, had not then gained sufficient maturity.

IV. FROM MARXISM TO 'REALLY EXISTING SOCIALISM'[9]

In the context of the ideological self-understanding contained in Engels' formula for the 'development of socialism from utopia to science', it might appear that the Russian October Revolution was destined to be the 'development of Socialism from a science to Socialism in action'. There are many who feel that it is at this point that the 'theory and its consequences' (and thus also its essential core) manifested themselves as inherent necessities. On the other hand, this might also be the point at which the whole concept of an immanent explication of the consequences of ideas was reduced *ad absurdum*; in fact, the concrete, autochthonous realities grown out of Russian history seem to be much more relevant here than a teleology of ideas. However, one cannot simply ignore this teleological pattern of understanding as long as the protagonists of this post-revolutionary societal formation adhere to the artificial, ideological identity of their 'Marxist' genealogy with the utmost resolution and even derive legitimizing force from it. It is very tempting for the critics and opponents of 'Marxism' simply to invert its apologetic construction; by bringing to mind the negative realities of 'really existing socialism' they aim to reveal a 'negative teleology' within the 'doctrine' of Marx.

Protracted and heated discussions are still provoked whenever somebody

(like the present author) radically contests the adequacy of this explanatory model. But in fact there is much coincidental similarity between the basic features of Marx's outline of the path towards a classless society and what has actually happened in history since 1917. Since it is impossible here to deal at length with this point, we must confine ourselves to giving a few methodological hints. This can be done in several ways, all leading to the same result. First of all, one may discuss whether or not historical movements are theoretically and *a priori* guided by ideas – as part of an investigation within the realm of the philosophy of history. It was Marx himself who, after his idealistic beginnings, emphatically denied this possibility. Secondly, one may ask what happens when dogmatists start to put their ideas into practice. As Engels remarked, ironically, they will do precisely the opposite of what their school catechism prescribes.[10] And thirdly, we are invited to investigate the real course of history – e.g., the post-revolutionary history of Soviet Russia – in order to discover the actual motives for each of the steps and sequences of events that took place. With regard to the history of the formation of Soviet society this would result in a picture to which one could apply an inversion of the expression 'any similarity to real persons and situations is purely coincidental'. In our case any similarity to preconceived ideas is merely accidental, even though it might have been desired by the historical *dramatis personae*.

What then could serve as an outline for a strictly historical and non-ideological reconstruction of Soviet history? Surely in this case a plain historical narrative will not suffice. The historical account must begin at the higher level of an elaborate theoretical and analytically well thought out model. The main task consists in providing an explanation of the genesis of certain general qualities of the social order. Relevant here are the proportions of social wealth and cultural activity and the degree to which specific classes and groups participate in these spheres. This includes proportions of equality and inequality, of freedom and subordination, and last but not least, the sphere and amount of repression and destruction. Surely in social and political programs, as well as in their ideological foundations, one can find statements about all of these elements. But all of these elements have their specific practical realities grounded in the real dispositions of concrete men living in real frames of reference, including everything that exerts an influence on them from their immediate social environment by evoking specific responses. Even when men are induced to act on the basis of 'ideas', they still are exposed to and stimulated by the facts that change the very parameters of their concrete situation in life.

In order to do justice to the Russian Revolution one has to consider the

general form which the sum total of the active societal forces had attained at the time, and what had been accentuated by the subsequent flow of events since the end of the 19th century. What 'Marxism' in Russia was to become (beginning with the mode of its reception within the Russian intelligentsia) was determined by the currents of thought it met with in a specific field of social tendencies, alliances, factions, and controversies. Which of the countless individual themes of Marxism could after all attain relevance depended on their selective comprehension and on their final arrangement. The virtual unity of the teaching of Marx was regarded much like a stockpile of building materials, and the fact that this stockpile supplied both some cogent and some vague recommendations was reason enough to make use of it.

During the revolution certain 'character profiles' became dominant or recessive among the revolutionary intellectuals and semi-intellectuals, the dissatisfied workers, peasants, and soldiers. These profiles of social character, which always have an autochthonous and practical origin, are incomparably more interesting to investigate than the unending universe of ideological disputes about right, wrong, and dangerous paths in the construction of socialism. In a strictly historical anamnesis even the concept of 'socialism', as the historical 'goal' of this procedure, may turn out to be rather irrelevant. One may even question whether it can be taken for granted that the actors of the Russian Revolution and the 'constructors' of the first socialist society followed in their actions such a conscious teleology and whether like architects, they had blueprints of a new society before their eyes and determined their construction plans accordingly. Even from the documentation on the inner processes of reflection and debate it becomes evident that all decisive steps were not directed towards the affirmation of some future goal; the steps made had no teleological structuring in time. Their principal mode was the so-called definite negation (*bestimmte Negation*), the essence of which consists in responding to actual challenges that result from continuous activities and developments emerging from a given past. They scarcely followed any goal other than to survive in the best possible way and to be able to continue 'somehow' with the resolution of conflict. It goes without saying that within this process of interaction countless contingencies appear. Within the process of revolution we can follow the transformations and transubstantiations of the 'revolutionary subject', i.e., of the leaders of the revolutionary party. One can speak here of 'transubstantiation' since it is well-known that in the wake of the numerous 'purges', the constitution of the rank and file underwent a change, so that in the final analysis a wholly new type of party and state bureaucrat displaced the older types – the self-sacrificing fighters,

innovative intellectuals, hypersensitive personalities, and tribunes of the people. After all, this type of 'Marxism-Leninism' only functions instrumentally as an available arsenal of ciphers, which symbolize a content of *praxis* that has little in common with official pronouncements. This type of ideology can never be an independent source of binding guidelines for action, nor can it serve as a programmatic prescription for politics.

V. CONCLUSION

In view of what has been said, what could we mean when we speak of Marx's theory and its consequences? Inasmuch as this is a *propter hoc*, i.e., a certain number of real historical results, our present considerations lead us to conclude that we are dealing here with a sphere of imponderabilia. 'Marxism' is, strictly speaking, nothing more than a nomenclature, designating certain sociohistorical constellations, and used as verbal communication among people who are situated analogously within such constellations. One substantial reality of Marxism is to be found in the fact that while capitalist industrial society was spreading worldwide – mainly in places where Marx had least expected it – situations did arise in which active groupings of society found occasion to bring about radical changes in the existing relations of property, and to conquer political power themselves. Thus our reflection brings us from the noematic character of 'Marxism', taken as an idea, to the practical reality of 'the Marxists'. They did not become Marxists because there is something like the 'ideal unity of Marxism', but rather because they found themselves practically disposed to recognize themselves and to communicate with each other in the language of Marxism.

As far as the course of the intellectual development of Marx is concerned, a praxeological analysis would show that the share of normative prescriptions for action contained in it became increasingly smaller. According to the definitive theoretical conviction of Marx it is not possible (and in the case of Marx himself not even necessary) to incite men to action by thoughts. It is precisely at this point that the present author fully agrees with Marx. The much-quoted sentence from Marx's early works that theory turns into a real material force when it takes hold of the masses, has only a rhetorical, not a lasting theoretical significance.

The idea of detaching and releasing the thoughts of Marx, in the way exemplified here, from any real causal influence on (and 'responsibility' for) subsequent history is indeed motivated by the goal of 'historical justice' – in order finally to give this over-burdened man his due *requiem historicam.*

But by no means do I have the intention of releasing the ideas of Marx, allegedly reconstructed in an authentic form and purified from subsequent sedimentary deposits, as an 'original' or 'true' Marxism, for the purpose of exerting a new inspiring effect. The truth of Marx, that which is important and prescient in his works, is situated way beyond the scope of any sort of Marxism. Our task consists of simply comprehending Marx as a figure in his own time as well as in ours – and this in order to reassign to him just a normal place in history. No imperatives are to be derived from him. Our guiding axiom should instead be to relate and to evaluate his biography; and the present author thinks that the history of Marx is precisely of such a type that it merits above all being told and evaluated with sympathy.

Finally it is hardly possible to avoid the question of the epistemological conditions relevant for dealing with Marx and Marxism. It is well-known that the way in which Marxists deal with Marx is very much determined by the fact that for them Marxism has acquired the function of an institution and provides intellectual and existential security, i.e., relief from uncertainties. This type of institutionalized and canonical Marxism still awakens a considerable fascination today among its opponents, who in turn are also molded in their intellectual and practical existence by a given institutional framework. Both Marxists as well as anti-Marxists have the same problems in trying to do justice to those specific historical and intellectual qualities of Marx, which are of such a type that they are completely independent of any institutional sphere, and rather take in the whole spectrum of the historical world in terms of quanta and primal social energy which continue to reproduce themselves by means of 'definite negation', and this in such a way that normative constructions of the future can no longer have any practical meaning.

When posing the question of the historical consequences of Marx's theory it should first be remembered that there still is a great lack of clarity about what in a strict sense could be considered to be his theory. After having made the necessary distinctions, a paradoxical result becomes evident. Those premises of Marx which were (probably also in his own implicit metatheoretical understanding) most bound to the historical circumstances and which increasingly lost their cognitive stringency happened to be regarded as very attractive and were broadly disseminated. These were the premises about the worsening of crises and of the increase of class-struggle in capitalism. These premises, put together into a kind of unified doctrine, quickly enabled Marxism to make a career as an 'intellectual superpower'. But Marx found few followers for what can be called his 'theory' in a far stricter and wholly

new sense, namely in his approach to comprehending (*begreifen*) social reality and its transformations. Throughout the course of his work one can detect a connected series of reflections which had as their aim to mediate between his own will and ideals on the one hand, and the many other things which to a great extent he accepted as such, i.e., as being beyond his control. In order to make these mediations more accessible to a sober and penetrating investigation, Marx had to tackle the negative work of the critique of ideological consciousness and to set out to destroy the notorious illusions with which ambitious individuals enter upon the stage of history in order to shape history according to some normative design. As is usually the case with such methodological innovations, Marx did not leave us with a coherent account of his approach. To my way of thinking, Marx's critique of ideological consciousness is an intellectual achievement the importance of which will probably assert itself in the future, in the form of a critique of the ideological forms that Marxism itself has taken on as a doctrine, and as a framework for decoding the historical content hidden underneath this ideological cover. But this critique is relevant also with respect to other current doctrines. Efforts of this type are an important contribution to the cultivation of a frame of mind in which the intellectuals become capable of understanding current events and the part they play in them in a more multifacetted way than did the propagators of Enlightenment – Kant, Hegel, and Marx himself.

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NOTES

[1] Heinrich Lutz, 'Zum Wandel der katholischen Lutherinterpretation', in *Theorie der Geschichte – Beiträge zur Historik*, vol. 1, *Objektivität und Parteilichkeit*, ed. by R. Koselleck, W. J. Mommsen, and J. Rüsen, München, 1977.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 174.

[3] Klaus Hornung, *Der faszinierende Irrtum – Karl Marx und die Folgen*, Freiburg i. Br., 1978.

[4] The author's first Marxological study is the booklet *Marxism and History* (Frankfurt, 1969) of which an English translation appeared 1973 in Great Britain (Allen Lane, The Penguin Press) and U.S.A. (Harper and Row). While this text essentially presents a doxographical reconstruction of a concept of history which may be ascribed to Marx, in the subsequent articles the emphasis shifted more and more towards an examination of what Marx and Marxism represent within their own 'real' history. A general summary of this enlarged view is to be found in the author's contribution to the series 'Grundprobleme der grossen Philosophen', edited by J. Speck, in the volume *Philosophie der Neuzeit II* (Göttingen, 1976) under the title 'Karl Marx: Die Wendung der Philosophie zur Praxis'.

[5] Franz Mehring, *Karl Marx – Geschichte seines Lebens* (1918), *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 3, East Berlin, 1960.
[6] *Marx Engels Werke* (MEW), East Berlin, 1956 ff., vol. 1, pp. 70f.
[7] MEW, vol. 4, p. 475. Cf. also the corresponding passage in Marx's critique of Proudhon in the same volume, p. 143.
[8] See my article 'Warum eigentlich Materialismus?', in *Theorien des Historischen Materialismus*, ed. by U. Jaeggi and A. Honneth, Frankfort, 1977, and the somewhat more detailed study 'Geschichtsmaterialismus' in the reader *Geschichtsbewusstsein und Rationalität*, ed. by E. Rudolph and E. Stöve, Stuttgart, 1982.
[9] This is the label applied, e.g., by the German Democratic Republic to its type of socialism.
[10] MEW, vol. 22, p. 196.

MICHAEL GAGERN

"ALL POWERS TO THE WALKING PEOPLE." FEUERBACH AS A FOURTH-WORLD MARXIST

This is an essay on social change in the Western industrialized countries. The discussion of the changes that actually happen will be in the tradition of materialist analysis: the potential of the development of new institutional and value structures in our society is seen to be dependent on the development and adaptation of the productive and reproductive forces which are being developed in this society. I shall describe some options of the "Walking People" to act as a ferment in the actual process of change. The "Walking People" are no class in the Marxian sense, but they may very well be the subjective carriers of the changes that will be needed for our physical and cultural survival.[1] In the language of some of the very recent political literature, the "Walking People" can be said to belong to the "Fourth World".[2]

A somewhat paradoxical way of characterizing the "Walking People" and the "Fourth World" is to say that they describe the people and communities all over the world who try to raise the standard of living by exploring the market of non-marketed and non-marketable goods and services and thereby reducing the gross national product. This implies that the power of the Walking People and the need for their particular political contribution rises with a society's increasing production of waste and destruction as a percentage of the GNP.

This is the case with our civilization, where an ever increasing amount of the GNP goes into undoing the harm that is being done by the productive and the administrative processes until the destructive forces cannot possibly be controlled and there is literally no space for the lethal waste, which then has to be dumped where minimal direct resistance can be expected.[3]

The Fourth World is not regionally determined (North-South, East-West, etc.), nor is it characterized by its attitude towards the ownership of the means of production (capitalist, socialist), or by its state of technological and industrial development. Unlike the First (capitalist industrialized), the Second (socialist industrialized), and the Third World (developing countries), the Fourth World does not base its policy decisions on the correlation between consumption and well-being. The Fourth World tries to deal conscientiously with a situation that is characterized by two presumably undisputed factors:

James J. O'Rourke et al. (*eds.*), *Contemporary Marxism*, 55–75.
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(1) The limitedness of the resources which have been decisive for the growth pattern of the past 50 years with the effect that their depletion brings thrift and physical labor back in style as the fundamental sources of well-being. (The opposite scenario, according to which we shall witness a time of almost perfect automation such that goods and services will be available in abundance, and work will turn into a leisurely activity for humankind remains the account of a fools' paradise or the material for horror stories.)

(2) Consequently, the dilemma of political decision-making, namely the justification and the administration of the do-without decisions will become the source of violent national and international fights over the allocation of scarce resources, if we don't learn to make *sovereign* do-without decisions.

The reason why I choose to call this situation "Feuerbachian" is not because Feuerbach has developed a particularly useful theory of thrift and decision-making under the circumstances of scarcity. I want to give him credit, however, for his positive attitude toward limitedness, and for his appeal for cooperation in the exploration of the great potential of a world of limits and boundaries – a pleasant and timely break with the Christian, Marxist, and liberal traditions of enthusiastic promises of bliss and prosperity.

I shall begin with a reflection on change: in which sense are the structures and values of our institutions changing? In a second step I shall outline some of the basic conflicting interests in this process of change. I shall try to show why the category of guilt plays such a central role in the solution of the conflicts, and why I believe an immanentist approach of the Feuerbachian kind to be quite successful in dealing with the problems of "sociodicy".[4] And finally I want to explain why the Walking People are such good carriers of the necessary changes. I shall outline a few characteristics of a Fourth-World political economy.

I. ON SOCIAL CHANGE

In their fascinating book on the power of the multinational corporations, Richard Barnet and Ronald Müller report that in 1973 the National Association of Manufacturers started a great "crusade for understanding" or what they also called: "the tremendous counter-effort by the business community" to turn back the growing attack on the multinational corporations. In this crusade which included computerized mailing lists of 14,000 plants of the biggest 100 U.S.-based global corporations "for getting company views to the right people at the right time", they use "three time-honored public

relation techniques for their "grass roots" campaign for a "coordinated attack" on the enemies of the global corporation:

(1) The first was to package an irresistible vision of peace and plenty rising out of the global shopping center.

(2) The second involved the merchandizing of fear: trade wars, unemployment, stock-market crashes, and revolutions.

(3) The third technique consisted of a series of methods to personalize the dangers as well as the rescue in the form of alluding to – sometimes conspiratorially hidden – groups and individual persons.[5]

In social philosophy the prophets of gloom as well as the standard bearers of progress follow the same archetypical scheme, but in a reverse order: hell, heaven, and the redeemer is the triad by which each party tries to rally its flock. When W. Ogburn in his 1923 book *Social Change* suggested that the painting of bleak, pessimistic pictures was as unscientific as the concept of progress, he deliberately and openly reduced the task of sociology to empirical descriptions of variations detected at the surface of the phenomena and did not pretend to reveal the internal structure of social events. Many contemporary authors of Western industrialized countries followed him in denying the existence of any definable persistent trends in the historical process and in rejecting the term "progress" as a scientific concept. Others argued that the social sciences had to determine and evaluate the trends in the social history if they didn't want to declare the bankruptcy of theory before the facticity of political practice.[6] The questions of change, controllable and uncontrollable future, development, progress, transition and doom are of a strikingly apologetic character: the answers are so important in terms of political strategy and its justification that they have kept an increasing number of social philosophers and sociologists busy and employed over the last century. In view of the diversity of the answers to these questions it seems to be safe to argue that a student who pretends to speak for all thinking human beings cannot have listened to many, and that those who are openly partial have the advantage of being honest. It is the great advantage of the Marxist-Leninist theory of social development that it openly confesses its partiality for the working class even at the expense of the reintroduction of tragedy and drama into the once hoped-for soberness of the science of the historical process.[7]

The many heated debates on the need for change lose any intellectual appeal they may have as exercises in social criticism with the fading credibility of the latest promotors and potential carriers of progress: the church, the king, the merchant, the worker, the intellectual, the bureaucrat, the

soldier, the manager, the entrepreneur, the exploited, technology, and even the unconscious. It seems that the revolutionary potential of the social groups and strata which have been scrutinized for the past 300 years has been widely discredited because of their poor performance in the historical process. Blaming the multinational corporations, the pope, the military-industrial complex, and the Communist Party for hunger, over-population, war, and revolution has a very definite function as a group ritual of representative guilt disposal. Its analytical value is less visible than its potential impact on political vigilance and its function as a form of social control. But crediting a single group, class, or individual for the changes that make life look better (more free, more just, more comfortable, more inspiring and exciting) makes even less analytical sense and only serves to stabilize power.[8] I can see three facets of our contemporary life however, which make it necessary to keep on talking about social change:

(1) Our institutions are not capable of handling the rapid development of destructive power concentrated on this planet.

(2) Some people are and may always be willing to make important long-term decisions contrary to other peoples' insight and explicit desire and will, and they are ready to use whatever force they deem appropriate to have their way: for reasons of state, for the good of the people, in the name of God, for their own sake, etc.

(3) If there was a postwar consensus among the ruling élites in the Western world about how to use their economic and political power, it has been lost, giving way to apparent inconsistencies.

It is hardly necessary to go into the details of our political life if we want to explain what is meant by these three points, but I shall make a few comments in order to avoid some possible ambiguities.

(1) The main characteristic of our institutions is the widespread sense of lack of orientation which is felt so strongly among political and economic power élites. The academic professions' industrious search for new forms of justification and legitimation of the application of force, as manifested in the recent revival of practical philosophy and political ethics as well as in the redressing of some worn-out economic theorems, is not the powerful reflection of a "new spirit" as some would have it. It is a sign rather of a spiritual and institutional deadlock, which has been very well characterized with a metaphor by a German union official: "we are the heirs of the patient whose doctors we are".

In his brilliant analysis of the failure of the East European alternative, Bahro credits the spiritual and institutional deadlock with all its destructiveness,

both in terms of real power to destroy physically and in the form of institutionalized incompetence to deal with the emerging problems, to the state of mind of *subalternity*. The degree of possible subalternity grows with the number of steps in the hierarchy. The profound "contradiction in the historical process" according to Bahro is that "the greater and more complex the social association, the more subaltern individuals become".[9] Being an effect of the modern hierarchical and highly technologically complex mode of production, subalternity can only be overcome with its transformation:

> The historical task I have in mind is the overcoming of subalternity, the form of existence of 'little people' (*'Kleine Leute'*). At its core it means the abolition of the traditional vertical division of labor and the revolution of the entire structure of needs that is bound up with this. It proceeds by way of a radical change in all our customary institutions and modes of production in society and in the economy. The overcoming of subalternity is the only possible alternative to the limitless expansion of material needs.[10]

This particular form of subalternity which comes with the hierarchical structure of the modern division of labor is destructive, because decisions of tremendous impact are being made all the time without anybody being likely or capable of carrying the responsibility for them: the causal relationship between the decisions and the effects is effectively diluted by the many intermediaries and by the artificially inflatable facticities and plausible presuppositions at all levels of the decision-making processes.

(2) In view of this situation, it is nevertheless very striking that so many people are always willing to make important long-term decisions having great impact on other people, and on the natural, political and economic environment. They make these decisions contrary to other peoples' explicit desire, insight, and will, and they are ready to use whatever force they can muster to have their way.

The hypothesis I wish to follow here, in order to understand this basic political fact, is that people are not unaware of the guilt involved in disregarding other living beings' passions, desires, territory and insight; but they have a method of cleansing themselves of the stain of this brutality, and this method has a peculiar structure. The structural element that seems to be fundamental in our societies, so I should like to argue, is always the exchange of something visible and present like pain, damage, lust, desire for something invisible and remote or future (grace, God's love, future happiness or health, the reason of state, the good of the party). The justification for the visible wrong is some invisible or future good. The difficulty for materialist and

secular political theories lies of course in the poverty and lack of imagination of this exchange.

(3) The most powerful postwar consensus between the élites of the Western industrial countries has been on economic growth. Yet the process of economic growth is still so little understood that a few remarks may be in order. Growth occurs when more goods and services are being sold than in the previous period. This can be the case, because people earn more money or save less because the prices are better or the goods are presented in a more attractive way. But growth also occurs when goods and services which were previously not for sale are being sold: new technologies, stolen or expropriated goods, slave 'services', hospitalization for psychiatric treatment, criminal care, day-care centres, newly prospected mineral resources, folklore and fitness, just to name a few at random.

Growth occurs when goods and services that are needed and welcomed by everybody, like bread and fresh water, are being sold; and it occurs when goods and services which are detrimental to most people – drugs, missiles, accidents – are being sold. On the other hand there are very desirable goods which can never show up on any growth list, like friendliness, politeness, parental love, friendship, mental and physical health. Moreover no correlation between the growth items and the ones that do not show up on any growth list has ever been established, although there is some speculation about the positive or negative correlation between the two. As economic growth skyrockets, say some, love and friendship decline. Economic growth is a sign of well-being, say others, and therefore warmth and responsibility prevail, while a poorly performing economy must produce greedy and mean characters.[11] The point is that there is no *a priori* reason nor any empirical evidence for why growth should be such an important strategic variable. There are, however, two very good reasons why the growth of the Gross National Product became such a recognized social catalyst.

(1) The simplicity of the reduction of all the tangible and intangible economic processes to a set of measurable transactions is overwhelmingly seductive for those confronted with the difficult task of administering the complex network of human hopes and social relations.

(2) Growth has been seen as the magic way out of the vicious circle of economic and social instability arising from inflation, unemployment, balance of trade deficits, and unequal distribution of wealth and income. According to the growth theorist, the economy could be steered in such a way that full employment could be achieved together with price stability, balance of payments equilibrium, and the redistribution of income.[12]

The key to our problem, of course, is full employment. Why is full employment such an important political goal? Looking at it from the point of view of the employed, it is the only way of securing their incomes. Looking at it from the point of view of the employers and the government, it ensures that people *work* for their living. The more they need to buy, the more they need to be employed. Thus the constant reduction of the economic, political and psychological 'space' needed for people to become self-sufficient (non-buyers), leading a life outside the labor markets, is the flip side of the coin of an increasing subalternity as a result of technology- and capital-induced hierarchical division of labor. People who are not buyers are undesirable from the point of view of the investors, the sellers, the internal revenue service, the people in the administrations, and the other buyers. As long as they can afford not to buy they can withdraw their support from the hierarchical structure of the division of labor. They can stop being subalterns, but only if they can stop buying.

It is absolutely crucial for the argument presented here that we differentiate between a voluntary ("Spartan") decision to do without certain goods and services, because "one should not consume too much" or because "it is better for your health", or even because "the producers are slave-drivers, whale-killers and war-mongers", and a more political struggle for economic and legal structures which would allow one to do without certain goods and services because one prefers others or other means of obtaining them.[13]

The "Spartan" type can and has been misused too easily to force the do-without decisions upon other people. It tends to promote a self-righteous, and mischievous, aggressively ascetic or fatalistic psychological and social environment. The other type depends on the people's desire and capabilities for leading a self-determined life, where doing without is not the only free choice and strategic variable at hand. Self-determination is an economical, political, and aesthetic category and not an ethical one like renunciation. The distinction seems important because even if both lives look similarly Spartan, the whole spirit is different, the latter being more positively sensual and optimistic and aesthetically demanding than the first one. This is also one reason why "Walking People" cannot be translated as "Wanderburschen" or "Fussgänger".[14]

While the very structure of employment already rules out a whole range of possibilities for developing self-determination, there are other conflicts that arise from the market structure of want satisfaction. The market is always an auction place, catering to the highest bidders. The economic and political interest of the bidders can be illustrated with the old economic

dilemma of guns vs. butter. The following account of this dilemma should shed some light on the fabric of the conflict as it appears today.

II. ON THE CONFLICTING INTERESTS

For several decades it seemed that conflicts over scarce resources and their alternative uses belonged to the past. Not only could we have butter *and* guns but it seemed that the gun production gave bread and butter to *everybody*. Only when the United States of America stepped up her military production and entered the Second World War did post-crash unemployment decline rapidly. In the long run, however, even late capitalism cannot produce guns and butter unless the guns serve to secure advantageous terms of trade or to impose taxes on other nations. This is the reason why Keynes formulated his theory of government spending explicitly for the short term. And this is also why it is economically sound but politically naive to propose a "defense tax" as a tool to step up military expenditure and fight inflation and government indebtedness at the same time.[15]

For most people such a tax is only acceptable in times of acute danger of war. The cold war rhetoric of the Reagan administration is therefore the ideological accompanying music for a budget which is realistic enough to trade social security expenditure for military goods and services, as one cannot have one's cake and eat it too. This realism is very dangerous though, since it is becoming more and more obvious that from the point of view of spillover effects and net economic and social benefits, military expenditure is far less beneficial to the people and the economy than are welfare programs, unless the tax burden can be handed over to other nations. That is the logic behind the Reagan administration's pressure on friendly NATO governments to contribute more money to the buying of military goods and services.

If there are serious trade-offs there are serious conflicts, and these conflicts show up increasingly on the national and international level. They result in wars, civil wars, starvation, and environmental disasters, and threaten the survival of millions of people, whole nations and cultures. From the point of view of the historiographers the trouble with these disasters is not that they may put an end to our civilization. Civilizations come and go. They are as competent in destroying themselves as they are in building themselves up. But it is outrageous that, from the point of view of the people, those who claim the right to decide on the trade-offs are also the ones who can best hedge about the drawbacks of their decisions.[16]

This fact makes it sensible, it seems, to use the term "sociodicy" by analogy with "theodicy", when governments try to justify a particular, unjust situation by claiming that fundamentally all is or shall be well. Sociodicy is the whitewashing of those who have the power to change a situation by which people (animals, trees, grass) are being hurt, by arguing that: (1) Everything would be worse were they not in control. (2) All the good things are due to their activities anyhow. (3) Theirs is not the responsibility for what goes wrong. (4) What may look unjust now will prove right later, if their advice is followed. The same reasons that make sociodicy necessary for those able but not ready to change something make it reasonable for those who cannot change much to lay their hopes on the promise for change and to look for the "redeemer", who may also be the avenger in Job's sense.

Among the most recent bearers of the hope for change (at least as far as the history of ideas goes) were the students. Marcuse gave this hope theoretical dignity by saying that the students, the hard core unemployed, the intellectuals and the people from the Third World were the legitimate heirs of Marx's proletariat for the revolutionary task of leading society from capitalism to socialism.

Why would anybody pin his hopes on these four groups instead of on the proletariat? Because these four seem to have common interests, and because the proletariat in modern society can no longer be considered the revolutionary class with the one interest of developing the means of production for the use of all mankind: there are too many egotistical and bourgeois values, too much difficulty in defining a homogeneous working class, and too little solidarity throughout the different sectors and industries and from one country to the other.

There is in fact a certain general interest students seem to have in common with intellectuals and the poor, the unemployed and the Third World. But this basis is obviously not strong enough to over-ride the very definite differences in prejudice, life goals and education. The past decade has given ample proof of the weakness of the common base. And what about the Third World? The great strength of the so-called "77 countries", who formed such an impressive bloc between two UNCTAD meetings, arose from their unity in matters of vital interest to all of them: export earnings, credit, national sovereignty etc. These common interests have been successfully disrupted. So what about the hard core unemployed? What about the intellectuals? What about them? What is their common denominator?

The common denominator is that they are dependent, and that they are part of an economic structure in which their potential solidarity, their

common and general interest can and is being bought off cheaply. Their independence is on sale. Why? Because they all borrow their independence from the ones who employ them and who pay for their living: the parents, the government, private institutions, the world bank, the welfare system. They have no economic base from which to wave their banners of independence for more than the time they are given to play within their respective systems. And the system in which we live has been successful in atomizing and buying off people's interests in such a way that it seems we are back in a Hobbesian state of nature rather than in any civilized or natural state of self-esteem and respect for the other. In this war of everybody against everybody where nobody really knows who to shoot at, there are no obvious common and general interests which could form the driving force for the unified action of some social group or class to produce their own living conditions.

On the other hand there are some very definite common interests on the *selling* side: big business, big labor, big technology, and the big state are all interested in selling. For them selling has become a survival device, to the point where they are prepared for almost anything to sell whatever they can think of.

That is the reason why we live in such a dangerously wasteful environment. In order to be able to sell, the sellers must make sure that everybody buys. They can only achieve their goal if it is made increasingly difficult for people to get by without buying. Thus we are buying our way from cradle to grave through all kinds of markets, supermarkets, invisible and visible, whereby the invisible markets are much more threatening from the point of view of common sense and self-determination.[17]

The worldwide wars over market shares is but one aspect of this wasteful need to sell.[18] The creation of demand is the other.[19]

To the extent to which want-satisfaction, communication, and quality control by the consumers in the marketplace give way to survival on installments or on government subsidies, buying loses the element of sovereignty which it had long ago gained within the capitalist system for a relatively large group of people.[20]

The effect of all this is that our economic system has become so immensely uneconomical that the average person, although feeling uneasy in some way or other, is unable to understand what is going on. For there is a basic trust in most people that irrationality cannot go too far, that there is always some mechanism which prevents total collapse. As Goethe puts it in Faust II:

Schrecken ist genug verbreitet Hilfe sei nun eingeleitet (Enough horror has been disseminated. Let rescue be inaugurated.)

In the same vein Hölderlin's famous line, "where there is danger, there comes rescue too" expresses a sentiment which breaks out with particular vigor in times of crisis and transition. I believe it is not overdramatic to say that we live in such a time.

III. GUILT, SALVATION AND FEUERBACH'S IMMANENTISM

In the history of ideas rescue comes from different sources, but no matter how worldly the solutions are, they all have to deal with the problem of transcendence. In a very inspiring paper,[21] Marx Wartofsky recently mentioned that in the history of ideas roughly "3½" solutions to the problem of transcendence were given: (1) Nominalism, (2) (Platonic) Essentialism, (3) (Aristotelian) Conceptualism, and (3½) (Feuerbachian) Immanentism. I do not want to argue with the historiographic exactness and completeness of this attempt at systematizing philosophical doxology as far as Plato, Aristotle (Hume?), etc. are concerned. However, I should like to see Feuerbach's immanentist solution as a full possibility for dealing with the problem of transcendence, by way of disposing of the unwanted but for the tradition inevitable theodicy. Feuerbach's contribution to facing the problem of *guilt* and responsibility may in fact be interpreted as one way of dealing with the human need for rescue and salvation which I shall try to show here.

As far as I can see, the question of how guilt arises remains unanswered, but obviously guilt is one of the main traits of human nature. Among the many attempts at solving this problem, the most powerful explanations have always been of a mythological nature, where the power struggle or greed between mankind and the Gods makes all kinds of suffering and 'punishment' easier to understand. Those, however, who do not accept such a fundamental understanding of guilt must either deny it altogether or find some way of dealing with it within the framework of this world. The postwar period gives ample evidence of the attempts at denying guilt as a basic trait of human nature. This denial culminates in what Christopher Lasch so catchily describes as the narcissism of the "me" generation whose slogan, "I am fine; you're fine; we are all o.k; don't touch me; I want to live", is the very consistent refusal to be guilty of acting in controversial ways. This attitude is already the answer to the self- and other-delusion of the parties, the ideologists, and the technocrats who live with the belief of the manageability of

practically everything. It seems that this belief is the most important asset of a partisan. Modern life is almost inconceivable and hardly bearable without it; riches, peace, justice, and happiness are all feasible under the condition that you are in possession of the right party, church, diet, income level, and credit and membership cards. The ideology of the fundamental manageability of everybody and everything presupposes a sentiment of "us". A network of relations is made to look like the awareness of a metaphysical substance or a mystical body, although it is being created on the basis of relatively accidental belonging and can be extended to anybody more or less whimsically. This constitutes a very striking contrast to what in a Feuerbachian sense makes belonging possible: the dialogue that arises out of common work and common interest.

The problem is that "we" are neither o.k. nor capable of untying ourselves from misery and punishment by way of creating artificial group identities. Who is going to war, if not us? Who sits in the camps and prisons and hospitals, if not us? And who sends us there? Who causes us not to act according to what we consider right and just, if not us? It seems then that "we" are to surrender to senselessness and hopelessness as long as we stay here on this earth and do not reach out to something that transcends our limited possibilities. Our interests, so it seems, at least the ones that compel us to act in controversial ways and contrary to the interests of other people, must be superseded by some higher sense which bestows dignity and authority on them. We, the people, cannot feel at ease in our unjust and egotistical behaviour; we cannot even muster the energy that is necessary for this kind of behavior, if we are not told that we are authorized to it by some kind of power, mightier than you and I. I claim that this is the social backbone of subalternity, of hierarchies, and bureaucracies. It must be admitted however that this is also the wisdom behind parental precepts, i.e., this mechanism also serves as some kind of protective device. It is always specific interests, however, that are protected and paternalism is just one of the least overt forms of protectionism for the sake of specific interests.

Thus, reference to some non-immanent force or law as well as the projection of some unknown future event and state of bliss or horror are first and foremost protective devices by which some specific interest can "legally and justly" be persecuted even at the expense of damaging, cutting, and even killing.[22] In anticipation of some of the implications that follow from what has been suggested here, it should be mentioned that this protective device makes it easy for believers to tolerate suffering and even get into the habit of doing without certain things. The political problem is that this

do-without habit is easily extended or, better, happily forced upon the non-believers. This readiness to do without the other person's right is then the soil for both obedience and revolt.

Feuerbach has warned against the lust to prescribe renunciation to other people, while he was very clear about the fact that a certain amount of suffering and foregoing of pleasures was part of human dignity. A person can never be idealistic enough he said, can never follow the categorical imperative too well for himself, while at the same time he should be as materialistic as possible when it comes to the needs of the other person – a stoic as far as he himself is concerned and an Epicurean as far as other people are concerned.[23]

For Feuerbach, the need for an immanentist solution to the problem of guilt arose out of the insight that both the Judaio-Christian tradition and speculative philosophy try to avoid the nail test which is the human person who is physically present and capable and willing to act in his social context. The Christian doctrine and speculative philosophy have no perception of their limitations, nor do they perceive the opportunities for people to develop with the help of the completely untapped resources that are available through their "Leiblichkeit und Gesellschaftlichkeit". Their search for legitimate human behavior remains the thought's monologue with itself. Consequently they take speculative aberration to the point where contingency becomes guilt and where the potential to grow and develop is being crippled by the myth of redemption.

Without any desire to enter here into a profound discussion of Marxism and liberalism, I want to point out that while these two conceptual frameworks that have molded our contemporary political climate also try to settle the matter of scarcity and contingency in an immanentist fashion, they both remain utterly irrelevant when it comes to explaining the problem of guilt and conflict. This is not very astounding as neither of them takes the existential human entanglement in guilt *seriously* enough. In the political and ideological routine, the inhibition of so fundamental a human trait leads to conceptions of development that are coined after the principle of postponement and remind one of the regular myths of redemption: "Wait until the individuals have developed their class consciousness such that antagonistic contradictions cannot arise any more . . ." or "Just let the owners of capital make all the do-without decisions for everybody so that the economy continues to grow . . .".

Feuerbach does not accept this kind of deference. Here I see the challenge of his way of thinking. The conflict that leads to the recognition of guilt is

clear and simple: " 'I want' says my passion for happiness; 'thou shalt' says yours." I only know what is right or wrong from experience with my passion for happiness.[24]

That is why the 'right' egotism has to be knighted as an ethical force.[25] This means that the clear understanding and open recognition of our self-interests have priority. Only then comes the control by our conscience, the voice of our conscience being the echo of the injured party's cry for vengeance, somebody's wailings and cry for vengeance against me.[26] Conscience can only develop and grow as 'Mitwissen', as the term says. Openness and candor are therefore of utmost importance as far as everybody's interests are concerned. For conscience is also the angry spirit or the shadow of some suppressed passion.[27] Feuerbach argues very strongly that conscience is not exclusively a consequence of some neglect of other people's happiness but can also develop as a result of the neglect of one's own passion for happiness. This does not at all mean that people ought not to strive for the highest possible aims. On the contrary. As our will does not operate independently of our nature, we need to raise our passion for life to consciousness. The final aim is "the genial vision of self – the unity of nature and spirit in the human person" ("Der Genieblick der Selbsterkenntnis, die Einheit von Natur und Geist im Menschen").

The two very simple principles that should govern the interaction and conflict resolution of people are: first, the recognition and fundamental acceptance of one's own desires and interests, and second, the knowledge and recognition of the basically just interests of the other. The particular strength of these principles is that they forbid use of reference to the future as a justification device for present brutal and unjust behavior. They rule out sociodicy as they make it impossible to whitewash blatantly unjust behavior by pointing to some hidden rationality and justice. This is not the case for either the Marxist or the liberal tradition.

In the liberal tradition of economic theory in particular, it is obvious that the political power of the theory lies in the exclusive administration of the future by a small group of owners of capital who are to make all the investment decisions and to determine the credit policy. This is true for Ricardo and Rawls alike.

It is absolutely honest for liberal societies to quiet the passion for happiness with promises of greater levels of consumption and to administer the guilt complex by way of insurance companies, law firms and psychiatric clinics. Happiness as a commodity and guilt as an insurable risk are both consistent outcomes of a secularization without the spirit

of limitation and without the necessary social conscience. It is an individualism without a social conscience and a secular revolt against religious and metaphysical conceptions without the spirit of generosity and self-limitation.

The same is true for the Marxist tradition where the do-without decisions are being administered by a self-righteous and zealous party that forces people and societies to rid themselves of the stain of their class history before they can trust their passion for happiness, which then will be directed and channeled. Guilt becomes a non-insurable risk and even the hopeful aspect of a possible "felix culpa" is allowed no space.

Contrary to orthodox liberal and Marxist doctrines, a Feuerbachian political economy would have to build a framework of economic and political theory on the basis of the two aforementioned principles – "as if people mattered".

IV. PRINCIPLES OF A FOURTH-WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY

Before I outline some elements of such a framework I shall try to describe what makes a (Feuerbachian) immanentist humanism attractive to more and more people today.

In spite of all the never-ending school discussions on the relative merits of liberalism and Marxism, and in spite of the 'new religiosity' which can be seen in so many contemporary movements I believe that the Feuerbachian vision of the "gänzliche Diesseitigkeit und Erdenbedingtheit des menschlichen Lebens" (Dilthey)[28] is likely to determine the self-consciousness of people even more than is already the case.

The U.S.A. provides a very good instance of two forms of humanist immanentism: only one can be called Feuerbachian, while the other one is only typical of a half-hearted process of secularization. The latter is the famous sentimental cult of humanity. It finds adequate expression in the 'electronic church' and in movies like 'Star Trek' and 'The Empire Strikes Back'. The narcissism which expresses itself in these manifestations of self-adoration has nothing in common with what I call and consider Feuerbachian here, even though Feuerbach's humanism has often been criticized as being idolatrous. It is not, however, because it lacks the dimension of the compassionate and cooperating living thou, without which there is neither guilt nor reconciliation, i.e., no history.

The other more seriously immanentist kind of humanism, the one that can justly be called Feuerbachian, has a very different quality. It is based on

the respect for nature and fellow man/woman, and its determination to be honest and clear leads to a need-consciousness, the quality of which expresses itself in the ability to choose and select. This way of thinking does not take love as a veil of ignorance and non-discrimination, but as the motor for interaction. This interaction is considered just only when it doesn't content itself with dialogues, but begins to change the whole system of the hierarchical division of labor by creating a work process in which as many people as possible can gain the competence and confidence they need to overcome their subaltern states of mind.

Who are the people who represent this kind of immanentist humanism and could therefore be the instigators of some change? When I say "all powers to the walking people", I have a very plain and direct and a more symbolic concept of who these people are and what they can do. In its symbolic meaning "walking" stands for determination, growth, independence, character and strength. It also stands for a passion for life that cannot easily be clubbed down or bought off. Some typical "walking" situations make this symbolic use of the term intuitively clear: the first steps of the child show determination, strength, growth, and the beginning of independence. When people walk out of a room to indicate protest, it somethimes takes a lot of courage to do so. Independence movements prove their determination and strength in their walking. Walking is also a symbol for realism. 'You have your feet on the ground' means that you know what you are doing. Walking is healthy in almost every respect and thus it is being used in religious discourse and meditation practice. The distinctive manner of walking of an individual is an expression of this person's character and style.

In order to develop these magnificent characteristics and attitudes, however, we have to be able to walk too. Not only do we have to be able to walk to work or shop within walking distance, but we should also be in a position to walk out of a room or job, or go to a demonstration, as well as to refuse to march, as marching is the direct opposite of walking.

It hardly needs mentioning that we have developed political and economic structures that enhance almost none of our walking abilities, but put a lot of energy and mental effort into our marching capacities.[29] This may be the reason why so many people who want to contribute to change are so desperate. They want to work for the use of renewable resources in order to keep this planet inhabitable. They are looking to vote for people who are not completely corrupt. They want to revitalize the cities, because life has become so intolerable for so many people. They don't want to be the target of nuclear attacks and therefore vote for disarmament. They also want to

be involved, because it is boring not to be. They want to be loved, because it is terrible to be lonely.

There are all very good reasons for getting involved, but people's spirits don't get buoyed up too much by this sort of motivation for very long. And then, when all the common misfortunes happen in their everyday lives, interest in causes surely wanes. And this is why I suggest walking or becoming a member of the 'walking people' as a way to enhance the quality of life and lifestyles. It is a relatively easily accessible way for everybody, because it is not élitist or separatist in the traditional sense, no special equipment is needed, nor does one need to have any particular hormones or genes, and one must not be born into any particular time or class. The only indispensable presupposition is the desire not to lead a subaltern life.

Traces of this will to walk can be found in almost every group and social stratum of our contemporary societies. Poets as different as Kurt Vonnegut, Alan Ginsberg, and Gary Snyder, political movements (most notably movements of the civil disobedience tradition), the ecology movement, the American Indian movement and the human economy movement all represent this spirit, which is only beginning to search for its organizational form.[30]

What do the "walking people" want? At this time they want a lot, but they certainly want important changes in four areas of international concern:

(1) Access to and protection of what has been discussed in recent years as mankind's "common heritage" (resources, mobility, air, water, trees, grasses).

(2) Access to decision-making in all matters with a high social cost factor. Decisions should be made, as a general rule, on the lowest possible level, while all decisions that demand a higher level (regional, international) must be made by representatives of the people who are affected by these decisions.

(3) Protection of the basic "walking rights" as I should like to call them in this context, i.e., the human rights, individually and collectively, but not just those granted by the constitutions but protected by either the right to work cooperatively or individually or by a minimal income system.

(4) The corollary of (3), which is the access to and expansion of those "public goods" that make it possible for everyone to buy less, so that a person needs to sell himself less urgently in the market place. This includes the land and the streams and the taxes and the construction norms and prescriptions, the tariff policy of the utility companies, and the draft. It may be a moderate plea for some common system or the 'domain' of old Prussia or the craft system which still flourishes in the Outer Hebrides of Scotland. It also means that the contribution to the wealth of a society by the informal sector would have to gain more recognition.

These are the building blocks of a political economy which could be christened Feuerbachian as well as Fourth-World Marxist or as immanentist humanist. The elaboration of such a political economy is a task that still has to be accomplished, although there already exists a lot of material on which one can build. This material shows how difficult it is to opt for and start with small changes, as it demands work at once.

One reason for keeping up the struggle is the conviction that there is a systematic connection between material production and the spiritual dimension of life, and between the little steps of everyday life and the big order of the universe, and that there are people who know about it. As guilt is inescapably connected with the order that has been destroyed or disturbed, serfdom or the formation of a subaltern mind at first sight is a handy way out of the responsibility for this destruction.

The other reason therefore for keeping up the struggle is the conviction that there are enough people who don't want to live their lives as 'complacent serfs' but who wish to put to work now the knowledge they can acquire.

Munich

NOTES

[1] It is not being suggested here that everybody can or even should become one of the "walking people". I do not propose an ethical theory with universally applicable moral laws which must be obeyed if we want to survive. I see the historical role of the "walking people" in their determination to trade in the comfort of serfdom (as Marx called it, or "subalternity" as Bahro describes it) for a self-determined guilt-responsive social life (see below).

[2] See for example Mark Satin: *New Age Politics*, New York, 1979. The book has a large bibliography and an appendix with many addresses of groups and initiatives.

[3] We don't have to go into the painful distinction between productive and unproductive work if we want to see the amount of waste and destruction which is currently being produced by the Western industrialized countries and traded on the world market. A few instances may clarify the point:

In the Federal Republic of Germany, citizens spent 10 times the amount the government can afford for public "development aid" to cure the ills that come from overeating.

The UN hopes to help the Third World countries solve their water and waste disposal problems which are held responsible for 80% of the sickness and disease in these countries. They need 300 billion dollars over a period of ten years, a sum that is already being spent on armaments worldwide in less than one year. The nuclear industry has become the symbol of this form of production, because not only does it produce destructive and wasteful material but it does it in a destructive and wasteful way.

[4] The term "sociodicy" will be used here, as I have used it before, by analogy with the term "theodicy". Obviously people who are afraid of radical changes arising out of the awareness of fundamentally unjust patterns in a society have an interest in finding justifications for these structures.

[5] Richard Barnet and Ronald Müller, *Global Reach*, New York, 1974, pp. 105 ff.

[6] See for example the work of McIver, Page, von Wiese, Popper *et al.*, and the critique of their work by Soviet authors or analysts of the Frankfurt School. For the Soviet authors, see E. V. Demenchonok and J. N. Semenov, 'A Critique of Contemporary Bourgeois Concepts of Social Progress', in: *Soviet Studies in Philosophy*, Fall 1980, pp. 68–90.

[7] E. V. Demenchonok and J. N. Semenov, *op. cit.*, p. 87. Their account of the Marxist solution to the pessimist/optimist dilemma is less penetrating than the very interesting discussion of a large group of influential bourgeois authors. The soberness of the Marxist analysis is stressed too much in view of the "tragic collisions" that have to be admitted. The point is not to use drama and tragedy, a relic of an otherwise perfectly controlled situation, for an excuse, but the true material of the human condition, the memento of limitation.

[8] Attributing the furthering of these qualities to the deeds, actions, or influences of an individual person, a group or class of people is very much like the expression of the sentiment of adoration in prayers and declarations of love, and is not a statement about causal relationships. These are much too complex and cannot be reduced to such simple personifications. In a similar context, Feuerbach expressed this idolatrous tendency in people in the following way: "If you cure a sick man or even just one who is obsessed with an *idée fixe*, or if you feed a hungry man, you are – to speak prosaically – a doer of good or – to speak poetically – a virtuous man: you are god, for what pleases a man is called by him, panegyrically, a god" (L. Feuerbach, *Sämtliche Werke*, Bolin/Jodl, 1903–1911, p. 297).

[9] Rudolf Bahro, *Die Alternative*, Köln, 1977, p. 323. (English version: *The Alternative in Eastern Europe*, New York, 1978, p. 273.)

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 321 (English, p. 271).

[11] The current revival of the "social indicator" discussion is an analytically interesting but technically futile attempt at codifying preferences and social bliss other than by way of GNP. It runs into the same deadlocks utility theory has encountered from the beginning.

[12] The famous "magic triangle" (price stability, balance of payments equilibrium, and full employment) has been the center of economic policy making for over 60 years now. It has become a magic polygon as the administrations have taken on more and more responsibility for the steering of the economy (income distribution, growth, quality of life/environment). The magic element lies, of course, in the fundamental incompatibility of the different goals that are representative of the different interests and interest groups.

[13] If you can buy fish, but only canned and from abroad, because all the fish in your country are dead, poisoned or reserved for the people who own the streams, the ponds, and the fishing rights, then you may not be able to eat fish. The same is true for mobility, and the same applies to fresh air, education, etc. Not buying makes sense only when the same goods or something better can be acquired otherwise. 50% of all our prices are "administered prices" in the sense that their elasticity is extremely low. In the long run this is only feasible when people cannot escape paying for the product

(insurance, military goods, education, streets, canned food, polluted air, etc.), as the legal system protects the producer only.

[14] As a matter of fact it should not be translated at all, because its intuitive meaning depends on the alliteration with "working class".

[15] The concern about the guns and butter issue has reached the media now, as it becomes clearer that the military-industrial complex Eisenhower cautioned his fellow citizens against once again sets the signals for the budgeting.

[16] They don't have to fight in the jungles; they don't have to eat poisoned vegetables; they don't live in crowded high-rise appartments or near nuclear power plants.

In a recent article entitled 'Victory is Possible' in *Foreign Policy Magazine*, Colin S. Gray, director of security studies of the Hudson Institute and foreign policy adviser on the Reagan transition team, criticized the "United States defense community" for "tending to regard strategic nuclear war not as war but as holocaust". He and his co-author Keith Payne hypothesize on a Soviet-American nuclear exchange in which approximately 20 million Americans die, but the U.S.A. becomes the "victor" with the "destruction of Soviet political authority and the emergence of a postwar world order compatible with Western values". (Quoted from Wade Green, 'Rethinking the Unthinkable' in: *The New York Times Magazine*, March 15, 1981, p. 45.) The cynicism that expresses itself with so much ease here is only possible, it seems, with a total lack of respect for the people who are unfortunate enough to die in the process, whereby the Russian and the European casualities are not even calculated. It is also possible only on the assumption that the people who count have a good chance of surviving and emerge in an even better situation as wars clear the ground for new ventures.

[17] Compare the case of Nestlé and the whole complex problem of so-called "patent-generated industry" such as the pharmaceutical and chemical industries which depend for their costly research on the legal protection of fantastic sales which makes an even more fantastic marketing effort necessary. The social cost of these efforts as well as the externalities that come with the products and the production processes are hidden costs for the taxpayers. These are mounting, together with the hidden payments for arms systems and other high technology fantasies of managers and administrators.

[18] Wasteful because this kind of competition does not lead, as theory of free competition would suggest, to the more thrifty use of scarce resources and as a consequence to the lowering of prices. On the contrary, the prices rise, because the cost of producing and selling on a large scale at a certain point becomes relatively much higher than the savings, not even including the cost to the society as a whole.

[19] Demand is indifferent to need. I do not want to argue why some needs are good while others are not. I am talking solely about a technical relationship, which controls our life-styles more and more. The pitiful situation of the East European or some Third World citizens who are dying to buy whatever there is to buy in the internationsl shopping center cannot serve as an argument against the analytical and political necessity for differentiating between need and demand.

[20] The beneficial effect of the money exchange and cash economy should not be overestimated however, for most people never received more money than that which they needed to reproduce their ability to work (*Arbeitskraft*), and the trade-offs between the power to buy and the loss of self-sufficiency and the natural barter system have never been measured and cannot be appreciated. Yet I doubt that anybody would deny that buying can be accompained by genuine pride and joy.

[21] The paper was given at Boston University in the spring semester of 1980. The series was organized by the Philosophy Department.

[22] This is a fact of social life, a pattern which makes it easy for weak characters to relegate the responsibility for mean behavior to others. The invoking of some hidden authority (God, the people, the king, science, etc.) has become such a ritualized procedure of legitimization that most people do not have the choice between killing and not killing but between killing in the name of this authority or that one, a consequence of which is that so many movements carry their obedience with them when they revolt.

[23] L. Feuerbach, *Nachlass*, vol. 2, p. 321 (Grün, II).

[24] Grün, II, p. 293.

[25] Grün, II, p. 277.

[26] Grün, II, p. 301; *Sämtliche Werke* (abbreviated S.W.), vol. X, Jodl/Bolin, 1959–1964, p. 86.

[27] Grün, II, pp. 297–298, and 86; S.W., vol. IX, p. 169; vol. X, p. 73; vol. III, p. 370.

[28] Unfortunately, I can't remember where Dilthey uses this phrase.

[29] Once again the furious arms production and the 200 plus wars that we have seen in the so-called postwar period may serve as a matter of fact.

[30] Interestingly, while this paper was being written, the "Fourth World" was beginning to get organized. The 'First Assembly of the Fourth World' was held in London at the beginning of August, 1981.

PART III

MARXISM AND METHODOLOGY

PETER P. KIRSCHENMANN

PHILOSOPHICAL EVALUATIONS OF SYSTEMS THEORY

I. INTRODUCTION

The systems approach has become a major trend in contemporary thought. It has penetrated, and sometimes even dominates, a variety of disciplines, ranging from the practical to the theoretical, including philosophy. Concomitantly, diverse labels have come into circulation which are meant to cover smaller or larger sections of systems studies: systems engineering, systems analysis, systems research, systems thinking, systems science, systemology, systems theory, systems philosophy. As with any other incipient intellectual trend, the systems approach itself, as well as many of its particular implementations, have been the object of much controversy. The best-known example is the debate about *The Limits to Growth* (Meadows *et al.*, 1972). It concerns the rather gloomy predictions of the so-called Club of Rome and, in particular, the dynamic world-models by means of which the predictions were obtained. Another example is the controversy about the methodology of the social sciences which was initiated by the neo-Marxist philosopher J. Habermas and the systems philosopher N. Luhmann (Habermas and Luhmann, 1971; Maciejewski, 1973). This intricate controversy touches less on implications of a practical application of the systems approach than on some of its theoretical presuppositions.

More than a decade ago, I completed a philosophical study of cybernetics and information theory; it paid special attention to the concept of information itself and to Marxist-Leninist analyses and evaluations of those fields (Kirschenmann, 1969, 1970). It is with gratitude that I wish to mention on this occasion that the study was done under the kind supervision of Prof. J. M. Bocheński. Cybernetics and information theory are now usually regarded as having merged with the more general movement of systems thinking. Understandably then, I have followed the development of this movement, albeit far from systematically. As regards the development in East European countries in particular, my attempts at keeping myself informed have suffered from the lack of the excellent library facilities which I enjoyed then. Yet even a glimpse at the relevant Marxist-Leninist publications is enough to show that, in contrast to cybernetics, the systems approach has stirred up

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no philosophical or ideological controversy to speak of. In the German Democratic Republic, in particular, it is admitted as late as 1979 that philosophers in that country "have paid but relatively little attention to more recent developments concerning the construction of *general* systems theories" (Paul, 1979, p. 883). Compare this with the great number of philosophical articles and books which they published on cybernetics at the time. The conclusion that ideological controversy is practically absent also in the Soviet Union is confirmed by a rather comprehensive recent account and evaluation of systems theory by three Soviet authors, which conveniently appeared in English (Blauberg *et al.*, 1977). After having stated that their general standpoint is based on the principles of dialectical materialism, they add that "there appears to be absolutely no ground for opposing dialectics to the systems approach"; rather, they consider "systems methodology as one of the applications of the general methodological concepts of dialectics to specific material (as exemplified by objects that represent systems)" (*ibid.*, p. 9).

For Marxist-Leninist philosophers, then, systems research can no more compete with philosophy than can other scientific disciplines, its generality notwithstanding. They have a standard response to more extensive claims about the systems approach which are voiced in the controversies in Western countries. Such exaggerated and illusory claims are for them the result of a frantic search for a new panacea, meant to solve the crises of capitalism which, for good measure, are misrepresented as being global crises. Furthermore, it is apparent that even philosophical reflections on the systems approach are felt by dialectical materialists to belong to an area where investigations can be carried out without much direct influence or hindrance from the side of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and ideology. The earlier debate about cybernetics helped in delineating this area, as its outcome was that cybernetics constituted part of that area. It is an area where one can concentrate on technical-philosophical problems for their own sake. A telling illustration of the professional attitude permissible here is the contribution by one of the three authors referred to above, V. Sadovsky, to the Sixth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science (Sadovsky, 1979): it contains no reference to dialectical materialism.

In what follows, I shall have to limit the presentation of different views and positions as well as their discussion to a few aspects of systems thinking, namely: the demarcation of systems science; a possible dispute about the true originator of the systems view in its modern form; the alleged generality of systems theory; philosophical elaborations and specifications of the systems

point of view, including assessments of the epistemological status of systems theories.

II. THE ILL-DEFINED FIELD

The systems approach is not a well-defined method; systems science is not a well-demarcated discipline. The same is true of all the other labels listed above: they do not have precise meanings, and some might suggest more than that which they actually cover.

Systems thinking has a theoretical side and a practical side. Its theoretical endeavors are motivated, at the very least, by the idea that the systemic or holistic nature of many objects of study has been neglected in traditional scientific disciplines. In particular, there is the notion that a cross-disciplinary science ought to study the similarities which actually or supposedly exist between systems of different kinds. These ideas have led to what is usually called "general systems theory". Of course, there are various additional ideas, motivations or promises which particular systems thinkers have associated with "general systems theory".

A first remark to be made here is that the name "general systems theory" is somewhat misleading: it does not denote a theory proper. As J. H. Marchal (1975, p. 450) commented:

> At present, the major work being done by the term 'general systems theory' seems to be that of a catch-all for any investigation that deals, however tangentially, with systems. And at present, what the numerous contributors to general systems research seem to share is not so much a body of theory, or even a satisfactorily precise characterization of a discipline, as a belief that systems are important to science and that attending to them is a fruitful way of looking at the world for purposes of increasing and organizing knowledge.

Rather than being one single theory, "general systems theory" has come to include a whole array of different theories: mathematical systems theories, control theories, automata theories, network theory and the like (for which reason I shall continue using double quotation marks). M. Bunge (1979, p. 1) proposed to refer to them as 'systemics'.

With respect to systems thinking generally, the above-mentioned Soviet authors reach a conclusion similar to Marchal's when they state that "on the whole the systems movement is at present rather an assemblage of non-trivial problems than a systematized summary of results achieved" (Blauberg *et al.*, 1977, p. 286). Nonetheless, E. G. Yudin ventured to draw up a provisional

list of principles common to all scientific and technological forms of systems research (*ibid.*, pp. 37ff.). These are: the notion of the wholeness of any system; the conception that its wholeness is to be specified in terms of connections (not just relations) between its components; the expression of the totality of these connections in the concepts of structure and organization; the description of the "vertical" structure in terms of levels and the hierarchy of the levels; the notion of control, i.e. a specific means of regulating a multilevel hierarchy; the analysis of such controlled systems in terms of their goal-oriented behavior; the idea that the source of the transformation of most systems lies within the systems themselves, that they are self-organizing systems; the search for mechanisms correlating the synchronic functioning and diachronic development of systems. Yudin adds, once again, that these principles constitute not a special science, but a general scientific trend, which he compares to two other approaches, structural-functional analysis and structuralism.

This common core of guiding principles notwithstanding, it is advisable to distinguish between "general systems theory", or attempts at building general theories involving some of these principles or notions, and research directed at particular systems. We can follow Bunge (1979, p. 2) and use the term 'systems analysis' for projects studying specific, usually complex systems for their own sake, without any special interest in developing a general theory or general models. As a rule, such projects are closely connected with specific practical problems. Pertinent examples are: studies of the ecosystem, transportation systems, health-care systems. Apart from analytical means like flow charts or network diagrams, such studies may use mathematical models and also the technique of computer simulation. Yet, in addition, they will employ typically managerial techniques and procedures, like those of operations research, budget programming and cost-benefit analysis.

The great diversity of possible projects and techniques that can be collected under the heading 'systems analysis' renders a systematic assessment all but impossible. This circumstance adds to the difficulties one can have in trying to single out what systems thinking is and what it is not. R. L. Ackoff's views concerning social problems provides a glaring illustration of these difficulties. He has claimed (1974, p. 8), not just that systems thinking is a spreading mode of thought, but rather that we in fact are entering a new age, the "Systems Age", in which we shall be confronted with the social problems and crises engendered by the former age, the "Machine Age". He tries to show how the "systems point of view and way of thinking can be applied to these problems and crises so as to develop more effective ways of

dealing with them". Now, in the conclusion of his chapter on education, he writes (*ibid.*, p. 95):

> I have tried to show that we are in the midst of an educational crisis that derives from a conception of education that was suitable for the Machine Age, but not for the Systems Age.
>
> We currently have an industrialized educational system that minimizes the number of choices available to students and that regulates almost every aspect of their behavior. It operates on the assumption that there is only one correct way to do anything, including learning. A teleological system orientation suggests that choice be maximized both in what is learned and how it is learned.

There can be no objection at all to these or many other suggestions to be found in Ackoff's chapter on education. But it is hard to see why these suggestions should follow from systems thinking, why a system orientation is needed to arrive at them. Do they not express just the insight that, for instance, students learn better if self-motivated? Ackoff's point might have become clearer had he explained why the "industrialized educational system" (nota bene: a system!) is supposed to derive from the allegedly non-systemic machine-age thinking. Besides, attributing to this age the view "that there is only one correct way to do anything" smacks of setting up a straw man. This seems to be a favorite maneuver among certain systems thinkers when they come to voice their more extravagant claims.

III. ORIGINATORS OF SYSTEMS THINKING

L. von Bertalanffy is generally recognized as the father of the modern systems approach, at least as far as its theoretical side is concerned. His biological theory of open systems and of dynamic equilibrium (Bertalanffy, 1932, 1942) can be said to mark the beginning of modern systems thinking. Of course, many of his ideas as well as many other central ideas of systems thinking can be traced further into the past, as von Bertalanffy himself pointed out on several occasions. The step taken by von Bertalanffy which was most significant for the development of systems theory was that he chose the open system as a general system model. Together with other scientists who entertained ideas largely similar to his, he founded the Society for General System Theory in 1954 (which name was later changed to 'Society for General System Research'). According to the program of the society (cf. Bertalanffy, 1973, p. 15 and 1975, p. 155), its major functions are to:

> (1) investigate the isomorphy of concepts, laws, and models in various fields, and to help in useful transfers from one field to another; (2) encourage the development of adequate

theoretical models in fields which lack them; (3) minimize the duplication of theoretical effort in different fields; (4) promote the unity of science through improving communication among specialists.

The general view that von Bertalanffy played the central role in initiating modern systems research has not gone altogether unchallenged. R. Mattessich (1978, pp. 283ff.) voiced the complaint that von Bertalanffy himself had been persistently silent about the real "originator of a truly generalized systems theory", namely A. A. Bogdanov. This well-known rival of Lenin published a highly original work, *A Universal Organizational Science* (*Tectology*), which first appeared in two parts in 1913 and 1917, respectively. The work went through several revised editions (see, e.g., Bogdanov, 1925–1929). In a particular revised form, moreover, it appeared in German translation (Bogdanov, 1926–1928). So it could indeed have been available to von Bertalanffy.

Bogdanov intended his new science to be the science of any kind of organized complexes or organized forms. While in its abstractness he compared it to mathematics, he nevertheless regarded it as a non-specialized empirical science. He also saw in it a science with a revolutionary potential in the sense that he expected it to yield consciously planned novel forms of organization. His own contribution consisted mainly in the elaboration of a framework of general concepts and of certain schematizable features of this framework. (See Grille, 1966, esp. Ch. XI.)

In the already mentioned book, the three Soviet authors clearly consider von Bertalanffy as the originator of the first modern systems conception, and they devote a whole chapter to the presentation and discussion of his contributions (Blauberg *et al.*, Ch. 2). Much less space is given to Bogdanov's ideas (*ibid.*, pp. 26f., also pp. 75, 77). They point out the great similarities of his ideas to concepts of cybernetics and to von Bertalanffy's conception, and acknowledge "their constructive significance in the development of the general theory of organization". But they add:

Soviet scientists are by no means inclined towards idealization of tectology. They have demonstrated in their works its negative aspects rooted in the old philosophical errors of Bogdanov, in the rather strong elements of mechanism and positivism characteristic of his world outlook.

Thus, Lenin's philosophical and political criticism of Bogdanov remains as the setting in which the latter's work is being evaluated. Mattessich seems to be unaware of this when he writes (1978, p. 284) that "Bogdanov's books

were for some time disregarded in Soviet Russia, in spite of the author's intimate acquaintance with Lenin".

I shall not try to judge which of the two systems thinkers could lay the weightier claim to being the father of the modern systems approach. Historically, however, it is clear that von Bertalanffy's ideas were so much more influential that Bogdanov's contributions can all but be ignored.

As in the case of other apparently valuable new methodological or general-scientific trends, Marxist-Leninist authors inevitably tend to trace the origins of systems thinking back to the founders of their philosophical world-view. In his sketch of the prehistory of the systems approach (Blauberg *et al.*, 1977, pp. 15ff.), Yudin points out that it grew out of the methodological crisis of classical science, which was dominated by the belief in elementalism and mechanism. In reaction to this one-sided belief, there arose equally one-sided holistic views. The classics of dialectical materialism, says Yudin, analyzed the foundations of this crisis and were able to overcome the opposition between elementalism and holism. Thus, with his social-economic theories, "Marx not only gave the first example of thoroughly analyzing a complex system, but also developed the necessary methodological instruments for that purpose" (*ibid.*, p. 20). Or, as Blauberg puts it, "for the first time in the history of human thought Marx's work, *Capital* above all, embodied the methodology of systems research" (*ibid.*, p. 104).

IV. THE GENERALITY OF SYSTEMS THEORY

Quite unmistakably, von Bertalanffy stated the intent to develop a general, interdisciplinary and unified systems theory. In an often reprinted article, which also served as the lead article in the first yearbook (1956) of his society, he wrote (cf. Bertalanffy, 1973, p. 32):

> In this way we come to postulate a new discipline, called *General System Theory*. Its subject matter is the formulation and derivation of those principles that are valid for "systems" in general.

Many have questioned the feasibility of this project, as von Bertalanffy himself reports (1975, pp. 154f.). Even advocates of the systems approach have criticized the belief that the approach could result in a "*general* systems theory" (cf. Mattessich, 1978, pp. 25, 274, 276ff.).

There are alternative ways of trying to defend the claim that there can be a systems theory holding for any kind of system. On the one hand, one may be able to point out sufficiently many similarities or analogies between

various kinds of systems – physical, biological, social, and maybe even conceptual ones. It is clear that von Bertalanffy was mainly thinking along these lines. In accordance with the above-quoted research program of his society, he was confident "that 'systems laws' manifest themselves as analogies or 'logical homologies' of laws which are formally identical but pertain to quite different phenomena or even appear in different disciplines" (Bertalanffy, 1975, p. 154). On the other hand, one can try to show that there exists a plausible substantial general notion of a system and that certain non-trivial general statements or laws can be formulated in terms of it. Because formal analogies by themselves cannot establish substantive relationships, my comments will mainly turn on this second approach. Prefatorily, one should note that Yudin's list of guiding principles cannot establish, and is not meant to establish a "general systems theory": there is a clear suggestion that several of the notions involved may not apply to all systems.

Conveniently enough, Marchal (1975) collected and analyzed the major objections and arguments against the existence of a fruitful general concept of a system. It has been argued, for instance, that there still is a telling disagreement among systems thinkers about the definition of such a concept, or that it plainly is all but impossible to define it, or that it would be vacuous anyway if it indeed were to cover the entire spectrum of systems we are interested in. Marchal tried to show that these criticisms can be met, and he offered the following minimal characterization (in the sense of a necessary condition) of a system (*ibid.*, p. 460):

> S is a system only if S is a set of elements and relations between the elements.

Others would wish to add at least that the elements must be *functionally* related, that they must act together to achieve some function or attain some goal. Marchal rejects such further requirements mainly because he wants his general concept to cover conceptual systems, like the system of arithmetics, too. Having thus defined a general system concept, on which he thinks agreement could easily be reached, he can also answer the last-mentioned objection. The concept does not imply that anything whatever could count as a system: a piece of paper, he says, does not. The example is not very fortunate; better examples would be afforded by apparently simple things like electrons and photons (cf. Bunge, 1979, p. 245).

Certain shortcomings of his "set-theoretic" characterization of a system did not go unnoticed by Marchal. The relations supposed to hold among the

elements of S cannot just be of any kind (Marchal, 1975, p. 466). A mere collection of items, among which "holds the relation" of lying close together, would not be called a 'system'. At least some of the relations must be of the nature of bonds, thus sustaining the identity, integrity or unity of the system in question (cf. Bunge, 1979, pp. 3ff.). We have seen that Yudin emphasizes this point, too. In another section, co-authored with Sadovsky, he states that among the connections between system elements "those that may be characterized as *system-forming*" are the most important ones to be identified (Blauberg *et al.*, 1977, p. 129). Now, as soon as one tries to characterize such bonding relations, one will find it necessary to draw a first line between conceptual and concrete or material systems: "one should speak here of different concepts" (*ibid.*, p. 128). The fruitfulness of the characterization of a most general notion of a system, therefore, is rather doubtful. Indeed, most systems thinkers have primarily been concerned with concrete systems; naturally, they have been using conceptual systems to articulate theories or models as representations of the former.

Bunge's general definition of a concrete system is (1979, p. 6):

> An object is a *concrete system* [if and only if] it is composed of at least two different connected things [substantial things, that is, as opposed to properties or states].

Every concrete system is characterized by its composition, its environment and its structure, or organization – that is, the set of relations, especially bonds, among its components and those with things in the environment (*ibid.*, p. 7). Proceeding from this starting-point, Bunge introduces and defines further general concepts, relevant in systems theory, such as closed system, open system, subsystem, level structure, input, output, system assembly, self-organization, emergent property, degree of integration or cohesion (*ibid.*, pp. 9ff.).

One blemish on Bunge's framework of definitions is that his starting concepts of bond, system, and environment do not afford a conceptual distinction between system and environment. A bond (connection) between two things consists for him in an action of one thing on the other. Yet, the environment of a thing or system is defined as the things acting on it or being acted upon by it. Thus, environmental things are also bonded to a system, whence its distinctness is lost. Bunge's subsequently introduced concepts, like that of cohesion, cannot make up for this lack of distinctness, as they are themselves based on the starting concepts.

Yudin and Sadovsky, aiming less at formalized definitions, take the idea of wholeness as a starting point; rather loosely, they characterize a system

as an integral complex of interconnected elements, which forms a special unity with its environment (Blauberg *et al.*, 1977, p. 127). As regards the task of defining a general concept of concrete system, then, systems thinkers seem to be faced with a dilemma: strict, especially formal definitions tend to be inadequate, while seemingly more adequate definitions tend to be rather vague or even circular. In particular, among the more clearly inadequate definitions, there is a considerable variety of "set-theoretic" proposals (of which we have seen one example, Marchal's definition). The three Soviet authors offer or report an array of criticisms directed against such proposals (Blauberg *et al.*, 1977, pp. 131ff. and 174ff.). For Bunge, set-theoretic means are here unsuitable from the outset inasmuch as concrete things or systems have to be distinguished from sets, which are mere concepts (Bunge, 1979, e.g. p. 16).

The dilemma can, it would seem, be somewhat mitigated if one holds the view that, except for the world as a whole, every thing, thus also every system, is at any rate a component of at least one (other) system (Bunge, 1979, p. 8), or that this is at least usually the case (Blauberg *et al.*, 1977, p. 127). The view suggests that the identification, description, and distinction of systems is a somewhat relative matter anyway, which is best settled in the light of one's possibly varying research goals. While the suggestion is acceptable in its own right, it should not be taken as a licence to ignore the demands of conceptual clarity and adequacy. For Sadovsky, the fundamental relativity of any system description is an expression of the general philosophical principle of the relativity of truth, as it was expressed by Lenin (*ibid.*, pp. 281f.). In particular, it is the "paradoxes of systems thinking" which lead him to this conclusion. And his first paradox, the "paradox of hierarchy", is just the one relevant here: "Any given system can be adequately described provided it is regarded as an element of a larger system. The problem of presenting a given system as an element of a larger system can only be solved if this system is described as a system" (*ibid.*, p. 270).

One Soviet author, A. Uemov, has taken an interesting, still largely set-theoretic, approach to the development of a "general systems theory". Unfortunately, original literature on this "parametric variant of the general systems theory" (cf. Blauberg *et al.*, 1977, pp. 181ff.; Paul, 1979) has not been available to me. Uemov realized, too, that to characterize systems in terms of sets of their elements (objects) and sets of relations between them amounts to no more than to state necessary conditions of the system concept: such characterizations usually entail that just about anything is a system. In order to arrive at a sufficient condition, Uemov also takes properties

of the objects as well as the specification of a second-order relation between the objects, properties and relations into account. A system, then, is defined by him as either a set of objects in which a previously specified second-order relation with fixed properties is realized, or a set of objects possessing previously determined properties with fixed relations between them. Again, the definition admittedly is relative, as it implies that systems are identified with respect to particular selected properties and relations. Given a specific choice, there will be many things which will not turn out to be systems in this specific sense. Yet, it is clear that Uemov's definition provides at best epistemological or methodological criteria for treating some thing as a system, and not an ontological characterization of systems, which is the aim of Bunge's approach.

For the construction of a "general systems theory" one needs further properties which are ascribable to any system; Uemov calls them "system parameters". Like his just-mentioned "system-forming" relations, these parameters are defined as second-order relations. Examples of such parameters are: being autoregenerative in elements, being autoregenerative in relations, being minimal (i.e. destructible through elimination of one single element), or being structurally stable.

Definitions by themselves do not yet form a theory: the greater part of the substance of a theory lies in other statements, postulates or theorems. Uemov, too, regards the establishment of general systems laws as one of the most important tasks of his approach. In his conception, these general systems laws take the form of strong connections between system parameters. Together with his collaborators, he established such connections in a quasi-empirical way (not in a straightforward "empirical" or "experimental" way, as Uemov and our informants would have it), namely, by processing large sets of possible systems through a computer and looking for statistical correlations. One of the laws found in this way, for instance, says that no relation-autoregenerative system is minimal. According to Uemov, one can subsequently "adopt some of the empirically confirmed propositions as axioms" (Blauberg *et al.*, 1977, p. 187) and thus arrive at an axiomatically formulated "general systems theory". Because of Uemov's abstract methodological approach, however, there can be no guarantee that the laws or the axiomatized "general" theory will apply to a given concrete system. In each particular case, this matter must still first be investigated.

Things are different with Bunge's ontological approach. He formulates several propositions which can be taken as making up the foundations of a general theory of concrete systems. For instance, the first and the last of his eight postulates are (Bunge, 1979, pp. 25 and 38):

. . . all systems receive inputs and are selective. The more cohesive each subsystem the less cohesive the total system.

Because of the extremely general character of these propositions they indeed stand a good chance of being true for all concrete systems. Incidentally, if this is so, then this sober general theory of systems could not be charged with committing some kind of neo-reductionism when it is used as a framework for studying complex systems like social systems. Remember that the charge, frequently made, is that "general systems theory" or systems philosophy reduces social systems to purely material or technical systems, just as the older reductionism tried to treat everything in terms of physics.

What is true, of course, is that such general statements do not say very much about any given concrete system. As soon as one wants to say more, one will have to consider more specific kinds of compositions, environments and organizations of systems, thus rising above the ground level of the general theory. As a rule, one does this by working out various kinds of theoretical models for concrete systems, from simple black-box models with input and output to ever more sophisticated ones. (See Bunge, 1979, pp. 253ff.) A given model, when used to represent a concrete system, can always be open to the charge of being inadequate, simplistic, trivial or even reductionistic. (For a good account, analysis, and fervent criticism of many ideas, models and especially their mathematical treatments which have been propounded by certain systems thinkers and theorists, see the study by D. Berlinski, 1976.) Yet equally open are the possibilities of enriching a model with facets of concrete systems which have been ignored up to that point.

The much-publicized predictions of the Club of Rome are based on particular dynamic world-models, which include variables like population growth, natural resources, pollution and industrial capital. With the help of computers, one can ascertain possible developments of these interconnected variables. The development and study of such particular models no longer belong to "general systems theory" proper, but rather to systems analysis. However, certain results of systems analysis may very well turn out to possess a more general significance. One of the results obtained in the context of the just-mentioned studies is the so-called Forrester's law, which says that partial goals of subsystems often conflict with the goal of the total system, and that short-term progress can lead to regression in the long run. Evidently, this result could have a wider significance. As regards the particular world-models used in those studies, there can be no doubt that they involve drastic simplifications as well as decisions about the range of possible desirable

developments (cf. Berlinski, 1976, pp. 39ff.). But then, all the assumptions underlying the models are open, and have in fact been subjected to critical discussion and revision.

V. SYSTEMS PHILOSOPHIZING AND THE STATUS OF SYSTEM THEORIES

There are different ways in which the ideas prominent in the systems approach can be and have been interpreted, used, or even exploited. There are different views on the specific nature of systems thinking, on its merits and its promises. In particular, many of these differences in opinion and evaluation concern the alleged generality of systems thinking, the intriguing character of this generality, or the epistemological status of system theories. Finally, since "systems theory" is not a well-defined body of knowledge, there is ample room for adding one's peculiar claims or general speculations.

There is a well-known claim made by von Bertalanffy regarding his General System Theory. He claimed that the new discipline would develop into a unification and reconstitution of all sciences (cf. Mattessich, 1978, pp. 267ff.). The new synthetic mode of thought was going to replace the former reductionistic, mechanistic, atomistic, positivistic and analytic way of thinking (as if these were one and the same way!), which had not been able to achieve this goal. Yet, his central idea, namely, that there are important similarities between systems of various kinds, is too small a basis for such a unification. And besides, it is not at all obvious why a unified science, an idea which he had taken over from logical positivism, should be a desirable goal. Later on, von Bertalanffy himself considerably tuned down his evaluation and expectations concerning General System Theory. (See Bertalanffy, 1975.)

Bunge used central concepts of systems thinking in a refined form, as we have seen, in his articulation of what he calls a "systemic world view" (1979, esp. pp. 245ff.). By 'systemic' he means that this view is neither atomistic nor holistic. Furthermore, it is a philosophical ontology that is naturalistic (but not physicalist), pluralistic (as concerns properties, not substances, and allowing for novel, emergent properties of systems) as well as dynamicist. One has to acknowledge that this is a very reasonable use and a balanced ontological elaboration of systems ideas, even if one cannot fully side with the materialist naturalism which he defends in this way.

We saw that von Bertalanffy was especially impressed by formal analogies or mathematical similarities between law statements encountered in different fields. In this respect, he compared the burgeoning General System Theory

with probability theory, which already had found application in an increasing number of disciplines. Moreover, the mathematical features common to various laws can be, and have been, studied as well as further elaborated for their own sake. This has resulted in highly abstract mathematical subtheories of "general systems theory", which can hardly be meant to be empirically testable. One can understand, then, why many systems thinkers have been much puzzled by the question of whether, and to what extent, "general systems theory" can still be said to be an empirical science or must be considered an *a priori* science – a question which has in similar ways been raised about probability theory.

Bunge is less puzzled by this question than most other systems thinkers. He has a keen sense of the need to distinguish, regarding any theory of factual science, between its mathematical structure, its factual content, and its empirical testability. For him, the most general theories (or theoretical frameworks) of factual science are at the same time ontological theories. Certain general theories of systems of any kind fall into this category. Such theories have a factual (or ontological) content, even though they are not directly empirically testable. Only in conjunction with specific assumptions do they yield specific and testable theories. Any *a priori* developed mathematical systems theory, therefore, will have to be checked with respect to its possible factual content and its mediated testability. Quite apart from the question of their empirical content, such theories can also be used for technological and other practical purposes of organizing or reorganizing man-made systems.

Soviet authors also struggle with the question of the status of "general systems theory". Following up on a particular criticism of von Bertalanffy's views by Ackoff as well as a related suggestion by P. Caws, Sadovsky believes that the answer may well lie in viewing "general systems theory" as a "certain metatheory" (Blauberg *et al.*, 1977, pp. 189ff.). Ignoring the distinction between conceptual and concrete systems, he defends this view by arguing that "general systems theory" could not be regarded as a generalized (or universal) scientific and technological theory of systems: for, since the theory is itself based on special logical and methodological systems, the theory would then have to be also a generalization of its own basis – which is impossible. A similar argument is presented by him as one of the "paradoxes of systems thinking" (*ibid.*, pp. 273f.). Sadovsky's proposal itself suffers from the obscurity of what he means by 'metatheory'. He is aware of the usual technical sense of the term, in which it designates a theory of particular abstract properties of other theories, such as their consistency and the like. Yet there is no doubt that he wants to use the term in a much broader sense.

A metatheory of certain specialized theories must, for him, also provide a general description of the knowledge embodied in those theories – in the present case, for instance, a classification of all systems – as well as a framework for constructing further specialized theories of the same kind. So he attributes to it functions which, in Bunge's view, are possessed by the most general scientific, or ontological, theories and frameworks. In opposition to Sadovsky, Uemov believes that his parametric variant of a "general systems theory" has shown that such a theory is not solely possible as a metatheory; rather, according to him, there is a whole variety of possible "general systems theories" (cf. Paul, 1979, p. 884).

Sadovsky attributes to "general systems theory" as a metatheory also the function of a methodology. Other authors, e.g. Mattessich, have laid even greater emphasis on this function. Mattessich discusses the debates about the question of whether "general systems theory" is about empirical systems or about all conceivable systems (1978, pp. 276ff.), and comments that especially von Bertalanffy's conception has from the very beginning been burdened with this kind of dualism, or schizophrenia, as some have called it. His own position is that the systems approach in general should be regarded as "a special methodology rather than a new science or superscience" (*ibid.*, p. 299). In contrast to von Bertalanffy, and like Bunge and the Soviet authors, he regards systems thinking not as a replacement of analytical thinking, but rather as a supplement to it. In particular, he argues that the systems approach can provide us with a much-needed, more adequate methodology for the applied and social sciences. However, he also attaches rather substantive claims to his methodological considerations. Unlike Bunge, he holds that every system possesses an inner, reflective, consciousness-like aspect (*ibid.*, pp. 26ff.). He hopes, therefore, that via the systems approach we could also come closer to a solution of several important philosophical problems, like the mind-body problem and the problem of how to incorporate value-judgments objectively into the body of scientific knowledge. These hopes may be a little far-fetched; they are not particularly well substantiated by him. And his equation of an inner aspect of a system with the locus where values and norms are embodied will hardly survive philosophical scrutiny.

Regarding Mattessich's or similar proposals, the Soviet authors have a good point when they write that

> in social knowledge, as well as in other fields, the systems approach may at present be regarded not so much as an elaborate methodology of research, but rather as the

requirement for working out such a methodology, prompted by the existing gap between the tasks facing the social sciences and the actual results obtained (Blauberg *et al.*, 1977, p. 231).

The controversy, mentioned in the beginning, between Habermas and Luhmann, and the ensuing debate fit into this context: once again on the German philosophical scene, it is the proper methodology for the social sciences which has been at issue here. Luhmann contended that the systems approach could be used to develop a general social theory. He based the contention on the idea that social systems, by reducing the complexity of the world, make a meaningful orientation in the world possible. One of Habermas' objections is that this approach incurably harbors the tendency to consider social systems as something given. Thus, it avoids discussion of the historical development of the interests and meaning (*Sinn*) which play a fundamental role in the constitution of every form of society; it also avoids discussion of possible changes in, and alternatives to, given societal forms. According to Habermas, societies and societal forms must not be viewed as systems: they must be viewed as historically developing meaningful totalities. The categories of systems thinking are bound to fall short of adequately grasping such totalities.

If we accept Habermas' critique we will have to conclude that "general systems theory" can never attain its intended goal of becoming a universal theory: societal forms, excepting perhaps technocratic forms of social organization, will always fall outside its scope. A less radical conclusion would be to say that, at least as regards social systems, systems thinkers should never rest content with any one closed conceptual framework or fixed model. Sadovsky's "paradox of hierarchy" suggests that they are in fact precluded from doing so quite generally. Habermas need of course not be impressed by any such concessions from the side of systems thinkers. He would argue that there will remain a radical difference between any systems approach and the historical-hermeneutical approach needed for an understanding of society in its totality, or the critical approach needed to bring about an improvement, especially greater freedom, in society. Since the approach which Habermas has been advocating and revising is problematic itself, the debate cannot yet be considered as closed.

In all its diffuseness, the systems approach will retain its attraction for thinkers like Ackoff and others, who claim that it has the capacities for providing a better understanding of all of reality as well as the means for shaping and reshaping science and society for the better. The peculiar problems one

encounters when trying to evaluate the systems approach are not altogether unique. They are analogous to the problems of evaluating other never completely articulated approaches laying claim to universality – for instance, the mechanistic view, which the systems view was supposed to replace, as von Bertalanffy claimed. The mechanistic view also had a relatively sound basis in limited areas of a particular science, physics. It also led to various very general abstract theories, those of rational mechanics. It also inspired the development of "mechanistic" theories or conceptual schemes in other fields, in economy, political science, or ethics. And it was also propagated as a total world-view. It is reassuring to see that Sadovsky resorts to the same analogy in his assessment of the diffuse character of the systems approach (Blauberg *et al.*, 1977, p. 86):

> The evolution of scientific thinking and the specific place held in it by philosophical analysis as a form of scientific self-consciousness prompt the supposition that the systems approach will hardly take on the shape of a rigorous scientific theory even in the future. Apparently, there is no necessity for that: the mechanistic conception that has existed for more than three centuries never had the form of a finished theory (although many thinkers did attempt to give it that form), and this in no way prevented it from exerting a definite influence on the development of knowledge, with both positive and negative implications ensuing therefrom. The same thing is likely to happen to the systems approach.

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EDWARD M. SWIDERSKI

HUMANISTIC INTERPRETATION AND HISTORICAL MATERIALISM: THE METHODOLOGY OF THE POZNAŃ SCHOOL*

I

For more than a decade already perhaps the most active center of philosophical life in Poland has been the Institute of Philosophy of the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań. Five departments interact to constitute what is certainly a school[1]: several theoreticians with distinct areas of concentration share a common methodology and interpretation of Marxist doctrine, espoused in turn by disciples who tirelessly propagate and apply them in a prodigious quantity of publications stamped with a characteristic mode of expression.[2]

The uniqueness of the Poznań school consists in the fact that while it is beholden to Marxism, which it endeavors to articulate and clarify, it fosters the Polish tradition of logic and methodological research, paying particular attention to the method of the social and human sciences. The resulting 'analytic' Marxism is superior to much Marxist theorizing still all too often carried on in the style of nineteenth-century philosophy.

The prominent figures responsible for virtually the entire theoretical edifice associated with the Poznań school are:

Jerzy Kmita: logician and methodologist of the social sciences, propounder of the theory of "humanistic interpretation" – a reconstruction of the explanatory procedure more or less tacitly presupposed by students of human activity and its products; of a theory of the "functional-genetic determination" of (social) consciousness; and, more recently, of a "historical epistemology" concerned with the determinants and status of science.[3]

Leszek Nowak: logician and general methodologist, Kmita's collaborator in the formulation of the methodological outlook of the school, is best known for his reconstruction of the Marxian theory of science as a realistically interpreted method of successive approximations by means of an idealization/concretization model to the essential configurations of phenomena. At present, Nowak is working on a systematic presentation of Marxist philosophy based on a revised conception of the dialectic and a so-called adaptive theory of historical materialism.[4]

Jerzy Topolski: historian and methodologist, has contributed numerous

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studies to social history – the study of the transformations of social macro-structures (e.g. revolutions), employing a humanistic interpretation of social action along with a functional genetic theory of its social determinants and consequences.[5]

All those associated with the Poznań school profess a common methodological standpoint labelled 'anti-positivist naturalism'.[6] In its essentials this position involves, on one hand, approval of methodological monism in the question of the methods of the natural sciences and 'human sciences', and, on the other, opposition both to the positivist account of science and to the anti-naturalistic views of hermeneutic philosophy, phenomenology, structuralism and the like. Unlike so many orthodox Marxists, however, the Poznań theoreticians clearly distinguish the Popper-Hempel model of scientific inquiry from classical positivism, and although they have modified their initial enthusiasm for the hypothetico-deductive model of explanation, they continue to follow Popper as to the role of theory in observation statements. Their dispute with non-Marxist methodological research arises over the issue of individualism as opposed to 'structuralism' or 'holism'. The latter, which they advocate, is regarded by them to be perhaps the one fruitful insight accruing to the anti-naturalist tradition, even though, in the interpretation of the Poznań school, it is radically expunged of all non-discursive, intuitional overtones. However, in their methodology, holism does not imply that the Marxism of the Poznań school is yet another rehash of the determinist, radically functionalist account of the social whole conceived as an impersonal collective in which individual initiative counts for nothing or little. With reference to such classics as Weber and Znaniecki, the Poznań school has endeavored to work out an explanatory model of individual activity which can at the same time be the key to the special nature and role of social structures.

It is my contention that this unusual concern by Marxists for social micro-structures has occasioned interesting developments in the general theory of social structures, developments having to do as much with the appropriate methodology of social science in general as with the philosophy (ontology) of social relations. Here I must limit my remarks to the relationship that seems to exist between the Poznań school's anti-positivist naturalism, its theory of action and its theory of social consciousness.

To explain why a particular activity was undertaken or why its product possesses a certain property requires that one be able to reconstruct: (1) the relevant knowledge of the agent about alternative courses of action and their anticipated results, and (2) the standards or norms according to which the

agent orders his instrumentally relevant knowledge to form a hierarchy of preferences. It will be noticed that this manner of formulating the issue of the 'interpretation' of human actions and their products hardly goes beyond the classical conceptions of the anti-naturalist tradition, those of Weber especially. Now although the Poznań theoreticians agreed with the anti-naturalist tradition in maintaining that what distinguishes actions from natural events and phenomena (e.g. bodily behavior) is their having a sense or meaning, they decidedly rejected any explanation of actions that does not take the form of a nomological-deductive account in the sense of Hempel (and Popper).[7] That means that, in order to be explained, the occurrence of an action or the possession of a property accruing to its product (i.e. the *explanandum*) must be deductively derived from a description of certain initial conditions – in this case the agent's knowledge and his values – and a nomothetic component, the appropriate covering law (the *explanans*). It would be fallacious to suppose that the attribution by an observer of a specific sense to an action or its product could be methodologically justified solely by reference to the agent's putative knowledge and convictions. For apart from having to cope with the epistemological problem of gaining access to the agent's consciousness (i.e. discovering his 'true' motives), the latter approach risks falling victim to a so-called *ad hoc* explanation: what is to be explained itself serves as evidence to justify the premises of the explanation.[8] Hence, the analysis of an action, if it is to be an explanation in the strict sense, must involve a nomological component.

It is not easy to see what such a law could be and how it could be arrived at. In the naturalist tradition the positivist conception of a Hume and a Mill stipulated psychological laws to connect the stages of activity to its outcome and in this way supported a causal explanation of action. Although Popper resolutely opposed the phenomenalism, inductivism and underlying psychologism of classical positivism in favor of the hypothetico-deductive model of science, he continued to uphold an essential tenet of Humean-Millsian positivism, *viz*, individualism where action and its social consequences are concerned. This attitude has to face the problem of access to an individual's motives in the analysis of actions.

In the anti-naturalist tradition, Weber, despite his advocacy of *Verstehen*, was a proponent of an explanatory analysis of social action. However, his solution, in the form of the controversial doctrine of ideal types to which he refused to attach objective truth value, is regarded by the Poznań school as unsatisfactory instrumentalism, merely a tool of research.[10]

This brief survey of the methodological and epistemological difficulties

associated with the explanation of human action gives a better idea of what the Poznań theoreticians had to contend with when they set out to realize their program of an anti-positivist naturalism. It is to be a method of explanation relying in principle on the tenets of Popper's critical rationalism; but where action and its products are concerned, the requisite nomological component of such an explanation should overcome the limitations of an individualism appealing to psycho-physiological regularities accruing to the species, yet without losing sight of subjectivity. Nor should it have to settle for an instrumentally interpretable theory. In short, the question was, is a discursive (i.e., non-intuitionistic) and realist theory of action possible?[11]

The answer to this question has been taking shape throughout the past decade, its substantive features having been already articulated by Kmita, Nowak and several others, by the mid-seventies. The first element is the aforementioned theory of "humanistic interpretation". In one of his many formulations of the argument Kmita defines humanistic interpretation as

> ... a kind of explanation the *explanandum* of which is the fact of a certain activity having been undertaken or the product of a certain activity possessing a determinate property while the *explanans* is characterized by statements (1) describing the subject's knowledge about possible actions to undertake (excluding the one to be explained) as well as their results, and also the subjective preferential order of these results, (2) statements assuming that every individual ... undertakes the activity leading to the most highly preferred result.[12]

Whereas the first part of this definition characterizes the so-called 'humanistic coefficient'[13] of any action or its product, the second, the nomological component of the humanistic interpretation, is the assumption of rationality.[14] The latter stipulates that the meaning to be ascribed to an activity is equivalent to the value most preferred by an agent who has preferentially ordered the anticipated outcomes of a series of alternative possible courses of action.

In its turn, the rationality assumption rested on the hypothesis that a given agent's knowledge was extensive enough to ensure action under conditions of more or less complete certitude.[15] However, the Poznań theoreticians did not delude themselves that such a 'no risk' situation ever obtained in the real world. In fact, the rationality assumption was also intended to avoid the difficulty of *ad hoc* or circular explanation, i.e., arguments in which the *explanandum* is already assumed among the statements referring to the initial conditions which are to obtain if a covering law is to be applicable. But the *ad hoc* problem is but a corollary of the fundamental epistemological difficulty, *viz*, gaining access to empirical evidence in support of assertions about agents' convictions. As the anti-naturalists knew only too well, all that seems

directly available to intersubjective inspection is the outcome of an action; the sense attributed to this outcome may or may not, for all one can judge, correspond to the result originally projected by the agent. The Poznań methodologists remarked, however, that researchers in the human sciences, confronted with an analogous difficulty, frequently sought to reconstruct the underlying knowledge by means of a so-called 'systematizing interpretation', one in which a common or typical though by no means necessarily fully explicit knowledge was reconstructed.[16] It had to be admitted that ascription of such knowledge to the agent was a theoretical ploy, amounting to an idealization of his consciousness in order to render his actions rational in the postulated sense. Nevertheless, in the opinion of the Poznań methodologists only such an idealizing reconstruction of the agent's convictions could make the formulation of the rationality assumption possible.[17]

But does not this entire conception come close after all to Weber's concept of ideal types which are to be distinguished from the (inaccessible) actual meaning the agent ascribes to his activity? And if so, does not the method of humanistic interpretation fail to acquire the stipulated realist underpinnings?

The Poznań theoreticians agree, on one hand, that it is only by means of an idealizing reconstruction that actions can be classified. As such, this procedure enables the investigation of the results of actually undertaken activities as 'imperfect', 'deviant' realizations or concretizations of the 'ideal type'.[18] Yet, on the other hand, they balk at the conclusion that the idealizing reconstructions are deprived of real referents. In their view, to the extent that these idealizations do permit classification of actions a degree of empirical confirmation for them is attainable. That means, in effect, that statements ascribing the 'same' knowledge to subjects engaged in these activities do possess empirical validity.

Now here the Poznań theoreticians raise two further questions: (1) How is it that a particular form of knowledge becomes relatively widespread despite the fact that actions carried out according to it remain relatively indeterminate, i.e., no one in undertaking that action can take into prior consideration the effects on the outcome of inevitable contingent factors and circumstances? This question assumes in fact that just as there is a discrepancy between an ideally rationalized consciousness and that of any real agent, there is virtually always a discrepancy between the intended and actually achieved results of actions. (2) How is it that under such indeterminate conditions agents evince propensities for undertaking similar courses of action, i.e., choose the same goals or values?

The Poznań school does not argue with the rather trivial observation that idealizing reconstructions articulate to some extent the cultural framework of a particular social group, in the sense that every collectivity lays claim to a knowledge and order of values enabling its members correctly to interpret actions performed in their midst.[19] Yet with reference to the methodological-epistemological plane, the Poznań school refuses to take the 'individualist' road upon which such convictions are ultimately to be ascribed to the individuals possessing and exercising them. It is no wonder, in their view, that methodological individualists frequently attribute no more than instrumental status to their concepts; they provide no arguments to clarify why a certain knowledge and convictions become widespread and particular goals desirable.[20] Kmita and his collaborators think that these issues show the need for postulating more than a mere cultural framework in the sense mentioned. What is needed in addition is a conception of social consciousness capable of resolving questions about the *genesis* of a particular system of convictions. It would then be the task of the social scientist to reconstruct the relationship between individual and social consciousness and to understand how the discrepancies between actual and intended results of activities are symptomatic of the modifications occurring within the social consciousness.

II

In this manner, the elaboration of a theory of action brought the Poznań theoreticians to the threshold of Marxist theory. To reiterate the main point: a discursive explanation of action, though it ought not lose sight of subjectivity, cannot be psychologistic, but must involve instead a key category of Marxist theory – that of social consciousness.[21]

Now given the history of orthodox Marxist doctrine, such a conception of links between individual and social consciousness is noteworthy, for it suggests an interpretation of the central precept of historical materialism – social consciousness is determined by social being – which has little to do with determinist versions of this precept, which left individual consciousness out of account altogether or relegated it to the status of a passive exponent of a collective ideology. More fundamentally still, a Marxist elucidation of humanistic interpretation of action presages a conception of social being opposed to the exaggerated holistic view at least tacitly upheld by certain species of orthodox Marxism. On the latter view, society was to be seen as a whole, not in the sense of a conglomerate however, but in that of a higher-order entity bearing emergent properties the maintenance and preservation

of which 'explained' the characteristics and transformations of its basic components, classes rather than individuals. The most that might follow from such an account of the social whole would be a determinist conception of action according to which rationality assumptions about agents' convictions would be perfectly spurious. The meaning of an action would remain completely external to it, indeed precede it insofar as to be an action at all in such a framework it would have to contribute to the preservation of holistic social properties.[22]

Now, given the methodological and epistemological requirements of the humanistic interpretation, what Kmita and his collaborators needed on the contrary was a conception of social being able to integrate the conceptions agents have of their own actions, yet guard against admitting that society is simply the product at every moment of its existence of the outcome of these personally motivated actions. What they required, in other words, was an idea of the real being of society which could accommodate the notion of the transformation of social structures in and through their undetermined reproduction by irreducible individual agents.[23]

The attempt to satisfy these desiderata has taken the form of a reconstruction of the Marxian notion of social practice in terms of a 'dialectic' of the conditions and effects of individual action. In keeping with the logic of the humanistic interpretation as the explanation of action and its products, the arguments of the Poznań school in favor of a complementary conception of social being have been more or less the following.

No one doubts that an agent's goals can be realized only if his activity is efficacious. To be efficacious an action must be not only immanently rational, i.e. correlate ends with means according to adequate knowledge; it must also contend with exterior circumstances. Now insofar as an agent cannot fully satisfy the requirements for a completely efficacious action, the results and hence meaning of his activity will differ to some degree from the goals he set himself. For instance, the means chosen could turn out to be inadequate to the projected end, which implies either that the agent did not possess the requisite knowledge or that indeed there was no pre-existing body of knowledge to apply. The last possibility is allied with another factor related to the efficacy of actions.

However successful an activity may be from the subjective standpoint, its effects extend well beyond those the subject intended to bring about, and that is simply because these come into complementary or conflictual contact with the effects of activities of the same and different types undertaken by others. In this sense, according to the Poznań theoreticians, all

activity leads to the emergence (more exactly: the maintenance at every moment) of an anonymous 'global effect'.[24] It is the unintended effect of previously and actually undertaken activities and constitutes the field of 'social practice'. Practice defined in this fashion is equivalent to the conditions each agent more or less consciously confronts when undertaking a course of action. It reacts on this action, in particular on the characteristic knowledge associated with it, continually adjusting what the fully rational agent would have to consider the best way to correlate the ends and means of his actions.[25] By the same token, the range of new goals or values actually realizable by agents is not open-ended at every moment of the existence of the social whole. Only those are associated with a communicable body of knowledge and thus taken up into the 'social consciousness' which have interacted positively with the hitherto existing state of social practice.

Social consciousness then is located and develops, so to speak, at the interface between the hitherto existing state of social practice and the actual projects of agents subject to standards of rational behavior. This 'mechanism' is identified by the Poznań school as the "functional-genetic determination of social consciousness": within the parameters of the hitherto existing knowledge and values of a society – the genetic component – only those novel ideas, values, etc. can acquire public currency as standards of rational activity which in fact cohere (i.e., are functionally compatible) with the structure of social practice.[26]

It might be doubted whether Kmita and his colleagues really resist the contention that their concept of a global effect requires acknowledging a special mode of being for the social which is impervious to the intentions of individual agents.[27] All they are prepared to admit, it seems, is that, if an agent is to be effective, he cannot but reproduce the social matrix of his activity. They might say with Marx, that to produce men must at the same time continually 'recreate' the particular conditions of their production, i.e., furnish what is necessary for them to acquire and maintain their identity as producers of a particular kind. In this sense, agents' self-identity surely belongs to the conditions in which they undertake their projects.

As I have presented it, what is noteworthy about this theory of social being is the fact that it is constructed to render justice to the humanistic interpretation of action. It is the result of methodological and attendant epistemological concerns having to do with the status of the nomothetic component of the explanation of action conceived in this manner. The rationality assumption in effect supposes that in their choices agents will gravitate toward the values and associated means of realization characteristic

of the state of the social consciousness at any moment. 'Gravitate toward' rather then simply assimilate, because for the sake of the humanistic interpretation social consciousness is to meet the need for a realistically interpretable idealizing reconstruction of an agent's consciousness. However, in order to account for the discrepancy between concrete actions and the postulated social consciousness the Poznań school set out to construct a conception of social being which would make it possible to speak of social consciousness as somehow real, i.e., as something to be discerned among the objective conditions of rational action, though functioning in such a way as not to deprive the latter of its character as individually motivated action. It seems that the only conception of social being that can satisfy this requirement is that according to which men, in and through their actions, constitute the structures in which they both discover and implement afresh their convictions as agents.[28]

In this way the Poznań school has grappled not only with the theory of action, but with issues which exercise the best minds in contemporary discussions about social theory and method. The answers it suggests, whatever their intrinsic merits, are at least worth examining because they are to a large extent free of the deadening stereotypes which have all too often plagued the growth of Marxist theory.

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NOTES

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[1] Until recently these departments were: Logic and Methodology of Science (J. Kmita), Marxist Philosophy (J. Such), History of Marxism (S. Dziamski), History of Philosophy (S. Kaczmarek), Dialectics of Knowledge (L. Nowak). I have been told that the situation has changed, though I am unable to confirm this information.

[2] For a complete bibliography of works in the period 1968–1974, cf. *Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of Science and the Humanities*, vol. 1, 1, 1975, pp. 120–137. There is also a Polish language journal, *Studia metodologiczne*, which has been appearing since 1965. Other, more recent titles appear in the notes below.

[3] Kmita's books are (with L. Nowak): *Studia nad teoretycznymi podstawami humanistyki*, Poznań, 1968; *Z metodologicznych problemów interpretacji humanistycznej*, Warsaw, 1971; *Wykłady z logiki i metodologii nauki*, Warsaw, 1973; *Szkice z teorii poznania naukowego*, Warsaw, 1976. He has also edited several collected works: *Założenia*

metodologiczne Kapitału, Warsaw, 1970; *Elementy marksistowskiej metodologii humanistyki*, Poznań, 1973; *Metodologiczne implikacje epistemologii marksistowskiej*, Poznań, 1974; *Wartość-dzieło-sens*, Warsaw, 1975; *Zagadnienie przełomu antypozytywistecznego w humanistyce*, Warsaw, 1979.

[4] Nowak's books are: (with Kmita) *Studia* ... (see above); *Metodologiczne podstawy prawoznawstwa*, Poznań, 1970; *U podstaw marksistowskiej metodologii nauk*, Warsaw, 1971; *Modele edonomiczne: Studium z metodologii ekonomii politycznej*, Warsaw, 1972; *Interpretacja prawniczna. Studium z metodologii prawoznawstwa*, Warsaw 1973; *Anatomia krytyki marksizmu*, Warsaw, 1973; *Zasady marksistowskiej filozofii nauki*, Warsaw, 1974; *U podstaw marksistowskiej aksjologii*, Warsaw, 1974; *Wykłady z filozofii marksistowskiej*, vol. 1 *Dialektyka*, Poznań, 1976, vol. 2, *Ontologija i epistemologija* Poznań, 1978. He has edited: *Teoria i rzeczywistość*, Poznań, 1976; *Założenia dialektyki*, Poznań 1977; *Założenia materializmu historycznego*, Poznań, 1978; (with A. Klawiter) *Odkrycie, abstrakcja, prawda, empiria, historia a idealizacja*, Warsaw, Poznań, 1979.

[5] Topolski's books are too numerous to list in their entirety; the following are representative of his association with the Poznań school: *Narodziny kapitalizmu w Europie XIV–XVII wieku*, Warsaw, 1967; *Studia z metodologii historii*, Warsaw, 1960; *Metodologia historii*, Warsaw, 1973; *Świat bez historii*, Warsaw, 1976; *Marksizm i historia*, 1977.

[6] The conception was first developed by Kmita and Nowak in their jointly written volume of 1968.

[7] Kmita and Nowak, 1968.

[8] Kmita, 1971, pp. 90–91.

[9] Kmita does not reject outright the possibility that some day completely adequate accounts of individual behavior may be furnished by a psychology which does not lose sight of the essential constituents of human actions; but contemporary psychology is not yet up to the task.

[10] Anti-naturalism and positivism, for all their differences, share the same view of science: (1) the search for unshakable criteria of science, (2) phenomenalism, (3) induction as the means to obtain universal empirical generalities. In accepting this program, anti-naturalists simultaneously perceive its inadequacy for the human sciences and accordingly seek to widen the experiential basis (intuitive understanding, etc.) in order to account for the particularities of the objects of these sciences (Kmita and Nowak, 1968, p. 120). Two recent writers who have reached conclusions similar to those of Kmita and Nowak are B. Hindess: *Philosophy and Methodology of the Social Sciences*, London, Harvester, 1977, and R. Bhaskar: *A Realist Theory of Science*, second edition, London, Harvester, 1978; *The Possibility of Naturalism*, London, Harvester, 1979.

[11] In 1968, Kmita and Nowak provided the following account of anti-positivist naturalism: (1) there are only hypothetical extraspective statements; (2) all statements regarded by anti-naturalists as observation statements are brought to the level of theoretical statements. To these theses were added: (3) support for the anti-naturalist conception of the systematizing structure (i.e., methodological holism), (4) anti-individualism. The last two points underwent modification in Kmita's 1971 study, while the hypothetical-theoretical character of all statements in a theory became the object of protracted analysis by L. Nowak in his numerous works on the Marxist philosophy of science.

[12] Kmita: 'O poznawczym oraz praktycznym znaczeniu badan metodologicznych', *Studia filozoficzne* 6, 1973, p. 176.

[13] The Poznań school borrows this expression from one of their more illustrious predecessors in Poznań, Florian Znaniecki. For their interpretation of Znaniecki, cf. Kmita: 'Kontekst odkrycia – Kontekst uzasadniania', *Studia metodologiczne* 12, pp. 29–47; W. Ławniczak: *Teoretyczne podstawy interpretacii dzieł sztuki plastycznej*, Poznań 1975, chap. 3; by the same author: 'Współczynnik humanistyczny dzieła sztuki', in Kmita (ed.), 1975, pp. 145–162.

[14] Kmita considers that students of culture tacitly make this assumption in their investigations. On paper their arguments interpreting an action or the property of its product are logically incomplete; but a reconstruction of their actual practice in the gathering of evidence brings to light their reliance on something like a rationality assumption. Cf. Kmita, 1971, chaps. 1 and 2 for the theory and a host of examples.

[15] In 1968, Kmita and Nowak developed the rationality assumption on the basis of the logic of decision theory, in particular the work of R. D. Luce and H. Raiffa.

[16] The theory of systematizing interpretation is set out in Kmita, 1971, chap. 2.

[17] Cf. e.g. Nowak: 'Idealizacja i interpretacja humanistyczna', *Studia filozoficzne* 4, 1975.

[18] According to Kmita (1976, p. 9), the difference between the idealized interpretation of an action and the factually accomplished action should be explained by taking into account the differences obtaining between the subject's actual convictions and what the Poznań methodologists identify as the referent of idealizing reconstructions, the so-called 'social consciousness'. Only this entire procedure constitutes a complete humanistic interpretation.

[19] Cf. Kmita (ed.), 1975, Part I: 'Kultura jako sfera świadomosci spolecznej'.

[20] Cf. Kmita (ed.), 1978 for articles on Chomsky, Piaget, *et al.*, dealing with rules of cultural competence, etc.

[21] It is interesting to note the virtual absence of references to Marxist doctrine in Kmita and Nowak's study of 1968. By 1970, however, reference to Marxist themes had become *de rigueur* in their works. In connection with the methodology of the human sciences Marxism was contrasted with structuralism and associated with genetic approaches.

[22] Kmita's views on this form of social 'holism' are not unequivocal. Compare his remarks in Kmita, 1971 with those in Kmita, 1976.

[23] I borrow this formulation from R. Bhaskar: 'On the possibility of social scientific knowledge and the limits of naturalism', *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour* 8, 1978, 1, many of whose ideas and expressions resemble those of the Poznań theoreticians. It is worth noting, however, that Bhaskar scoffs at rationality assumptions to explain what agents do rather than, as he puts it, how they do it.

[24] The most typical global effect in Marxist theory is of course the division of labor which constitutes a hierarchy of activity-types running from the most basic material production to the relatively autonomous spheres of cultural activity. It is perhaps needless to recall that much has been said about such hierarchies constituting a relational system designated by the term 'totality'.

[25] It should be clear that social practice, as a concept, is not coextensive with the concept of action. As a matter of fact the Poznań theoreticians have taken to distinguishing three things: personal activity (*czynność*), actually accomplished activities (*działanie*), the global effect or practice (*praktyka społeczna*).

[26] As presented here the view is somewhat simplified. If the global effect is a hierarchy, an ordered rather than accidental system of interrelated activity-types, then Kmita and

his colleagues adopt Marx's language, e.g., in the 1859 Preface according to which society as a whole "needs" certain ideas to realize tasks. Does not this manner of speaking come close to a reificationist conception of society?

[27] Kmita opts for what he calls a "radical anti-individualism" in opposition to "extreme anti-individualism"; cf. Kmita, 1976.

[28] In Bhaskar's terms, such a conception should be named 'relational': "(i) social structures . . . do not exist independently of the activities they govern; (ii) social structures . . . do not exist independently of the agents' conceptions of what they are doing in their activity; (iii) social structures . . . may be only relatively enduring . . ." (Bhaskar, *op. cit.* p. 238).

ANDRIES SARLEMIJN

IS THE PLANNING OF SCIENCE POSSIBLE? A COMPARISON OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND SOVIET MARXISM[1]

I. COMPLEXITY OF THE PROBLEM

The planning of science is a complex idea which seems to be incompatible with a number of conceptions of science, namely:

(a) The conception that science develops autonomously because scientists are led exclusively by their object of study and their method.

(b) The difficulty presented by the complexity of the sciences as a whole. No one can command a comprehensive view of all the sciences, their various schools and trends, nor can he thus forecast what the consequences of a new theory or discovery will be to all the disciplines and industrial production both present and future.

(c) The often unexpected developments in the various fields of science. To take an example at random, the subject matter of sociology can undergo drastic change because new schools of thought become popular, which raises questions as to whether a science planner can in fact foresee such radical changes.

(d) Factors as yet insufficiently investigated from the psychological standpoint. Are the main discoveries of the past not attributable to genius and luck, which defy planning?

(e) The conception of science as an institution which exercises an autonomous cultural and critical function which could be lost by control for the sake of socio-economic ends.

(f) The problems inherent in science policy. Towards what goal must planning be directed and how can it be guaranteed that the chosen goals are reached?

Regarded in this way, the subject is too complicated to be dealt with in one paper, and limitations will have to be made. The present writer has decided on a comparison of Western philosophy of science with Soviet Marxism, as the result of the following considerations:

(a) In the philosophy of science in the West, many arguments are adduced against the planning of science. Let us submit these arguments to critical analysis and examine particularly the grounds on which they are built. On this point, philosophy of science deviates strikingly from economics and sociology of science.

James J. O'Rourke et al. (*eds.*), *Contemporary Marxism*, 109–144.
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(b) Planned economy in the U.S.S.R. was, in the beginning, considered as absurd here in the West. But later, important economists, such as Jan Tinbergen, also advocated a certain form of planned economy. Are there any grounds for expecting a similar development in the field of planned science? The political considerations below appear to point in that direction:

(i) efforts to reduce structural unemployment in the "rich" industrial countries by means of better coordination between science, technology and industry with the aim of achieving higher production;

(ii) unemployment among graduates;

(iii) the realisation that the planning of science is in fact taking place or has done so, for instance in the Second World War, with reference especially to the atom bomb, in space travel projects, the penetration of nuclear energy[2] and, in addition, in all industrial research.

On the basis of all these considerations it is to be expected that in Western philosophy of science too, discussions on this idea will become an even more familiar matter.

(c) It struck me as relevant to compare the viewpoint of Western philosophy of science with that of Soviet Marxism, which has been proclaiming the idea of planning the sciences for more than 60 years.

II. THE LIBERALISM OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

I will begin my analyses of the liberal models of Western philosophy of science with the introduction of the concepts "model" and "liberalism". A philosophy of science *model* is an idea on the basis of which a (meta)theory of science is developed. The word "model" is often used in that sense in economics and sociology. I shall state the most important examples from modern philosophy of science.[3]

The neopositivists think of the development of the sciences as similar to the growth of the picture which takes shape in working out a jigsaw puzzle. In history, insight into the separate pieces of the puzzle and the relationship between them grows. A science (for instance economics) is an independent discipline, and hence a separate piece of the jigsaw puzzle, when it can explain the processes of its special field without having to refer to initial or boundary conditions obtaining in another field (for example, social psychology). In the Darwinist model of Popper, on the other hand, scientific theories are considered as similar to biological species which either become stronger when they succeed in standing up to a falsification attempt, or "die out" when they fail to do so. According to the revolutionary models

of Kuhn and Lakatos, theories are developed in accordance with the guidelines of paradigms or programmes which, in a "revolution", are rejected when they cease to guarantee the formation of theories which hold promise of being successful. Since methodological and programmatical armour cause damage to intelligence and imagination, Feyerabend has put forward a plea for setting up an anarchical model, enabling scientists to work out their original intuitions as free agents.

In the context of this article, a model is *liberal* if it does not lead to a solution of the complex of problems affecting the planning of science. In particular, a model is said to be liberal$_1$ if, in the context of the said model, questions on the planning of science are without significance and, further, a model is liberal$_2$ when it is incompatible with the planning of science. It is, I hope, clear that the statement "x is liberal" does not imply a general theoretical judgment, nor does it attempt to link up with any political party. It does not even imply any judgment as to relevance, because a discussion with a form of liberalism$_2$ can be useful in considerations on planning theory; on the other hand, philosophy (or sociology, psychology, etc.) of science can, as we shall see, be understood in such ways, that the planning of science has no connection with its field of research, whereas the philosopher (or sociologist, psychologist, etc.) involved in politics will of course advocate a certain science policy. In that case he is liberal$_1$ only in his academic field.

II.1. The Liberalism of Neopositivism

The model of the neopositivists is liberal$_1$ because their theory of science is a formal theory. As a methodology it is a purely logical metatheory in the sense of Hilbert's metamathematics,[4] which ignores the historical development of a theory and concentrates exclusively on the justification of a theory. From such metatheories no prognoses or other substantive insights into the development of the sciences can be derived. Moreover, the neopositivist model is liberal$_1$ because – for reasons that I have discussed elsewhere[5] – it is incompatible with a substantive theory on the history of science, so that considerations on the dynamics of science remain unfounded.[6]

Otto Neurath occupies a special place among the neopositivists as he is not only a philosopher of science, but also an economist and sociologist. He is not only a neopositivist but also a Marxist. As a social scientist he defends liberalism$_2$.

He believes that innovations in science and technology cannot be predicted:

If now, for instance, a prognosis is to yield a new form of machine, the forecaster should be able roughly to describe it. To be capable of doing that amounts to anticipating the invention as of today, at least in principle. To foretell what calculations Einstein would make would mean to be Einstein himself (1931, pp. 404–405).

Not only science forecasting but also science planning are therefore impossible for Neurath.[7]

Establishment of what liberalism is to the neopositivists is interesting because of the high degree of agreement between neopositivism and Soviet Marxism:

(a) Both speak of an asymptotic material unity of all the objects of the empirical sciences.

(b) To both these schools of thought the development of the sciences has had the following practical consequences: religion and speculative philosophy can no longer be accepted as a basis for responsible action. In the works of Neurath in particular, we encounter a naive, positivist belief in the rationalisation of social life and in the elimination of religion by science.[8] Moreover, in Neurath's work we note the lack of a critical analysis of the relationship between pure science and technology. Without a word of argument he assumes that the advance of science also implies that of the (engineering) technologies. The Soviet-Marxist standpoint on the relationship between science and its practical application will be dealt with in Section III.

II.2. The Liberalism of Popper's School

II.2.1. Popper's model is liberal$_1$ with a significance which is much stronger than the neopositivist model, since Popper wants to indicate that planning in the strict sense of the word makes no sense. In his book, *The Poverty of Historicism*, Popper's considerations coincide with those of Neurath quoted above, to the effect that as the development of pure science cannot be forecast – even by the scientist himself – and as pure science exerts an influence on applied science, on industrial production and thus society as a whole, Popper considers any sort of planning, ergo the planning of science, as impossible.[9]

The strong language used in *The Poverty of Historicism* makes it very difficult to interpret Popper's real insights faithfully. In the preceding paragraph I have made use of the adjective "pure" with reference to science in order to provide the interpretation with such nuances as are in agreement with Popper's later work. In addition, this interpretation demands that we distinguish between: (a) the planning of science as rejected by Popper in the

strict sense of the word, and (b) the planning of science in the wide sense, that is without the requirement of providing a precisely described target (for instance a given form of advanced production).

In some of Popper's texts it is apparent, in fact, that the scientist can make a definitive contribution to social development, namely by indicating ways to eliminate evil:

> [The method of piecemeal technology] can be used ... to search for, and fight against the greatest and most urgent evils of society, rather than to seek, and to fight for, some ultimate good (as holists are inclined to do). But a systematic fight against definite wrongs, against concrete forms of injustice or exploitation, and avoidable suffering such as poverty or unemployment, is a very different thing from the attempt to realize a distant ideal blueprint of society (1957, p. 91).

Can the politician, however, force a scientist by financial means to engage himself on behalf of certain projects? In that case the meaning of "planning of science" is identical with that of "allocation of funds". In Section II.2.2., we will find that even such a weak form of planning cannot be made compatible with Popper's liberalism without stumbling up against a number of problems. However, Hans Albert's interpretation of Popper's view does permit – as we shall see below in Section II.2.3 – the planning of applied science.

II.2.2. Popper and Albert are not only liberal$_1$; in contrast to the positivists – who at heart considered themselves as anti-philosophers – the former base also a liberalism$_2$ on philosophy. How such a basis is to be appraised is made clear in the text by Albert given below in Section II.2.3.

> To a much greater extent than most people would be inclined to admit, social practice in the various fields – from science to industry – is inspired by philosophical ideas, some of which are easily overlooked as they assume the guise of the obvious (1972a, pp. 103–104).

According to Albert the professional philosophers have to define those ideas explicitly. The philosophy of science of Popper's school focuses upon the idea of "scientific method", to which the results of the modern sciences are due. This philosophy of science is more normative than that of the logical positivists. Popper's liberalism$_2$ is derived from the actual application of the said method, to wit:

> Its success depends mainly on three conditions, namely, that sufficiently numerous (and ingenious) theories exist, that they be sufficiently varied, and that sufficiently severe tests should be made. In this way we may, if we are lucky, insure the survival of the fittest theory by the elimination of the less fit (1940, p. 313).

This process, again, can only develop if there is a sufficient number of people with unlimited freedom to develop, defend and test theories:

> Ultimately, progress depends very largely on political factors; on political institutions that safeguard the freedom of thought: in democracy (1957, p. 155).

> The progress of science depends on free competition of thought, hence on freedom of thought and hence, ultimately, on political freedom (idem., p. 90).

These liberal thought processes are later even reinforced by Popper's quasi-Platonistic theory about "world$_3$", in which theories lead their own lives.[10] He draws a distinction between pure and applied science even as regards their development. Pure science aims at integration, that is to say, the most universal theory. Applied science, on the other hand, seeks specialisation. This distinction in Popper's case does not imply any difference as regards the relationship between science and society. In all the thought experiments which go to establish the existence of "world$_3$" this distinction is absent.[11]

II.2.3. Hans Albert does distinguish between the relationships between social developments and pure and applied science. In his view, pure science cannot be controlled in any way. Its progress is based on the free consideration of theories that deal with theoretical problems and on testing those theories, which can then give rise to new problems. To forbid the consideration or testing of certain theories would constitute a break with an age-long tradition and result in a "social catastrophe immeasurable in its immensity" (1972b, p. 328). The pure science method does not work in the view of Albert either, unless theoretical pluralism is accepted, and this, again, implies a social and political pluralism, because it has to be protected against anti-democratic forces. The state is obliged therefore – in the views of both Popper and Albert – to safeguard the autonomy of pure science.

The planning of pure science is not only in conflict with the method, but also with the object of science, this last being understood as the "approximation of truth" (1972b, pp. 320, 327). As regards truth, privileges or competences do not have to be entrusted to authorities outside science, in the opinion of Albert. His conclusion, quoted below, is quite explicit.

> Insofar as it aims in its practical researches at progress in the establishment of truth, pure science requires no guidance from outside nor can such outside interference fail to have negative effects on its capacity (1972b, p. 329).

In spite of the strict borders he recognises between science and politics, Albert admits that the results obtained by pure science can be oriented

towards practical requirements in two ways. He expresses the first by means of the word "Aufklärung", which signifies both "information" and "enlightenment". Enlightenment is achieved by criticism, justified by the insight obtained by social science, of obsolete ideas on which existing social institutions are based. Obsolete ideas about what occurs in nature can be corrected with the aid of the physical sciences. For the second practical orientation, Albert makes use of the term "Steuerung". Essentially the word means "steering", but for Albert it signifies the use of the knowledge of pure science to solve technical problems. Thus both terms are based on the possibility of explaining phenomena by means of theories.

> The explaining of a fact means, among other things, showing how it could in principle be prevented or caused, providing, of course, the appropriate toe-holds for human intervention are given (1972b, p. 331).

This explanation tallies with various texts in Popper's *Poverty of Historicism*. It is untenable, however, owing to the *logical* asymmetry between "explain" and "prevent" or "cause". This asymmetry has practical consequences, for instance, that while a person may be able to explain an eclipse of the sun, he still may not have sufficient technical insight to allow him to prevent the eclipse. The clause "providing, of course, . . ." used by Albert shows that he has foreseen such an objection. The asymmetry applies also to social phenomena, however, such as present-day structural unemployment, which is easily enough explained, but by no means so readily overcome. Elimination of the conditions bringing about unemployment can, implicitly, be the cause of unemployment in a different way. It is *only* when all the conditions bringing about a phenomenon are known and can be eliminated, that the phenomenon can be prevented, and it is on this point that Albert's methodology is inadequate.

As regards the relationship between science and society, Albert states that government authorities and industry exert an influence on technological development, that is, on the application of pure science. The distribution of power, in his view, should be based on the following liberal socio-economic principles. The state concentrates only on those problems whose investigation is not directed by the autonomous decisions of business enterprises. These problems include transport planning, environmental protection, public health, education, etc. Technical development is under control after all. Is the development of pure science, including among other things its measurement devices, not dependent on technology? Albert admits that it is, but still maintains that pure science is nevertheless strictly autonomous, and that for

science "the imperatives of everyday life" have an entirely different meaning from the one they have for technology (1972b, p. 329).

In Popper's school, the relationship between pure science, applied science and society is, *briefly summarised*, the following. The pure sciences develop autonomously in the direction of integration by the method of trial-and-error. Pure science finds application by that same method and is exposed to influence exerted by government and industry, the direction of development being specialisation and *not* integration. For Popper and Albert, the planning of (pure) science is *in principle* incompatible with the critical method. In Section IV, I shall return to the question whether that is the case and, if so, to what extent.

II.3. Revolutionary Models and Planning of Science

The models used by Kuhn and Lakatos are liberal_3 in the sense that science-planning in the context of these models is problematic. The discussion on this point is not as yet over. Neither of the two philosophers has concerned himself explicitly with the problem.[12] Their analyses, however, have given a turn to the discussion on the demarcation between science and non-science.[13] According to the neopositivist principle of demarcation, it was held that notions that do not satisfy stringent logical and empirical criteria fall outside the empirical sciences. Even Popper demanded on principle that a theory must be testable. Kuhn and Lakatos, on the other hand, point out that untestable *intuitions* as to the structure of the object and notions on the manner in which it should be investigated have played an important part in the history of the sciences. Kuhn saw in this a reason for considering Popper's critical method as of secondary importance.[14] Lakatos, however, postulates that a programme is scientific only when the intuitions lead to critically testable theories.[15] On these grounds he distinguishes between internal and external history.[16] The internal, that is the so-called rational reconstruction describes ahistorically how a well thought out intuition can and must lead to increased insight into physics. In this fictitious description, for example, electron spin must, from the outset, be considered as part of Bohr's programme. Compared to this context, external history comes to be a commentary on the internal one and has to explain with reference to the quoted example, why Bohr was so "short-sighted" in 1913. Kuhn (1974b, p. 316) protests against this demarcation on the part of Lakatos (1974b) and puts forward a plea for a fruitful combination of the internal and external approaches. According to him, it will often be possible to understand from the

religious, economic and cultural context how certain scientists have arrived at their viewpoint.[17]

Because of his positive evaluation of external development, Kuhn has had a very great deal of influence on social-scientific research into scientific knowledge. He is sometimes reckoned among the sociologists (Mulkay, 1977, p. 120), sometimes as a psychologist (Fisch, 1977, p. 280), and Macleod (1977, p. 157) will have him as a social historiographer. Mulkay states that, thanks to Kuhn, the sociologists have discovered problems which were unthinkable until that time, for instance those of cognitive development, group information and intellectual resistance. Lakatos' challenging opinion on external development has also led to different sorts of sociological research (Macleod, idem, p. 161). Thanks to the influence of Kuhn and Lakatos, discoveries have also come to be regarded in a new light, in which they appear to be less accidental than was held to be the case by traditional philosophy of science.[18]

Kuhn is received with much less enthusiasm by E. Jantsch and J. J. Salomon whose research focuses on the areas of planning and forecasting.[19] This is an understandable reaction, since paradigms, as Kuhn comprehends them, cannot of course be "made" and since, as he also thinks, science and technology develop autonomously and independently of each other. A new paradigm can only come into being as the outcome of the problems which have arisen in the context of the crisis of the old paradigm. To abrogate established paradigms would be tantamount to disposing of mature science and developed technology. It is true, of course, that there is an interaction between science and technology, but doing away with the element of autonomy would also put an end to the interaction. Kuhn's liberalism is thus scarcely to be distinguished from that of Popper. In spite of this, R. Johnston and T. Jagtenberg are of the opinion that "post-Kuhnian sociology of scientific knowledge" will make possible "a more effective linking of knowledge to needs" (1978, pp. 33 and 52).

At this point I shall break off my situation sketch of Western philosophy. Of course, in a more detailed treatment of the subject I should have had to deal with the methodology of the technical sciences including, among other authors, M. Bunge, J. Agassi, J. O. Wisdom and F. Rapp who have dealt with specific characteristics of these sciences.[20] For the purposes of a "Sovietological" study, however, it is sufficient – indeed, for the sake of clarity, even necessary – to compare the developments in the U.S.S.R. with *some* theories of the relationship between science and society with which the general Western reader is familiar.

III. IS SOVIET MARXISM ANTI-LIBERAL?

In the U.S.S.R. the planning of science has never been subjected to discussion on fundamental grounds.[21] Therefore it is to be expected that Soviet Marxism is anti-liberal (in the sense stipulated in this article) and is founded on a fully described form of planning of science. It will be found, however, that a moderate form of liberalism is also tolerated in the U.S.S.R. Even in theory some autonomy cannot be denied to industry, technology and pure science, in spite of the methods used by sociologists and economists to make the difference between the various levels in social life as slight as possible.

III.1. The Classics on Planning and on the Practical Function of Science – Difficulties of Interpretation. Politicization of Science During the Stalin Era

I shall begin my analyses by marking the limits within which the planning of science can be discussed. In Soviet-Marxist terms an autonomous development of (technical) science is only defensible provided such autonomy is compatible in some way or other with the ideology principle, the principle of practice and that of *partijnost'*. On the one hand, these postulates stand in the way of a clearly formulated theory of the uncontrollable autodynamics of scientific disciplines. On the other, these principles have been derived from the works of the classical authors; because of the "age" of these sources, there is a good number of different possible interpretations. If we are to gain insight into Soviet-Marxist discussions on the autonomy and planned control of the sciences, a short sketch of the historical developments is a *sine qua non*.

III.1.1. Neither Marx nor Engels concerned himself with the lot of the scientist. It was only the social function of science which stimulated Marx's attention. This and the changed present situation make a revaluation of their philosophy of science a difficult matter. Another difficulty is caused by the fact that when Marx and Engels speak of the relationship of science to society they do so from one of the three following standpoints: (a) the (physical) sciences as they function in capitalist society, (b) these as they will function in some better society, (c) the "positive" economic science as professed by Marx.

(Sub a) The physical sciences are each considered in their relationship to industry. By application of the physical sciences the forces of nature are made to serve the needs of production (MEW 23, pp. 573–574). To Marx, a machine is thus "science in real form" (MEW 26 (1), p. 367). The

development of the forces of production is connected with that of the sciences (MEW 23, pp. 22 and 554). "Connection with" is, however, a vague expression and provokes the question of whether innovation is attributable primarily to industry or to the sciences. Engels is of the opinion that there is interaction, but thinks the actual stimulus comes from industry:

> The technological needs of society stimulate science more than ten universities (MEW 39, p. 205).

As owners of the forces of production, the capitalists have at their disposal the results of science and technology (MEW 26 (1), p. 367; 23, p. 395). They can make use of them without having the general welfare in view. Just as the workers have no say as to what happens to a machine that they have made, so does a technological-scientific discovery go on to lead its own life and become an autonomous production potential which is at the disposal of the capitalist and over which the scientist has no say (MEW 23, p. 322). Marx's prophecy is that this will change as capitalism develops. Like the other forces of production, the sciences will also be centralised and the process will eventually lead to "deliberate technological application of science" (idem, p. 705) and to "deliberate, planned control" by socially oriented people (idem, p. 94).

(Sub b) Marx does not clearly explain how such control is to be carried out. It is, however, clear that, in the view of Marx and Engels, the traditional barriers between philosophy, physical science and industry will have to be overcome in order to bring about this control. The application of the physical sciences in industry was possible in the past, in Marx's view, because those sciences threw off the shackles of philosophy. Paradoxically enough, he says that by becoming "inhuman", the physical sciences took the first step along the path to human emancipation. By this, Marx means that the physical sciences concentrated purely on the improvement of industrial production and lost sight of the real interests of man. That was to be set right in a better society.

> Later, anthropology will form part of the physical sciences and the physical sciences will also be part of anthropology – there will only be *one* science.[22]

Marx himself never worked this programme out, and contemporary philosophers of science are unable to read anything significant into it.

(Sub c) Economics, as Marx himself professes it, is an accurate analysis of the "natural laws" of capitalism (MEW 23, p. 12); it is a positive science and at the same time the basis of so-called scientific socialism. It is distinguished

from classical (bourgeois) economics by its historical method, that is by the analysis of the interaction between the technological developments and the social institutions. On the one hand, the capitalist institutions stimulate science, technology and economics and, on the other, the scientific technology and economic developments undermine the rationality of the capitalist institutions in the course of time. For this reason the historical method has a *practical* relevance to *politics*. In this context the "criterion for practice" begins to assume some significance. This criterion, however, should not apply to economics alone, but to all sciences. The thesis is not incontrovertibly laid down and has, in Soviet Marxism, led to various interpretations, as we shall see in Section III.1.2. On the one hand, Marx and Engels are in agreement in maintaining that the sciences are practical and are part of the *basis* of social development in so far as they are applied in industry. On the other hand, in other texts of Marx and Engels, the sciences are assigned to the ideological *superstructure* of development. Do Marx and Engels distinguish between good (practical) and bad (ideological) science? In any case, speculative philosophy and classical economics are considered as part of the ideological superstructure of the bourgeoisie, although the criticism of philosophy and economics is practical. One wonders according to what criterion this is supposed to be so. In his letter to Franz Mehring, Engels explains that, while the impractical ideologist in fact bases his opinions on science, ignoring practical applications, he concentrates wholly on theoretical development. Quite erroneously this "scientist" considers this development to be autonomous (MEW 39, p. 97) and has quite lost sight of the fact that theory is affected by everyday life, so that "where the speculative approach ceases – namely, in real life – really positive science begins" (MEW 3, p. 27).

The above formulation taken from *Die Deutsche Ideologie* agrees with Lenin's view, to wit:

> The view of life, of practice must be the first and basic view of the theory of knowledge. It inevitably leads to materialism because it sweeps aside the innumerable whims and fancies of the scholasticism of professors. Of course, one mustn't forget that the human imagination cannot in fact fully satisfy the criterion of practice or the opposite. The criterion is "indefinite" enough to prevent human knowledge from becoming "absolute" and at the same time definite enough to be used in the struggle against all sorts of idealism and agnosticism. When that which is established practically is the only, latest and objective truth, it follows and it must be admitted, that the way of science that is based on the materialist point of view is the only way to the truth (LW 14, pp. 146–147).

Lenin, apparently, just as Marx and Engels, wants the sciences to concentrate on the problems of everyday life (practice) and to do so in such a way that

they form the foundations of the materialist politics of the Communist Party. It would be unfair to criticise these texts from the point of view of the (unsuccessful) discussions in Western philosophy of science on the demarcation line between science and ideology (philosophy). What we must do, however, is consider its significance with a view to gaining insight into Soviet Marxism. At least two interpretations of the principle of practice are open to Soviet Marxists.

(a) *The sociological interpretation* regards the reactionary scientist as not being interested in changing social relationships. He will therefore be inclined to seek refuge in theoretical speculations, not concern himself with applied science and not take the trouble to explain or describe technological and economic developments as precisely as possible. By contrast, a Soviet-Marxist scientist is, according to this sociological interpretation, interested in doing so. This interpretation is in conformity with the scientific foundation of socialism, "positively" understood, and with the objectivity of science as defended by Lenin. Apparently this interpretation is assumed in the present-day general debate on science in which the Soviet successes in science and technology are attributed to Marxist-Leninist ideology. However, this interpretation cannot be followed strictly because it can lead to political "positivism". If the practically inclined scientist is the only physical or social-scientific engineer then it is he and *not the Party* who decides the targets of science planning. We shall see in Section III.2 that this is, in fact, a point for discussion.

(b) The *methodological interpretation* is different. In the Soviet-Marxist sense a theory is "positively" scientific if it is found to be applicable in industry, technology or organisation. In Section III.2 we shall see that the Soviet Marxists hold this to be possible although at the same time they recognise the difficulties. The invention of a machine then would only be practical if its manufacture is profitable or can at least be paid for in the short term! We shall come back to this again in Section III.2.4.

III.1.2. Until 1930 the principle of practice and that of *partijnost'* had no drastic consequences for the profession of science and philosophy. Lunačarskij and Bogdanov, the main representatives of the positivism condemned by Lenin, remained active both in science and politics. Lunačarskij even became a Commissioner of Education. In 1929 he was obliged to relinquish that position. In the same year positivism was condemned by Bukharin, Stepanov and Minin, among others. Following this, the division of science into either "bourgeois" or "Marxist" was strictly observed in both the selection of

scientific personnel and the evaluation of scientific development. At the international congress on the history of science and technology held in London in 1931, Gessen read a paper entitled 'The Social and Economic Roots of Newton's Principia'. Its main thesis was:

> Newton did not see and did not solve the problem of the conservation of energy, but not because his genius was insufficiently great. Great men, no matter how notable their genius, in all spheres formulate and resolve those tasks which have been raised for accomplishment by the historical development of productive forces and production relationships (1931, p. 203).

Even the classical mechanics of Newton is called a bourgeois theory and part of the ideological superstructure. Kol'man contended even that mathematics is dependant on technology, economics and industry:

> The position of mathematics, as that of any science, is at bottom determined by the development and the position of the forces of production, of technology and economy. The latter affect mathematics both directly, by presenting it with new problems, creating its material basis and supplying its man-power, and indirectly through the prevailing outlook upon the world, the philosophy of the ruling class (1931, p. 215).

To Soviet-Marxism in the year 1931, science is no longer taken to belong to the base, as Marx and Engels took it, and is no longer considered as part of the productive forces. What is the goal of this ideologising of the sciences? At the same congress, this was made clear by M. Rubinstein, a professor of economics and a member of the presidium of GOSPLAN:

> Even more important than the planning of scientific research work is the direct *organisational connection of science and technology with the large masses of the working class* (1931, p. 61).

In the interests of political discipline, science comes to be considered as ideology.

In his considerations on the relationship between politics, economics and mathematics, Kol'man asserts that:

> like any other science, philosophy cannot exist under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat without the leadership of the Party . . . [and]
>
> all attempts to present a theory or a scientific discipline as an autonomous and independent discipline in fact signify opposition to the general line (1939b, p. 27).

Strict "control" of science by the political leadership leads to avoidance of fruitful discussion, particularly on important practical problems, out of sheer fear. This has been noted on various occasions by the political leaders

themselves, for instance in 1934 by M. Karapetjan, in 1947 by A. Ždanov and in 1950 by Stalin in his 'Letters on Linguistics', in which language is assigned to the "neutral" base. These letters brought about an absolute revolution. Before that time – as is apparent from the Rozental'-Judin *slovar'* of 1940 (pp. 181–182) – every science was regarded as an ideology, based on the "productive-practical reality of the people". The October Revolution and socialism in the U.S.S.R., according to the *slovar'*, would bring about a new era in the sciences. Science in the U.S.S.R. would therefore be pursued in a way different from that elsewhere in the world. Stalin's position in 1950 on the neutrality of language started discussions on the social functions of science and particularly on the question whether it is part of the base or the ideological superstructure. In 1951 S. G. Strumilin read a paper before the Department of Economics and Law of the Academy of Science of the U.S.S.R. in which, in contrast to the traditional asseverations, he said that Newton was a genius, misunderstanding of foreign scientific successes would slow down Communism, and only pseudo-science is part of the ideological superstructure.

When real science is associated with the industrialisation of modern economy – even if it is not in contact with the workers – it is an instrument and a means of production that becomes more and more efficient every time (*Nauka v svete . . .*, 1951 (4), p. 2867).

Not all sciences are directly connected with industrial production. The level of abstraction of mathematics and logic in fact keep them very far away from everyday practical things. But for all that they cannot be eliminated without dire results, because all sciences are related to each other. These assertions met with fierce protest. Quite rightly, M. S. Strogovič pointed out their inconsistency with Stalin's *O dialectičeskom i istoričeskom materializme* (1938). They did in fact deviate from Stalinist tradition. K. Vostrovitjanov was also right when he pointed out the vagueness of the principle of demarcation between pseudo-science and objective truth, because it is the demarcation principle which has to make the distinction possible. F. V. Konstantinov and L. M. Gatovski agree in part with Strumilin's theses. They distinguish between the theories of physical science and the philosophical principles underlying those theories and assume that the theories are part of the base and the principles belong to the superstructure. In his reply to the criticism levelled at him, Strumilin relativised his thesis as follows: *science was not always a productive force but becomes such a force.* Twenty years later, theoreticians occupying themselves with the science of science were still arguing about that formulation, as we shall see in Section III.2. below.

III.1.3. Stalin is now dead and his works are no longer quoted. Nevertheless, in 1950 he set an important discussion going which is still in progress in the present-day science of science in the U.S.S.R. and became popular in the decade from 1960 to 1970. In 1965, a special department for science of science was instituted at the Academy of Sciences. G. M. Dobrov, who is very well-known in the West, works there. In the foreword to his *Logičeskie osnovy nauki* (1968), P. V. Kopnin still poked fun at the idea of a science of science: "just as it is nonsensical to set up a science of water or earth, one ought not to create a science of science". In my own view, however, Kopnin, on the one hand, fails to realise that disciplines such as biophysics and solid state physics have come about in just such a fashion. On the other hand, one has to admit with Kopnin that the science of science, in the present state of the art, is still deriving its material and theories from highly diverging disciplines (methodology, psychology, sociology, historiography, economics, ethics, etc.), so that it is not yet possible to call it an independent science. Kopnin's protest has been unable to hold up the development in the U.S.S.R. The scientists of science can invoke, among other things, addresses by A. N. Kossygin and decisions of the Central Committee in the period of 1960–1970, in which the desire for a more efficient coordination and development of research in the U.S.S.R. was expressed. This need for an efficient development, they say, makes the science of science indispensable.

III.2. Points of Discussion for Present-Day Scientists on Science in the U.S.S.R.

In order to enable science to be efficiently planned, there has been much discussion since 1960 on the subject of the efficiency (*éffektivnost'*) of scientific activity. Among other things, the following means have been considered: forecasting and controlling developments, bridging the gulf between science, technology and industry, reduction of science to a means of production and calculating the economic value of the products made by scientists and engineers. I shall deal with these four means in greater detail and show that Soviet *ideology* is extremely anti-liberal in the sense described above, that is to say, the ideological assertions suggest that *efforts* are being made to control and plan strictly, so that science and technology contribute to the progress of industry and the welfare of the Soviet nation. At the same time, it will be apparent from the following analyses that Soviet-Marxism leaves room at the moment for a descriptive or theoretical liberalism in the sense described. That is to say that Soviet economists who are concerned with practical planning put on record (descriptively) that science, technology and

industry are still undergoing autonomous developments. Other Soviet scholars (mainly sociologists and philosophers, but also a few economists), on the other hand, postulate a theoretical foundation for the autonomous development of science and technology. But the word "autonomy" is practically nowhere to be found in Soviet literature. The statement by N. P. Federenko during a round-table discussion organised by the *Voprosy Filosofii* in 1973 ran as follows:

> The economy is at the present time a stern arbiter judging the (economic) efficiency of the results obtained by technology and science.

Realising what this statement signified in practical terms, he immediately added:

> Of course we don't absolutely demand that every scientific discovery must be of immediate economic use (1973 (10), p. 35).

In the remainder of Section III, I shall deal with the following subject matter: the discussion between the proponents and the opponents of planning with "American methods" (2.1.), Soviet-Marxist theories on the relationship between science and industrial development in the context of planning of science: opposition between the sociological, metatheoretical and economic theories (2.2.); discussions on the social implications of the *dictum* "science becomes a productive force" (2.3.); according to Soviet-Marxism, science has an economic value: (how) can that value be determined? In this context a distinction should at least be made between pure science, applied science and science which is applicable in the factories. Here we have a confrontation between technological operationalism and economic relativism (2.4.).

III.2.1. In Soviet science of science (*naukovedenie*), a great deal of attention is paid to the so-called target-programme method.[23] According to Soviet sociologists, the application of the method presupposes a distinction between scientific developments in industry and in technology, respectively, which are to be expected in a five year plan. Forecasts in the industrial field, in the view of these sociologists, must be based purely on economic grounds; technological and scientific forecasts, on the other hand, must be based on organisational methods. By "organisational methods", they mean a control of the progress of research, processing of information and prognosis. The techniques which have to be applied for the purpose have been borrowed from American literature[24] – pattern, parm, *delphi*, pert, quest, citation index, extrapolation, etc.[25]

What do Soviet scholars expect from the application of such methods and techniques? This is a question which divides the optimists from the pessimists. Dobrov belongs to the first-named group and makes clear the difference between planned (arrow I) and non-planned (arrow II) development in Figure 1 (1969, p. 123).



Fig. 1.

Dobrov tries to express by this means, for instance, that the delphi method can be used to find out in good time what secondary and ancillary research has to be finished before one can proceed with evaluated research.

How are the priorities determined and the "direction" of development laid down? To this end, according to Dobrov, three kinds of information must be obtained and attuned to each other. First of all the possible alternative developments of the sciences are laid down in the so-called research prognoses. Then the research programmes are determined, these being based on the technological and scientific needs of society. Once the research forecasts are attuned to the programmes, concentration on the organisational system takes place. The means and personnel available in the future are also taken into consideration.

When the target-programme method sketched out here has been realised, G. M. Dobrov, V. M. Gluškov, V. N. Klimeniuk and many other Soviet sociologists hope to be able to guarantee the efficiency of science and to be able to forestall the crisis arising out of Price's saturation theory, which prophesies that the need for scientists will not increase in 49 years' time.[26] Other Soviet scientists are less enthusiastic about this method. We can distinguish two sorts of criticism, that of economists (such as Kronrod) and the mathematicians (such as Grekova) which is aimed at specific techniques, and that of Kedrov and others which is directed against the methodological principles of the target-programme method.

The target-programme is difficult to coordinate with existing economic planning. According to A. Kronrod that method is based on the "principles of a neopositivist methodology" and leads, in his view, to "subjectivist and voluntaristic ranking". In this context we should not think of the neopositivism of the Vienna circle, or anything of the sort. In this case, neopositivism represents an attitude attributed to all scientists who dissociate themselves too much from a planned economy or the policy of the Party.[27] In Section III.2.3 we shall come across the expression in a different context. The practical difficulty is based on the fact that the multi-year plans are essentially politico-economic directives. For example, a plan lays down targets over a period of 5 years, which is incompatible with any permanent change in goals due to the availability of new facts and forecasts in the field of science planning.

The criticism of I. Grekova of the collecting and processing of information without a theory on the development which one intends to get to know and manipulate, is very ironical.

> 'By the grace of technology' has now replaced 'by the grace of God'. . . . We must look at the facts squarely and admit that the application of mathematical methods does more harm than good so long as a phenomenon has not been studied scientifically. It is harmful because attention is distracted from the main to secondary aspects and because it forms a basis for self-deception. . . . What is left out of consideration is the main question as to *what* information has to be collected and processed (1976 (6), pp. 112–113).

The criticism of the mathematicians V. G. Boltjanski, V. J. Danilov-Daniljan and B. M. Kedrov is more fundamental. They justify their criticism not only on the grounds of a lack of a theory of development but also on the grounds of a lack of nuances. Sociologists such as Dobrov fail to distinguish sufficiently between the various sorts of scientific and technological developments. In their article entitled 'Mathematics and Scientific-Technical Progress'

published in 1979, V. G. Boltjanski and V. J. Danilov-Daniljan discuss in detail the question of whether it is advisable to control or plan logic or mathematics by means of the methods based on appraisal by experts. They point out that some disciplines in classical mathematics were considered important (until 1900) and are now almost forgotten, and that the opposite has also taken place. Recalling the ill-fated history of logic (in the U.S.S.R.?), they say:

> Voluntaristic intervention in the evolution of science almost always turns out to be reactionary and slows down development. Let us consider, for example, the scepticism which certain trends in mathematical logic were met with in the first half of the present century and which were regarded as "proof" of the reactionary character and impracticability of mathematical logic as a whole. But now mathematical logic and machine-mathematics (*mašinnoj matematiki*) are in general use. In the same way attempts to develop the more practical parts of mathematics to a high degree and, instead, limit the 'very abstract' sub-disciplines . . . are not justifiable. . . . An artificial delay in the development of theoretical mathematics would give sparse savings in the short term but lead to very great losses in the future (1979 (7), p. 115).

It is in cautious terms, that these authors demand autonomous development for mathematics. Kedrov's criticism goes further. He distinguishes three methods of knowing and controlling development: extrapolation, scenarios arising out of the appraisals of experts and, finally, forecasts based on the historical laws of scientific development. The extrapolations are unreliable because they neglect changes in quality, and the scenarios are unreliable because the experts of the nineteenth century were unable, for example, to imagine space travel. In conclusion, Kedrov states:

> There is but one 'strictly' objective method. It is based on the knowledge of the laws of development of the object under consideration. . . . There is only one way to discover and master these laws and that is to look into the history of the sciences (1972 (10), p. 47).

Kedrov claims that the "development laws" are so universal that their significance is not determined by any one period in the history of the sciences. In the opinion of the present writer, Kedrov is trying in that way to defend the thesis that sciences develop autonomously.

I agree with Kedrov's criticism of the directing and planning of science without a theoretical discussion of its development. On the other hand, his criticism is unjust. The extrapolations have even been ridiculed by Dobrov and Mikulinskij, and the scenarios are not intended to bridge over long periods in that development.[28] In Section III.2.2, I shall deal further with Kedrov's theory of scientific development.

The demands of some sociologists go so far as in fact to make impossible the planning of the *contents* of science. Volkov, for instance, asserts:

> No plan can foretell in what fields which discovery will be made, when or how this or that scientific problem will be solved and what its significance will be in practice. . . . The most valuable thing in science is a new creative idea. But it is just new ideas that cannot be planned in advance.

He agrees with P. L. Kapica in quoting the latter when he asserts that a plan must not limit but should stimulate "the freedom of scientific activity" (1968b, Chap. XIII). Is it still possible to make that compatible with planning in the strict sense of the word? Is that freedom not in conflict with manipulation based on the appraisal by experts?

From the foregoing it is evident that the planning of science and a planned economy cannot readily be made compatible with each other and that the problem in the U.S.S.R. of the relationship between free, autonomous development, and the manipulation of science has not yet been solved.

III.2.2. Research into complex relationships between pure theory, applied theory and industry and also into the inter-relationships of the sciences has been stimulated in a search for solutions to the above-mentioned problems. On these subjects there are veritable mountains of literature. I shall limit myself to the following question. Do Soviet scholars find it necessary to "manage" science so as to insure that it leads to practical applications, and if so, how is it done? In the U.S.S.R. there are greatly diverging theories on this matter. Theory$_1$ is defended by Volkov, by the authors of *Man-Science-Technology* (1973) and others. Theory$_1$ is in line with Strumilin's view quoted in Section III.1.2 to the effect that "true" science is practical:

> As has been found in the history of the sciences there is no . . . 'pure' theory which has not (that is if it is scientific) in the course of time been found to be practically applicable (1968a, p. 209).

"Real" science, in other words, does not have to be controlled to make it practical. This statement of Volkov's is in agreement with the methodological interpretation of the principle of practice formulated in Section III.1.1. The difficulty with this principle is that a theory only acquires "scientific" status *after* it has been found to be practically applicable. What status does it have before that time? The same difficulty is encountered with the formulation in *Man-Science-Technology:*

> Practice intervenes of necessity in the process of scientific cognition, it forms its basis, its aim and criterion of truth (1973, p. 73).

This criterion of truth cannot be logically defended because history provides no basis for necessity; it is methodologically untenable because technical processes, as J. Agassi (1967) and M. Bunge (1966) have conclusively shown, cannot be test-cases for theories and can in fact be in accord with theories which exclude one another.

Theory$_2$ of Duzenkov asserts that there is a social interaction between pure and applied science and industry. As an instance of this are quoted the recent interactions between atomic theory, atomic industry and chemistry. The defenders of theory$_2$ try to use systems-theory techniques to chart the various components of this interaction in the hope of promoting the efficiency of science. Theory$_2$ still remains programmatic even with respect to the question that has been posed.[29]

Theory$_3$ goes beyond theory$_1$ in no longer recognising any distinction between science and practice. Hence to V. G. Marxov and Ju. S. Meleščenko "the evolution of science and technology has become a single unity" (1966 (3)), and to B. M. Kedrov the interaction between science and technology in the twentieth century has become so intensive that science "has outstripped" practice and is now leading the way (1967 (5)). Kedrov gives the following example: not practice, but science lays down where, how and whether or not new sources of energy are to be tapped (1966 (5)). He is apparently impressed by the fact that important decisions are taken in industry by people with academic qualifications. In my opinion it is not very convincing to infer from such grounds that science is practical.

Theory$_3$ is an East European variant on Western theories on the "scientification of society". In the U.S.S.R. this is one of the processes that has been hinted at in the above-quoted statement that "science *is becoming* a means of production".

Kedrov tries to explain in pointed terms in two articles published in 1972, how the nucleus of theory$_3$ on immanent development should be understood. He assumes that the difference between pure (*fundamental'nyj*) and applied science refers to the approach chosen. One can distinguish pure and applied theories in every science. "*Fundamental'nyj*" should thus be understood in the sense of "advancing the frontiers" and research of this kind takes place in every science. In addition, Kedrov, in agreement with Marx and Engels, assumes that technical instruments and machines are based on knowledge of physical science, that is, they are 'generalised natural sciences'. In this way he arrives at the schematic idea that is given in Figure 2 (1972 (10), p. 42).



Fig. 2.

Here "*f*" stands for *fundamental'nyj*, "*E*" for economics, "*e*" for economic, "*a*" for applied, "*N*" for natural sciences, "*n*" for scientific (*naučnyj*), and "*T*" for technology. Kedrov assumes that fundamental science leads spontaneously to applied science and this last to technologies. Furthermore, he believes that, among other things, an interaction between the technologies of the natural sciences and economics guarantees the evolution of the sciences. The required explanatory analyses are lacking with Kedrov so that his theory of development is incomplete. The principle of practice in fact fails to explain the mechanism outlined in the schematic sketch. The remarkable thing is that Kedrov's philosophical insight stops precisely at the point where the economic problems start.

Theory_4 stands for the practical knowledge of Soviet economists who observe that there is still a real gulf between the development of the technical sciences and industrial practice. This gulf was referred to by T. S. Xačaturov, D. L'vov and P. A. Račkov, among others, during the sixties. In the decade following, the situation remains unchanged, as can be gathered from the round-table discussion[30] organised by the *Voprosy ékonomiki* on the occasion of the start of the five-year plan for 1976–1980. Among the participants were T. S. Chačaturov and V. J. Volkov who took part on behalf of the publication, and S. A. Gussarov, V. M. Ivančenko, A. A. Košuta, V. J. Budavej, G. J. Sinčenko and L. A. Vaag, all of whom had been directly or indirectly concerned with working out the five-year plan. The participants agreed on the one hand, that the technological science results do not meet the industrial requirements. With some irritation, Gussarov illustrates the attitude of the engineers as follows: "I develop the technology, others are responsible for the efficiency of production". On the other hand, it was admitted that there are no clearly understood economic criteria by which to decide whether technological discoveries should be introduced or not. The required

methodology is still not available for coordinating the planning of science, technology and planned economy (Kosuta); the planned economy schemes still have to come in for essential modification (Budavej). It is interesting to note that it is precisely planned economy which is so difficult to fit in with the planning of science. The technological-scientific side, on the one hand, and the economic reality, on the other, do not match so readily. I shall return to this complex of problems in Section III.2.4.

It is evident from the foregoing that, in the U.S.S.R. too, the philosophical basis for the planning of science is still the cause of many a headache. It is not enough to accept programmatically the principle of practice and the catchery "science becomes a productive force". In fact this sometimes is implicitly admitted: "Science develops relatively independently" (V. G. Maxarov, Ju. C. Meleščenko, 1966 (3)) and "the attempt must be made to regard the latest revolution in the sciences as a relatively independent process" B. M. Kedrov, 1966 (5)). This relative freedom on the part of the sciences, however, implies no ideological freedom on that of the scientist, as will be seen from the following.

III.2.3. Strumilin's above-quoted programmatic assertion that "science becomes a means of production" is, in Soviet literature, often related to the scientist's social function. In the sixties the dictum was still objected to by a number of critics including M. M. Karpov who held it to be idealistic and for that reason incompatible with Marxism (1963, p. 297), but even after 1980 the sociological interpretation is still disputed. Some, like G. Gabriel'jan, S. M. Grigorjan and P. A. Račkov do not include scientists as belonging to the proletariat because they believe that only material factors can have a role to play in the production process. G. M. Volkov and V. G. Maxarov, on the other hand, do include scientific workers in the ranks of the proletarist.[31]

This would seem to be a scholastic squabble in exegesis, and so it is, although it has social relevance nevertheless. The last-mentioned assertion leads in fact to a *political* paradox. If the "academic" is admitted into the ranks of the proletariat, then the ideal of classlessness has been achieved and the worker no less than the scientist can be used for planned development. But then the academically trained also constitute part of the most progressive section of the population. C. A. Stepanjan, a specialist in "scientific communism", points out the dangers of this sociological interpretation of science as a force of production.[32] In his view, scientists tend to "positivism" and tend to underestimate the "leading part played by the working class" (1973 (4)). Both as members as well as non-members of the proletariat, the academically trained, and let it not be forgotten that they are

still referred to in Soviet literature as "intelligentsia", can be politically dangerous.

III.2.4. We have seen in the preceding that the gulf between the Soviet scientific and industrial worlds is a difficult one to bridge. A means for solving the problem which is often mentioned in Soviet literature, is the calculation of the economic value of scientific products. Of course this proposal fits in with the ideology which regards science as a productive force. How is one, however, to find the acceptable operational definitions to evaluate a scientific 'product' economically?

The thesis that investments in science are economically worthwhile does not come in for discussion in the U.S.S.R. Strumilin worked out in 1957 that the state earns back eleven times the amount it has invested in the training of an engineer. Calculations made in the sixties aim to show that it is 3½ times more profitable to allocate funds to science than to any other area of the economy.[33] Volkov (1968a, p. 227) is of the opinion that the profitability of science must be obvious from every calculation. I believe that Volkov is right, so long as the subjective value attributed to science is high enough. The calculations and speculations bear no relevance to the question. For planning or "managing" on behalf of the economy, the price of separate scientific performances must be calculable in economic terms. Can that be done? As "scientific product" is a term capable of many interpretations, I take the liberty of distinguishing between the following questions: (a) Is the economic value of theoretical or experimental research forecastable? Can the value of results of that research be calculated? (b) Is the value of applied-science research forecastable or after the research has been done can it be calculated retrospectively? (c) Is it possible to establish the price value of a discovery or invention that can be utilised in industry immediately?

(Sub a) No publication in the U.S.S.R. claims that the economic value of a piece of theoretical research is forecastable or calculable retrospectively.

> It is impossible to calculate what profit science has brought to society. Can anyone appraise the profit that Einstein's theory of relativity has brought with it? (1968 (1), p. 4).

In agreement with the above statement by M. Keldyš, G. N. Volkov says:

> Who is in a position to calculate the value of the effect of the theory of relativity or of quantum mechanics? (1968, p. 228, see also p. 104).

From this it cannot be concluded that theoretical or experimental research can be dispensed with, because

insufficient development of theoretical research leads to stagnation in applied science research, to a slow-down in the rate of technological progress (*Ekonomičeskie problemy*. . ., p. 41).

Does the same apply to experimental research? B. G. Kuznezov made a statement in 1966 to which there were many reactions, both direct and indirect. He claimed that neither the economic nor the scientific effect of an experiment can be forecast, not even with a degree of probability. In principle the effect is uncertain because the interpretation of the result has not been established (1966 (6), p. 46). S. Pirogov is more precise in stating that economic calculations are not possible as it is uncertain how much has to be invested in a piece of research, how long it will take and what the result will be (1970 (6)).

(Sub b) Heated discussions are carried out in the U.S.S.R. on the economic evaluation of applied science research and extreme standpoints are taken up. In their work on *the organisation of planning technological progress*, B. F. Zalzev and B. A. Lapin postulate that no application should be given a positive estimate unless it is established with a probability of 0.6 that it will lead to technological innovation within a year. This standpoint is fiercely disputed in *Voprosy ekonomiki* (1971 (8)) by B. Grinčel, to whose way of thinking such a measure would make all thorough and serious research impossible.

The suggestions of the authors of *Ekonomičeskie problemy naučno-techničeskogo progressa* use subtle but impractical shades of meaning. Going into the opinions mentioned in (sub a) above, they say that the uncertainty of the effect of research diminishes the more it assumes the character of applied science. When a technological invention is revolutionary and implies more fundamental theoretical insight, they say that its economic value is more difficult to estimate (p. 104). If the issue of an economic operational estimate just has to be forced, then there are two ways open, in my opinion. These are: the price that the patent brings and/or the savings which the application of the invention brings immediately (naturally one cannot foresee the future).

There was again a fierce confrontation between the opposing sides during the symposium held in Kiev on the science of science and technological science forecasting.[34] T. Beljakova again defended the thesis that the scientific organisations and their staffs will be provided with an economic stimulus when the price of scientific successes is calculated. Her point of view met with considerable disagreement on the part of G. Laxtin and others. Laxtin

said that the funding of research and education depended exclusively on convictions derived from the logic of the scientific and technological development and from society's need of knowledge.

(Sub c) Planned economy gives rise to the impression that the prices can be fixed by government with some degree of arbitrariness. This in turn produces the idea, which was expressed in Soviet literature on economics in the sixties, that technological innovation can be given "economic preparation", that is, that the prices could be fixed so that the introduction of technological inventions could be stimulated in industry. For a proper appreciation of "economic preparation of technological inventions" it is convenient to introduce the term "technological operationalism". By this I understand the identification of the economic value of a technological invention with the savings or extra profit which the application or production brings here and now. This viewpoint was defended by the authors of *Naučno-techničeskij progress i éffektivnost'* (1972) and by V. A. Žamin (1973 (8)), according to whom only a technology that gives extra profit is a new technology. Technological operationalism is however incompatible with the idea of "economic preparation", because this idea has its roots in the notion that technological progress guarantees prosperity in a way that is, at best, approximate. Technological operationalism is opposed, *inter alia*, by the authors of *Ekonomičeskie problemy*. . . . They point out that the economic value of the technologies invented, in the field of space aviation, among other things, cannot be determined. These writers (p. 110) also claim that if only those technologies had been developed which promised to be economically profitable, then many machines on which the country's prosperity is now based, would not have been available. The discussion between the technological operationalists and the economic preparationalists has to do with real social evaluation, namely with the question of whether it is the economy or technology which is the primary basis for prosperity and well-being.

Economic preparation was also a theme at the round-table discussion organised by *Voprosy ékonomiki* in 1976. Most of the participants, in contrast to technological operationalist opinion, were prepared to use manipulation by economic means in the interests of technological development.[35] However, as emerges from an analysis of the discussion, the question as to how this should be done leads to paradoxes.

For instance, (a) if the prices of existing older means of production are lowered, it is then profitable to continue to use and repair them and not change over to more modern ones (T. S. Xačaturov). If these prices are not reduced, the modern means of production become more expensive

(A. A. Košuta). (b) If the factories are not stimulated, they shrink back from incurring the costs of production of newer products (T. S. Xačaturov); stimulation by the grant of credits, however, has negative consequences for profitability (A. I. Ščerbakov). This reveals to us some of the problems with which Soviet economists have to contend in trying to harmonise the system of economic planning with that of stimulating technological innovations (Borosdin).

The foregoing shows convincingly, I think, that a discussion with Soviet Marxism on science planning can turn out to be rewarding, since the situation in the U.S.S.R. is on the one hand, as regards scarcity of means in advanced industry, parallel with, and on the other in view of its own system of planned economy divergent from those in Western industrialised countries. I shall continue my evaluation in Section IV.

IV. IS THE PLANNING OF SCIENCE POSSIBLE?

IV.1. The Object of Planning: Programmes or Solutions of Practical Problems?

The "planning of science" idea has some positive aspects and its intelligent realisation would be a good thing for scientists and society. Politicians are willing to spend money on research into urgent social problems. On the other hand, many scientists and philosophers would have more incentive if they had a firmer belief that their very modest achievements fitted into a larger context of knowledge, which would be useful to humanity in the future. The neopositivists wanted to make it a certainty that all scientific research would be valuable, for which reason they elaborated their concept of the unity of science. But that unity had nothing to do with the real historical evolution of science; the fascination with it was therefore not of long duration. The more historically oriented methodology of Kuhn or Lakatos seems, at the present stage of the discussion, not to be compatible with planning. The theoretical explanation of the processes applied in the technical sciences often appears much later in the history of science, so that there is no such line of innovation beginning with the invention based on theory and ending with technological application in industry (Kuhn, 1971, p. 212); secondly, a definitive judgement on paradigms or programmes is, as we have seen, not possible (Kuhn, Lakatos), and thus paradigms or programmes cannot be planned, forbidden or prescribed in any intelligent way. But I do not think that programmes should be the starting point of planning, because planning starts from practical problems and programmes from theoretical ones.

It is possible to recruit scientists for research projects and to formulate extra-scientific values and standards for the solution of urgent problems. When the projects do not lead to the desired goals, they should not be regarded as having failed. Negative results are results and should be published, as A. D. de Groot (1970) states, because they are informative. They can form the starting point for new projects later on. I do not think that project planning necessarily contradicts the existence of programmes or that it contradicts the principle of critical testing, because neither a programme nor the principle prescribes exactly *in concreto* what should be studied or what chosen for the tests. And project planning should be organised in such a way that pluralistic and critical discussion on scientific theories remains possible. That is a practical problem, hence the methodological objections of Section II above do not apply to every kind of planning.

IV.2. Over-rating of Instruments of Planning by Some Soviet Sociologists: The Cultural Function of Science

I do not deny that project planning of science could sometimes be misled. In this context it is instructive that Soviet scientists recognise the dangers, as we have seen in Section III.

(a) Some of them postulate – although Marxism-Leninism prescribes that science should be practical, party-minded and ideological – that the evolution of science is "relatively autonomous" (Kedrov, Maxarov, Meleščenko) and "free" (Volkov). The main argument is progress itself: we cannot make a judgement about the future use of present scientific and technical discoveries. We can conclude that Soviet scientists, too, do not believe in a parallelism between scientific progress and the history of practical social problems.

(b) And, as we also have seen, technological operationalism is not very popular among Soviet scientists, not even among economists.

(c) An impatient wish to plan science "effectively" could also lead to the quest for certainty about scientific or technical evolutions. Some Soviet scientists, like Dobrov, though unlike Volkov, are as we saw misled by the following train of thought: "some events, discoveries or scientific evolutions could have been known earlier, if we had paid more attention to the indications". This proposition does not justify prognostics in a strict sense, because it has a conditional form and because events become indications of later developments when these developments *are known*. Therefore *delphi* and other above-mentioned methods of prognostication can be useful when deciding whether it is reasonable or not to start a certain project, but those

methods cannot be adequate instruments for planning the future evolutions of science, as Dobrov believes, with certainty.

(d) Planning should not contradict the autonomous function of science in cultural evolution. When a government wants to coordinate research by the judgment of a central authority, then planning can lead to the situation in which scientists have to "sell" their not-yet elaborated ideas to the *apparačiki* or to politically-minded scientists, who are primarily oriented to bureaucratic opportunity and '*Aktualität*' (timeliness) or, what is more, to the possibility of working continuously on programmes which guarantee the evolution of science. What could we know about the shortcomings of neopositivism, if ingenious people had not worked for decades on this programme? Did it not take centuries before the shortcomings of classical physics and mathematics were discovered? It is just because sciences have their own historical evolution that they can criticize old-fashioned prejudices about science and society.

(e) Reading Popper's expositions about the evolution of science, I get the impression that he purposely chooses the terminology of free-market economy: "freedom of thought", "competition of thought", etc. Reading Soviet scientists on the evolution of science I get the impression that they purposely choose the terminology of planned economy: "economic value of science", scientific "product", science as "force of production" etc. However, the planning of science and planning of economic processes have nothing more in common than the word "planning". If we decide to produce a certain number of pairs of shoes, then we can "predict" that a certain number of shoelaces will be needed. If we decide to spend money on economic and social studies of actual unemployment, while not yet knowing the solutions that will be proposed by the economist, we cannot determine the objects of the auxiliary studies, for instance, of the social-psychologists, who have to investigate the psychological consequences of those solutions.

Economic planning starts from known correlations, the planning of science can only start from conjectures without any certainty. Of course, words should not be forbidden, but we should not forget that in the context of planning, the word "product" has a different meaning in "industrial product" and in "scientific product".

IV.3. Conclusion of the Comparison

Can science be planned? The answer depends on the meaning of "planning". Science cannot be planned in the same way as economic development. On

this and many other points, there is some measure of agreement between Soviet scientists and Western philosophers of science, as we have seen. It is only cultural and political freedom that would be a "hot" point of discussion between East and West.

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NOTES

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[2] Some authors think that the question whether science can be planned is purely rhetorical, because science *is* planned. See J. J. Salomon, 1973, pp. 53–54, 95 and 238–240. This opinion simplifies – in my view – the important philosophical question: what kind of science is planned science?

[3] See A. Sarlemijn (forthcoming), which deals with the methodological models in detail.

[4] See, for instance, R. Carnap 1968, Vorwort.

[5] See Note 3 above.

[6] As early as 1967, R. Carnap defended his "scientific humanism" and believed that if the evolution of positivism were to go on, the whole of social life would become scientifically organised; see W. Stegmüller, 1971. For an analysis of the political implications of the neopositivist manifesto, see H. Koningsveld, 1976, pp. 30–34 and 84.

[7] We must not forget that O. Neurath could not yet have been familiar with modern methods of forecasting, such as delphi.

[8] See O. Neurath, 1931, Chapter I.

[9] See K. R. Popper, 1960, Preface. For a critical analysis of Popper's arguments, see J. W. N. Watkins, 1974.

[10] K. R. Popper, 1970, p. 161.

[11] K. R. Popper, 1968, pp. 107–108.

[12] That does not mean that they were not aware of the problem; see T. S. Kuhn, 1971, and I. Lakatos, for instance, 1974a, p. 153, where the latter argues that final judgments on programmes are not possible.

[13] For a sharp-witted analysis of the different principles of demarcation see I. Lakatos and E. Zahar, 1975.

[14] See T. S. Kuhn, 1974a, especially, pp. 11 f.

[15] See I. Lakatos, 1974b, especially, pp. 115 f.

[16] In I. Lakatos, 1974b, p. 289, the external history of science is the set of footnotes to the internal history. However, in 1978 (cf. 1978, p. 189), Lakatos says that his remarks on internal historiography in the text and external historiography in the footnotes must be seen as an "unsuccessful joke", even though he applied this method himself (in 1976).

[17] See T. S. Kuhn's analysis of the Copernican revolution (1979), especially Chapter III.

[18] See M. D. Grmek, 1981, pp. 12–13 and 19–24.

[19] E. Jantsch, 1967, pp. 50 f. and J. J. Salomon, 1973, pp. 112 f.
[20] See F. Rapp, 1974 and 1978.
[21] "There was no large-scale confrontation of proponents and opponents of planning" (R. Hutchings, 1976, p. 51); but: "at one time there were debates as to whether it was generally possible to plan scientific activity: those debates are now substantially concluded" (M. Rubinstein, 1931, p. 59). Also G. N. Volkov, 1968b, speaks about opponents, without mentioning their names.
[22] *Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte*, Marx-Engels-Studienausgabe, vol. 2, Frankfurt, 1966, p. 106.
[23] For a sociological discussion about this method see *Povyšenie éffektivnosti* . . . (1976 (10)); for an economic discussion, see Note 27 below.
[24] But the best known book in the U.S.S.R. is E. Jantsch, 1967, which has been translated into Russian twice (1970 and 1974).
[25] In this field Dobrov is the recognised specialist in the U.S.S.R.
[26] For a detailed criticism of this theory, see G. M. Dobrov, 1964 (10) and 1969, pp. 28 f.
[27] See A. Kronrod, 1973 (3), the editorial article '*Važnyj étap rabot* . . .', 1973 (9), N. Lebedinskij, 1973 (9), and the sharp criticism of this opinion by N. P. Federenko, 1973 (10).
[28] G. M. Dobrov, 1969, p. 139; S. R. Mikulinskij, 1968/9, p. 12.
[29] See V. I. Duženko, 1968/9, p. 32.
[30] For a report of the discussion, see '*Planirovanie i upravlenie* . . .', 1975 (8).
[31] M. M. Karpov, A. X. Bogomolova, A. J. Luk'janov, 1974 (6), gives a survey of the opinions about this topic in the U.S.S.R.
[32] The same opinion is defended by G. J. Glezerman, 1978 (1).
[33] See P. A. Rackov, 1966 (5), V. V. Namilov, 1966 (12), and S. Pirogov, 1970 (6).
[34] See '*Povyšenie éffektivnosti* . . .', 1976 (10).
[35] Only V. M. Ivančenko's opinion could be interpreted in this way.

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FN = *Filosofskie Nauki*
PX = *Planovoe Xozjajstvo*
SI = *Sociologiceskie Issledovanija*
VE = *Voprosy Ekonomiki*
VF = *Voprosy Filosofii*
LW = V. I. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sočinenij* (fourth edition)
MEW = Karl Marx – Friedrich Engels, *Werke* (Dietz-Verlag, Berlin)

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PART IV

SOVIET MARXISM-LENINISM

HELMUT DAHM

THE PRESENT STATE OF THE MARXIST-LENINIST CORE BELIEF IN REVOLUTION. WHAT REMAINS OF BASIC MARXISM?

Forced to defend itself against the challenge of ideological pluralism, Marxist philosophy of history soon realized that its assertions concerning the fundamental correlation between the forces and the relations of production (presumably the basis of all historical social forms and the ground of all social being), and its statements concerning the reflection of these forces in the social thought of a political superstructure are ambivalent, and as such imponderable.[1] The determinist orientation of the causal primacy of the means of production and the forms of technology in Marx's *Critique of Political Economy*, the forerunner of his *Capital*, began to compete with and to be contradicted by the liberal declaration of the *Communist Manifesto* that all previous history is the record of class struggle. Shortly before the end of the 19th century, Engels noted in his introduction to the new edition of Marx's *Class War in France from 1848 to 1850* that the conditions of social conflict had changed since 1850, not only "in reference to civil war but also in regard to class struggle".

> Today, a complete restructuring of social organization is needed; it no longer suffices that a small, conscious minority standing at the head of unconscious masses directs the revolution but that the masses themselves actively take part in the struggle because they understand what is at stake; today, the irony of world history turns everything upside down. We, the revolutionaries, the agitators, prosper much better with legal means than with illegal activities.

Accordingly, Engels characterized the political class struggle of the enlightened masses who understand what the issue is – the class struggle for social consciousness – as the "primary task of the party".[2]

In other words, since on the one hand it was indisputable that the transformation of the patterns of production and the forms of technology had not been able to influence permanently the continued existence of class exploitation and class struggle; and, since on the other hand – according to the doctrine of the *Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts, German Ideology*, and *Anti-Dühring* – no modification of the modes of production and the forms of technology is capable of making the human condition more tolerable and less distressing (so long as such an alteration fails to eliminate and to end the

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exploitation of men by men), Marx and Engels obviously attributed more importance and clearly attached greater significance to the class struggle than to the determinist explanatory value of the causal laws of so-called social-economic formations (the economically conditioned suppression and succession of different forms of society).

A clear preference for social and political arguments regarding the class struggle must inevitably refute and render pointless the economic and technological arguments concerning the explanatory power for this class struggle of an economically conditioned succession of different forms of society. Of necessity, this rebuttal should address the issues from two points of view:

(1) insofar as social-political "voluntarism" of the "subjective factor" recklessly disregards the economic reductionism of the "objective factor" of Marxist ideology in the interest of and with a view to preserving the influence of the revolutionary movement, and

(2) insofar as the division of labor (the real basis of the existence of different classes) should prove to be – contrary to all of the promises of Marxist ideology – "*unannulable*".

Existing below the threshold of both arguments, concern for legitimizing certain concrete political relationships has led in many ways to vacillation and to hesitation between one argument and the other. At the very least, this vacillation has revealed the questionable character of the explanatory value of both fundamental principles, be they in reference to the modes of production and the forms of technology of social existence, or in regard to the class struggle for social consciousness. Indeed, for Lenin and his followers, the ambivalence of both fundamental principles was the point of departure for their Marxist conception of history. Their use of the theoretical and practical ambivalence of these principles for political purposes produced precisely those problems of praxis-relatedness which determine the contemporary manifestation of historical materialism.

In his book *The Marxist Conception of Ideology,*[3] Martin Seliger comes to grips with the unexplained bifurcation of Marxist social teaching; indeed, not only in reference to the basic cause of this dispersion (praxis-relatedness, action-orientation) but also in regard to its effects – relativity, plurality, unsolvability of ideological-linguistic contradictions, revisionism, and more of this kind of asymmetry.[4] In brief, relativity, pluralism, and revisionism represent the reverse side of activity-conditioned, praxis-related asymmetry – an asymmetry of being and consciousness, of reality and theory – of the development of an ideology, whose object-relationships are described theoretically as homomorphic, i.e., as not clearly reversible, as incomplete, or as

ambiguous. "*Ideological pluralism is the unavoidable consequence of the attempt to put ideology into practice.* In this process, asymmetry clearly reveals itself in ideological pluralism, at that point where ideology is split open and divided up into a basic, fundamental norm, and a serviceable, operational norm of reasoning".[5]

What consequences *this* has for the original semantic state of the doctrine is clear in the light of the ecology debates. Soviet conceptions of these debates attempt to answer the question: as a consequence of the advance, conditioned through praxis, of Marxist-Leninist ideology toward an operational norm of reasoning for political behavior and social action, what has become of the core belief of its basic, fundamental principles? Crucial points in this investigation are:

(1) the "economic anatomy" of classes – in connection with the question concerning the essence of the revolution,

(2) alienation of labor and division of labor – in relationship to the question regarding the goals of the revolution,

(3) the relationship of scientific-technical progress and ecology – in regard to the question concerning the impulse of the revolution for the realization of the aggregate-state of Communist methods of production.

I. CONCERNING THE ESSENCE OF THE REVOLUTION

Point of Departure: Ideological Position Regarding the Ecological Crisis

For a long time hardly anyone in the Soviet Union was interested in serious discussion of the intellectual issues which arose out of Western debates concerning the ecological crisis. Only towards the end of 1975, after I. Laptev began to discuss in detail "the ideological aspects of the ecological problem," were the reasons for Soviet reserve and reluctance more clearly discernible.[6] These reasons were manifest in the following statements:

(a) Capitalism is attempting to escape its sole responsibility for the present ecological crisis by placing problems about the human environment above questions concerning society and classes. The consequence of this ploy would be to blot out from political consciousness the awareness of the necessity of the on-going promotion of class struggle!

(b) The bourgeois initiative for warding off and for overcoming the ecological crisis is nothing other than anti-Communism in a new garment, since the future of the entire human race is identified by the opinion makers (the members of the "Club of Rome") with the destiny of capitalism. In short:

according to Laptev's conception of the crisis, it cannot be disputed that the capitalistic use of the resources of nature is the principal source of the ecological crisis and that capitalism alone has to bear the historical responsibility for the degradation of the environment. "Here the destructive role of capitalism clearly reveals itself. These are convincing arguments against an ecological demagoguery which penetrates ever deeper into the realm of ideological warfare."[7] For these reasons, Laptev rejected the challenge to halt economic growth or at least to restrain it.

Replies to this negative position were not long in coming. Along with the report of M. Mesarović and E. Pestel, *Mankind at the Turning Point* (New York, 1974), these replies belong to the second wave of the contemporary ecological debate.

Controversy Concerning Origin and Responsibility

In an article written for the Journal *Questions of Philosophy*, 'Critique of the Scientific-Futuristic Denial of Societal Progress', K. Kantor, member of the Institute for the International Workers' Movement of the Academy of Science of the U.S.S.R., took up the task of coming to grips with Western authors.[8] According to Kantor the real intellectual origins of the ecological crisis are:

(1) the anthropocentric religion of Christianity (White);

(2) the 'Faustian culture' of the German ethos (White);

(3) the traditional European concept of progress and its logical consequences (Mesarović, Pestel, Künzli, Fry);

(4) Marxism as the conservative heir of European thought (Passmore, Künzli, Fry). In this context Kantor stated:

> Since Marxism is the most uncompromising theory of social progress – insofar as it combines social progress with an increasingly comprehensive mastery of the forces of nature – the ecological, scientific-futuristic critique of progress unavoidably becomes a new form of the condemnation of Marxism. The ecological demands raised against Marxism rest on the argument that Marxism is a product of Western culture and represents its more extreme, radical expression.[9]

From this argument the conclusion follows: "all scientific and mathematical proofs for the perniciousness of progress in the ecological global-model serve, objectively, exactly the purpose"[10] of a reiterated condemnation of Marxism.

The refutation of this reproach was thus indeed the consequence of the frivolous views expressed at first concerning Western ecological debates: now

one had to establish a much more difficult proof. This proof, according to the bold admission of Kantor, should make it clear that the ecological aspects of Marxist doctrine, obviously underestimated and insufficiently investigated by Marxist scholars, truly originated with the creator of scientific Communism, not with the Frankfurt school (as Künzli maintains).[11]

Ecological Aspect of Marxian Doctrine

But the early writings of Marx describing nature as the "inorganic body of mankind"[12] provide little proof for any interpretation which, according to Kantor, really is the crux of the matter. Namely,

(1) that Marx deepened and ecologically complemented the social-economic analysis of the origin of capitalism, and

(2) that the ecological problem began to become important in a rigorous sense only for the Marxist understanding of social progress.[13]

There is an important and indisputable fact which clearly contradicts such assertions. For political-economic Marxism, that is, Marxism historically in action, one thing has always stood firm: that only the powerful and always more violent "progress of natural science and of industry will drive society forward".[14]

Engels' Axiom of Progress

A detailed historical analysis reveals the labor pains and the debasement of the axiom of Engels. Three points will make this debasement evident.

(1) Violent disputes concerning the question of the necessity or superfluity of what I have called the "capitalistic circumcision" of believing Marxists[15] at the beginning of the 20th century: "capitalistic circumcision" raises the question of the validity of the original principle, according to which the transition from socialism to Communism presupposes the development of capitalism[16] (Trotsky): "Acceptance of the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat *and of the peasantry* into the program . . . is a direct betrayal of Marxism".[17]

(2) Resolute insistence by economic orthodoxy upon the political demand that Russia has to wait for "Godot", that is, for the presence of capitalistic relations of production; only then can a socialist revolution take place.

(3) Lenin's doxological revision in the form of a monstrous alteration of the social-economic principle of the original Marxist theory of revolution. In October 1921, Lenin had to confess that the Russian industrial work force –

declassified (thrown out of its class tracks) through the war and the frightful devastation and disorder – "had ceased to exist as a proletariat".[18] In other words, according to Lenin's own admission, the presumably socialistic (=proletarian) revolution of October–November, 1917 quite obviously lacked that very social-economic foundation which according to Marx alone legitimized it. Stalin understood very well that the proletarian question was the sore point of the entire system. With his rule a policy of industrialization began as if all hell had broken loose! This policy in no way bothered with the question: what consequences will this policy have for the environment? This attitude of indifference was and indeed is today the reason why the Soviet Union has to defend itself against the claim that it is an environment-hostile state.

II. CONCERNING THE GOALS OF THE REVOLUTION

Inconsistency of the Ideological Foundation

What is the connection between the ecological crisis debates and the ideological revision of scientific Communism? Both questions are brought into relationship by the Soviet argument that the neglect of the environment in capitalistic countries is the effect of class-differentiation and alienated labor, and ultimately the consequence of the division of labor. The impression which the Soviets seek to create can be stated succinctly: the present ecological crisis can only be mastered when the root of all evil, capitalism, with alienated labor and its root radical cause, the division of labor, disappears; and disappears exactly as Marx has taught.[19] There is, however, no doubt – at least for attentive observers of contemporary ideological development – that the aforenamed arguments, namely, (1) the abolition of alienated labor, through (2) the return of humanity from its Babylonian captivity into the homeland of a classless society (which originally meant an undivided, united, free labor society) are no longer correct. Even in East European discussions of ideology, arguments have long been advanced for a position which undermines the very foundation of Marxist doctrine. I repeat the arguments now with necessary brevity:

(1) *Every* society generates its own peculiar form of alienation. Even in socialism new types, new aspects of alienation arise. Consequently, Communist society is not free of conflict. It too has not eliminated the alienation of labor.[20]

(2) The necessity of the division of societal labor cannot in any way be

destroyed, abolished or done away with through some kind of new form of social production. Accordingly, the specialization of social labor is infinite in its very essence.[21] Finally, "the scientific understanding of Communism does not have the slightest thing in common with anarchic conceptions that every division of labor will disappear under Communism and that each person will live and work 'as God inspires him' ".[22] It follows from this second doxological revision (which equals the first revision in grotesqueness in that it declares mankind's ever fleeting goals as unobtainable in principle) that the contemporary ideological configuration of Marxist-Leninist society is in hopeless disarray. There is really no other recourse but to abandon the original understanding of the classical statements concerning labor (redemption from alienation), society (abolition of the division of labor), the Party and the state (withering away).

Results of the Critique

First: As a result of Lenin's alteration of ideology in order to forge the union of an almost non-existent proletariat with the peasantry,[23] the Marxist doctrine concerning the *essence* of the revolution has forever lost its logical-theoretical power of persuasion as the sole conditioning social-economic principle for the socialist revolution. In keeping with all previous social-political experience, the reality-related correctness of this theory of revolution must be subsequently established, and indeed with determined force. Lenin's "hard but undeniable truth of praxis" is that "in countries which are experiencing an unheard-of crisis – to wit, all the countries of the world – and are suffering the disintegration of all relationships and the intensification of the class struggle . . . it will be impossible to get along without terror, in spite of the hypocrites and phrasemongers".[24]

Second: The Marxist doctrine about the *goals* of the revolution has forever forfeited its moral authority and ability to inspire as a result of ideological-critical discussions (immanent to the system) at the end of the 50s until well into the 70s. This involved an admission of the impossibility of forever putting an end to the division of labor as the real cause of the alienation of labor. In the meantime the urgent rectification of the original understanding now reads clearly: "The division of labor will also remain in the age of Communism".[25] The expression of this view in the journal *Kommunist* states that "the opinion that Communism will eliminate every division of labor is not (any more) accurate, although there are still people who support this opinion with an appeal to the statements of Marx, Engels, and Lenin".[26]

In short, the specialization of social labor is intrinsically endless.[27] In other words, even in the age of Communism the activity of men will be subject to objective necessity.[28] So tempting and alluring for more than a century, the dream of a future human "domain of freedom"[29] is simply not real and will never be factual. It can only be followed by a rude awakening and a sobering awareness of reality.

III. THE MOTIVE FORCE OF THE REVOLUTION

Environmental Protection as a Function of the Class Struggle

The relationship of scientific-technical progress and ecology forms the third crucial point in the test for authenticity of the contemporary manifestation of Marxist-Leninist ideology in the region of social doctrine, and indeed in connection with the question concerning the *impulse* for the realization of the aggregate state of Communist mode of production. The first part of this point is quickly explained – it belongs, in so far as the fundamentals have not already been touched upon – to the realm of operational norms of demonstration. According to B. Mirošničenko, "the undecided questions concerning maximizing the reciprocal relationships between man and nature (Marxism characterizes the relation of social man to nature, to the means of production, as productive forces) become ever more pressing, since intrusions into the environment are assuming more and more a worldwide character". Therefore, the Soviet Union, with its concern for a bright Communist future of the planet, "has every reason to participate in international measures for the protection and the improvement of the environment".[30] Accordingly, the Soviet Union makes a non-binding concession, after such a long period of rejection, that according to N. Koval'skij, "the task of continued occupation with the problem of the environment, promoted and proclaimed by the prestigious international group the 'Club of Rome' is timely and proper".[31] Appeals for the decline of the consumption level of the masses, however, promote the suspicion and suggest the hidden intention of solving ecological problems at the expense of the working class.

In turn, socialism is the only correct way of dealing with the ecological problem, and thus the revolutionary workers' movement must combine the complete solution of ecological problems with the battle for socialism.[32] In other words, "Communists combine that battle for healthy living conditions for man with the battle for a radical social change. The goal of this battle

consists in creating a new socialist form of life for the welfare of present and future generation on earth."[33]

That is, as it were, the shell of the ideology of historical materialism. But what is the condition of its core belief?

The Motive Power of the Social Revolution

In contradistinction to the *forces* of production, to the relations of society to nature as the means of life, the social, collective man exercises no influence over the *relations* of production, the economic forms of his relation to himself, except through a revolutionary change of the economic foundation and structure of his social life, i.e., through a revolutionary change in the mode of production, which not only secures the reproduction of the physical existence of individuals (*forces* of production) but also determines how these (individuals) produce the means of life (*relations* of production).

With regard to the collective man of the socialistic mode of production and type of life, the "combined universal worker" of *Kapital*: he too, finds these conditions of production. They are to be found in Russia since November, 1917; in Poland since the decree of nationalization of January, 1946, or since the Party unity day of workers and the socialist party of the PVAP of December, 1948, or at the latest since the constitution of 1952. Similar developments have taken place in the other socialist countries.[34] As a result of the formation of this kind of 'community' the class struggle in ideology slowly began to assume the gigantic dimensions of a confrontation of different social systems, and indeed so much so, that many people no longer appeared to know in whose name the class struggle was actually being carried on. Above all, the doctrine of the non-capitalistic path for the developing countries and the questionable interpretation of its economic anatomy obscured the situation even more. Originally, the property-less wage-laborers of capitalist industrial society, the Marxist salt of the earth, were supposed to be the driving force of the socialist revolution.[35] Since these workers were almost completely absent at the moment of revolution (and even afterwards), Lenin not only had to promote the union of workers with peasants – the so-called *smyčka* – into the ranks of the revolutionary driving force, but he also had to make sure that the "nationalization" of the trade-unions remained politically blind and completely consigned to the guidance of an ever decreasing minority of the Party vanguard. When Stalin's resolute policy of industrialization supplied the necessary proletariat, and his violent

collectivization of agriculture suppressed the property of the peasants, Lenin's concept now appeared once again to be correct, and the *smyčka* could be imposed, as the obligatory model, upon the socialist countries created as a consequence of World War II. All of those socialist states appeared as states of workers and peasants, whose ruling classes had to accept the politically leading role of the Communist Party.

However, this construction, which has little to do with original Marxism, was seriously called into question by the situation in Poland. The (false) image of a functioning mass democracy evoked by the 1977 Soviet constitution stood in sharp contrast to the realities that emerged in the Polish developments. The decree of the Polish council of state on September 13th, 1980 (which became law two days later), and the actual registration of Solidarity workers on October 24 and November 10, 1980, as well as of solidarity peasants on May 12, 1981, spoke unmistakably in the language of Marx that, surprisingly even in socialism, the existing relationships of production, "from forms of development of the forces of production turn into their fetters".[36] The consequence of its "critique of political economy" could only be a new "epoch of social revolution",[37] which from the standpoint of ideology turns out to be both logically required and unthinkable at the same time. The issue is an ideological aporia, whose resolution requires a meta-language.[38] Different than but not dominated by such a language, the violent reaction of *Pravda* on May 15, 1981,[39] to the successful registration of Solidarity peasants in Warsaw three days earlier manifests very clearly that the CPSU certainly understood the implications.[40]

The Scientific-Technological Revolution as a Force of Production

After the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU (1956), Khrushchev particularly emphasized the doctrine of the social-economic formation (socialism/Communism) – indeed, as a useful instrument not only for intra-Party and inter-Party power struggles but also as a tool for the interpretation of the phenomenon of the so-called scientific-technological revolution in the sense of a Marxist philosophy of technology. At the beginning of 1959, Khrushchev proclaimed the entrance of the Soviet Union into the age of the developed construction of Communist society.[41] This announcement, previously prepared on November 6, 1957, on the occasion of the solemn session of the Supreme Soviet to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution,[42] corresponds to Strumilin's Utopian world of automation and 'thinking

computers',[43] which Stepanjan and Ukraincev in sensational articles manipulated into arguments against contemporary Chinese pretensions of superiority.[44] The doctrine of different forms of society accounts for the material, social, political and intellectual presuppositions of the change from capitalism to socialism and defines the conditions of the subsequent and necessary transition of the socialist phase to genuine communism. In short, it lays out the necessary laws governing the origin and development of communism. Of course, the words of Marx's *Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts* are here to be heeded, that communism is "the necessary form and dynamic principle of the immediate future but not as such the goal of human development – the form of human society".[45] Neglected since the dismissal of Khrushchev, the formation theory appeared stronger and clearer in the panorama of Soviet political science. It served, on the one hand, as a justification for the Soviet Union's claim to be the intellectual and political leader of the socialist community of states. In this area the formation theory already played a singular role in the controversy with the Chinese communists. The Chinese conception of the peoples' communes in the so-called great leap forward made it perfectly clear in 1958 that the Chinese communist Party acknowledged the formation theory and sought to derive political advantage from this doctrine. Only in the 60s did they begin to criticize violently the Soviet criteria of supremacy and to ridicule the doctrine. The formation theory served, on the other hand, as the normative axiom for the foundation of a Marxist philosophy of technology. In 1975, the book of Fedoseev about the Marxist-Leninist conception of contemporary socialism[46] once again asserted the primary importance and vital significance of the doctrine concerning economically conditioned forms of society, especially the last form, socialism-Communism. The first part of the book criticized two recent false interpretations, the dogmatic interpretation and the revisionist interpretation. The dogmatic interpretation denies the multiplicity of forms for the realization of socialism; the revisionist interpretation, on the contrary, makes out of the multiplicity of forms 'models' of socialism which it regards as self-contained in principle. Regarding both interpretations, Fedoseev places great value on the statement that the social order of all socialist countries, despite the admitted multiplicity of their forms, must be chiefly and essentially identical.[47] In the second part of the book, which promotes the leadership pretensions and supports the political intervention of the Soviet Union, Fedoseev unambiguously stresses the universal and necessary character of the doctrine of the economically conditioned forms of society, particularly in connection with the question of the international criteria of developed

socialism. The answer to this question presupposes that a developed socialist society exists only in the Soviet Union. Or, expressed in another way: "a developed socialist society has not yet been formed in any other country".[48] Fedoseev follows up this remark by asserting that two general characteristics are fundamental and authoritative for a demonstration of the existence of a developed, mature, socialist society, namely: (1) a high degree of performance of the socialist mode of production, and (2) a complex mutual adaptation within the social organism, of all elements of life.[49]

Associated with these two characteristics for the foundation of a Marxist philosophy of technology are key terms such as: the material-technical basis of Communism, the scientific-technological revolution(STR), the conversion of science into an immediate force of production, the all-round developed personality, the organic union of the STR with the merits of the socialist economic system, the socialistic mode of life, and many more of the same. The most important of these terms in the 70s, referring to the Soviet forces of production, was clearly 'the scientific-technological revolution', which replaced the earlier more current 'material-technical basis of communism'. The 21st Congress of the CPSU (1959) was prepared to confirm the thesis of Khruschev that the U.S.S.R. of 1965 would be superior to the United States in several important areas of production, and would overtake the U.S.A. in per capita production in 1970, consigning the U.S.A. to second place. "The Soviet Union at this time, perhaps even earlier, will be the first in the world, not only in total production but also per capita, and this will guarantee the highest living standard in the world."[50] In other words: "In this short period of time the absolute superiority of socialism over capitalism will be secured in the domain of material production, the determining force of a society's entire development."[51]

In answer to the "question concerning the minimum social-economic condition" for the achievement of these goals, Stepanjan elaborated at that time:

> Even today we can see the outlines of the formation of the material-technical basis of Communism: in a harmoniously developing socialist production, above all in industry; in the extension of the scientific-technological revolution; in the rapid growth of the complex mechanization of labor and automation of production with the use of computers; in a new direction of chemical production, which can produce raw materials of every kind with predetermined properties.[52]

The complete electrification of the economy, development of new energy sources in atomic fusion and fission, the fundamental reform of the system of

public education for the achievement of the aforementioned tasks were all included in the plan for the transition to a Communist pattern of production. The Twenty Fourth Party Congress, in 1971, renewed the well-known concept of the "material-technical basis of Communism" – though less solemnly and dogmatically – on the basis of the projection of the "scientific-technological revolution".[53] At the ideological core of this position is the thesis that in the STR science is transformed into a direct force of production. In 1863 Marx had already determined that science was becoming an independent factor in the machine-based mode of production.[54] Evgenij Babosov, who supported this point of view with reference to Marx's manuscripts (first published by S. M. Grigorjan and Ju. T. Xaritonov in *Kommunist*[55]) failed however to mention some remarkable things that one can read here. For example: machines would play a much more important role in production than the toil and the talent of men; science which is incarnate in machines, in production procedures, in chemical processes, appears as a power of domination over labor, as something foreign and hostile to labor; the use of science – as an application of the natural sciences to the process of material production – rests on a separation of the intellectual forces of this process from the knowledge and capabilities of individual workers; and, thus, a small group of highly qualified workers in fact emerge who cannot be compared numerically with the masses of unskilled workers, workers in a chronic state of ignorance. Capitalist methods of production first intelligently developed the scientific factor; then they employed and fashioned it to a degree inconceivable in previous ages.[56] In this context, Babosov stated that "elements for the generation of science" as a direct force of production had already surfaced in the machine-based production of capitalism.[57]

The pressing problems of contemporary ideological exegesis become clear when contemporary conceptions of traditional doctrines are examined, as in A. Kusin's book, *Karl Marx and Problems of Technology*. Here Kusin examines the "totally developed individual",[58] for whom "various social functions are successive, alternating modes of activity",[59] the change of labor, the flow of function, the all-round mobility of the worker, and the "absolute readiness of man to respond to changing demands of work".[60] In reference to the problem of the goal of the socialist (proletarian) revolution, Kusin maintains that Marx spoke only of the necessity to abolish the division of labor "in the context of the technology of machine-based production, with the system of machines and with workers viewed as the living appendages of these machines." Naturally, it is "such a partition of machinery

and living appendages that mutilates man's life, not the professional division of labor".[61] On the contrary, however, Marx was clearly of the opinion that precisely through technology, which in its turn enables science to become an independent factor (a direct force of production) that the separation of the intellectual forces in the process of material production from the uneducated workers is unavoidable without the "totally developed individual", without the "production of the completely developed man". Much more instructive and unpleasant than this a fortiori argument from experience – which assures us that there is no "totally developed individual" of the required type, let alone his mass reproduction – are the a priori objections. Out of the ideological axioms of Marxist social teaching a theoretical confusion has arisen from which it is impossible to escape unscathed – a confusion concerning the phenomena of structure and superstructure, the material and intellectually conditioned elements of the economic forces of production, the objective and subjective factor, and social being and consciousness.

Heinrich Stork has gathered together and substantiated these objections in his *Introduction to the Philosophy of Technology*.[62] The result of his analysis is:

> Science cannot ... on the one hand belong to social being, i.e., as a direct force of production, and on the other hand belong to social consciousness, i.e., as technology of the intellectual forces of the process of material production in the sense of anticipatory thinking. This twofold classification (in reference to science) avoids an answer to the perennial question of philosophy concerning the relationship between thinking and being, spirit and nature. 'What is primary: spirit or nature?'[63] Over and beyond these considerations, science (viewed in its entirety) must be material and non-material at the same time. Such a state of affairs is not possible according to the doctrine of dialectical and historical materialism. It would be senseless to ascribe scientific praxis to (material) social being, and to assign theories to social consciousness, because to speak of the 'scientization of technology' (production) means exactly the same thing as the 'growth of theory in the sphere of production'.[64]

Therefore, one should really resolve to state openly, without any qualifications, that science is a part of social consciousness – which indeed it should be, insofar as it occupies in Communism the central position of a religion.[65] This would mean, however, that science is something conditioned by the mode of production. Instead of this, the *Foundations of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy* states that the development of science is the point of departure for the "revolutionizing of praxis".[66] Henceforth, it is vital that science surpass production in order to facilitate the further development and continued progress of technology.[67] Stork adds: "That production (social

being) is surpassed by science (social consciousness) clashes with the materialist answer to the fundamental question of philosophy. Social consciousness is thus not only relatively independent but gains decisive influence over social being".[68] Nevertheless, it is continually argued that the independence of science is ultimately relative and conditioned. In this regard, Stork identifies and rejects as untenable the fundamental and decisive implication that production is the last determining cause of the development of science, if indeed it is correct that work has fashioned man.[69] Consequently, the same questions arise which are met in dialectical ontology – that is, questions about the origin of information, tychistic improbabilities, and the actual meaning of causality – the answers to which are of crucial importance for evolutionary determinism.

Nevertheless, this explanation breaks down, not only in reference to the three examples of social doctrine already discussed, but also in regard to the two aforementioned metaphysical doctrines – because it cannot be adequately established by the principles of Marxist-Leninist philosophy. For on the one hand, the man-machine symbiosis – a metaphor for the emergence of structurally meaningful, ectropic information – leads one back in any ontological analogy, to a metaphysical programmer. And on the other hand, the material, universal substance must sooner or later be the cause of itself – which is absurd.[70]

SUMMARY

The dispute over the ultimate responsibility for the current dangers to the environment brought to light contradictory views within Marxism-Leninism. For example, the claim that Marx's theory contains an 'ecological side' stands against Engels' unmitigated 'axiom of progress'. However, there is something more important for the stance taken by scientific communism towards current socio-political problems – the obvious inconsistency of its argumentation, which has its ideological roots in a twofold revision of original Marxist theory. In the early part of this century, it affected both the theoretical and practical *nature* of the socialist (i.e., proletariat) revolution; in the early 70s it concerned the *goals* of this revolution.

The carrying out of the socialist revolution (in the inauthentic sense) in Russia required giving up, in both a theoretical and a practical sense, the principle of socio-economic determinism, at the cost of reducing the explanatory value of this principle to empty meaninglessness. The difficulty of maintaining the view that social consciousness is completely derivable from

the state of development of the material forces of production becomes, today, especially apparent in the Soviet attempt to explain the scientific-technological revolution. Of course, the questionable character of the principle of socio-economic determinism was already made evident by the conscious and intentional disregard of Russia's actual class structure at the moment when the communists seized power. Voluntarism, not socio-economic determinism, was the operative principle in October, 1917; and, Soviet statements to the contrary, there is no way that it can correctly be called a 'proletarian revolution'.

Furthermore, this act of sheer will on the part of a minority has also given lie to the original Marxist doctrine on the *goals* of the socialist (i.e., proletarian) revolution; for it undercut the claim to be able to eliminate not only the *alienation* of labor but also its real cause, the *division* of labor. That is, the exigencies of the state-run socialist economy required that the credibility of the aim of realizing the goals of the revolution be forfeited. Present-day Soviet Marxism has thereby lost its moral and humanitarian legitimacy, though it still tries to propagate its claims, to those who are unaware of its theoretical and practical bankruptcy, by parading about the utopian notions of the self-creation, self-liberation and self-realization of man.

Finally, regarding the *motive force* of the revolution's progress towards communism: The leading role of science and the resulting class struggle drawn along technological lines are gaining the upper hand over the principle of socio-economic determinism and the primacy of 'social being'. Marx had assumed that the division of labor would be eliminated (after the abolition of private property) by the fact that scientific and technological progress would eventually draw all workers together into one process.[71] However, time has shown that the growth of the role of mental labor, as a result of the increasingly technical character of production, has led, not to some egalitarian leveling process but rather to the formation of a new élite: "The development of technology has not brought forth the integral 'scientist-engineer-laborer'; it has not trained an army of workers of this type. It has, rather, functionally differentiated working men to an ever greater degree. This is doubtless also true for the socialist countries. . . ."[72]

In sum, the fact that the materialist view of history is a view 'related to practice', with the resulting development of ideology in a pragmatic, operationally functional direction, has in the end led to the situation where the original principles of the Marxist core belief – regarding the nature, goals and motive force of the proletarian revolution – have lost all substance and are preserved only in the ritualistic expressions of Soviet ideological discourse.

Cologne

NOTES

[1] Cf. Helmut Dahm, *Meuterei auf den Knien – Die Krise des marxistischen Welt- und Menschenbildes*, Olten-Freiburg i. Br. 1969, Teil III: *Historischer Materialismus*, pp. 127–174.

[2] Cf. Helmut Dahm, 'Macht und Gewalt im deutschen und russischen Sozialismus', in Eduard J.M. Kroker (ed.), *Die Gewalt in Politik, Religion und Gesellschaft*, Stuttgart, 1976, pp. 31–58, with all source indications. See, in particular, pp. 49 ff. (Notes 23–28).

[3] Cf. Martin Seliger, *The Marxist Conception of Ideology*, Cambridge, England, 1977.

[4] Cf. Helmut Dahm, 'The Function and Efficacy of Ideology', *Studies in Soviet Thought* (*SST*) 21, 1980, pp. 109–118.

[5] Seliger, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

[6] Cf. I. Laptev, 'Ideologičeskie aspekty ékologičeskix problem' (Ideological Aspects of Ecological Problems), *Kommunist* (*K*) 17, 1975, pp. 65–73.

[7] *Ibid*, p. 69 and p. 73.

[8] Cf. K. M. Kantor, 'Ekologija i progress' (Ecology and Progress), *VF* 8, 1977, pp. 106–116.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 109.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 111.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 112.

[12] K. Marks (Marx) i F. Engel's (Engels), *Iz rannix proizvedenij* (From the Early Works), M., 1956, p. 565.

[13] Kantor, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

[14] Marks i Engels, *Soč.*, iz.2, t.21, p. 285 (=*MES 2*).

[15] Cf. *Acts* 15: 1–2, and *Galatians* 2:14.

[16] Cf. *Protocolls* (in Russian) of the 4th (1906) and 5th (1907) Congresses of the RSDWP, M., 1963.

[17] L. Trotsky, *Permanentnaja revoljucija* (Permanent Revolution), quoted from the Fischer Taschenbuch, Ffm, 1969, p. 151.

[18] V. I. Lenin, *Soč.*, t.44, p. 161.

[19] Cf. Kantor, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

[20] Cf. A. T. Pavlov, 'IV soveščanie redaktorov filosofskix i sociologičeskix žurnalov socialističeskix stran' (Fourth Conference of Editors of Philosophic and Sociological Journals of Socialist Countries), *Filosofskie nauki* (*FN*), 1, 1967, pp. 167–172; here pp. 168 f. See also I. S. Narskij, 'Problema otčuždenija v trudax Karla Marksa' (The Problem of Alienation in Marx's Works), *FN* 4, 1967, pp. 47–57; here p. 50.

[21] A. Egorov, 'Partija naučnogo kommunizma. O teoretičeskom obobščenii KPSS opyta kommunističeskogo stroitel'stva' (The Party of Scientific Communism. On the Theoretical Generalization of the Experience of Communist Construction Through the CPSU), *K* 2, 1973, pp. 36–55; here pp. 47 f.

[22] *Ibid.* p. 49. See also Engels' *Anti-Dühring* (M., 1951, p. 265) and *MES 2*, t.3, p. 75.

[23] See my *Das Unternehmen Afghanistan als Lehrstück der politischen und militärischen Doktrin Sowjetrusslands*, BIOst Bericht (Köln) 9, 1980, pp. 56–73.

[24] Lenin, *Soč.*, t. 43, p. 235.

[25] 'Razdelenie truda' (Division of Labor) in *Malaja Sovetskaja enciklopedija*, iz. 3, t. 7, columns 864–866; here column 866 (=*MSE 3*).

[26] Cf. Egorov, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 48.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 49.
[29] Cf. *Anti-Dühring*, p. 267.
[30] B. Mirošničenko, 'Ekologija – sfera meždunarodnogo sotrudničestva' (Ecology as Domain of International Collaboration), *K* 16, 1979, pp. 93–104.
[31] Cf. N. Koval'skij, 'Važnyj učastok antimonopolističeskoj bor'by' (An Important Segment of the Anti-Monopolistic Fight), *K* 16, 1979, pp. 105–115; here p. 112.
[32] Koval'skij, *op. cit.*, pp. 113–115.
[33] *Loc. cit.*
[34] Cf. *Die Technik der Macht*, Olten-Freiburg i. Br., 1974, 525 pp.
[35] Cf. 'proletariat' and 'proletarii' in *MSE3*, t. 7, columns 613–614.
[36] *MES2*, t. 13, p. 7 (Marx, *Zur Kritik der politischen Oekonomie, Vorwort*); German version in Marx, Engels, *Werke* (*MEW*), vol. 13, Berlin, 1964, p. 9.
[37] *Loc. cit.*
[38] Cf. I. M. Bocheński, *Die zeitgenössischen Denkmethoden*, Bern, 1954.
[39] Cf. *Pravda*, May 15, 1981.
[40] Cf. A. Avtorxanov, *Proisxoždenie partokratii. Tom pervyj: CK i Lenin* (The Origins of Partocracy. Vol. I: The CC and Lenin), Ffm, 1973; especially Chapter 19 ('Ogosudarstvlenie profsojuzov i raskol CK'), pp. 610–638.
[41] N. S. Khrushchev, 'Speech Before the 21st Party Congress of the CPSU on January 27, 1959', *Pravda*, January 28, 1959.
[42] N. S. Khrushchev, 'Speech to the Jubilee Session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. for the 40th Anniversary of the October Revolution (November 6, 1957)', *Pravda*, November 7, 1957; also: *Sorok let velikoj oktjabr'skoj socialističeskoj revolujucii* (Forty Years (Since) the Great October Revolution), M., 1957, pp. 36–37.
[43] Cf. S. G. Strumilin, *Na putjax postroenija kommunizma* (On the Path Toward Erection of Communism), M., 1959, 104 pp.
[44] Cf. C. A. Stepanjan, 'Oktjabr'skaja revoljucija i stanovlenie kommunističeskoj formacii' (The October Revolution and the Coming of the Communist (Social) Formation), *VF* 10, 1958, pp. 19–36, and 'O zakonomernostjax pererastanija socializma v kommunizm' (On the Laws of the Growing of Socialism into Communism), *K* 14, 1959, pp. 33–46. See Boris Ukraincev, 'Voprosy dialektiki pererastanija socializma v kommunizm' (Questions of the Dialectic of the Growing of Socialism into Communism), *K* 13, 1960, pp. 61–73.
[45] *MEW*, Ergänzungsbände, vol. 1 (Berlin(Ost) 1968), p. 546; *Iz rannix*, p. 598.
[46] P. N. Fedoseev i dr., *Marksistsko-leninskoe učenie o socializme i sovremennost'* (The Marxist-Leninist Teaching on Socialism and Today), M., 1975. Review by A. Butenko in *K* 16, 1975, pp. 115–118.
[47] *Ibid.*, p. 93.
[48] *Ibid.*, p. 249.
[49] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 250.
[50] 'Peredovaja: Na novom etape stroitel'stva kommunizma' (Lead-Article: 'At a New Stage in the Construction of Communism'), *VF* 12, 1958, pp. 3–13; here pp. 12 f.
[51] *Ibid.*, p. 13.
[52] Stepanjan, p. 39 (cf. Note 44, above; *K* 14, 1959).
[53] Cf. A. M. Rumjancev, 'Programma sozdanija material'no-texničeskoj bazy kommunizma' (Program for the Creation of the Material-Technical Basis of Communism),

Nauka i žizn' 1, 1970, pp. 13–22. L. I. Brežnev, *Otčetnyj doklad CK KPSS XXIV s'ezdu KPSS* (Report of the CC CPSU to the 24th Congress of the CPSU), M., 1971. E. M. Babosov, *Naučno-texničeskaja revoljucija i modernizacija katolicizma* (The Scientific-Technological Revolution and the Modernisation of Catholicism), Minsk, 1971; especially pp. 11–28. See Pavel Kovaly on three Marxist books on the scientific-technological revolution in *SST* 14, 1974, pp. 139–148. Arnold Buchholz, *Am Ende der Neuzeit*, Stuttgart, 1978; and 'The Role of the Scientific-Technological Revolution in Marxism-Leninism', *SST* 19, 1979, pp. 145–164. Cf. F. Rapp on three Soviet books on similar subjects in *SST* 22, 1981, pp. 159–162. Helmut Dahm, *Der gescheiterte Ausbruch*, Baden-Baden, 1982.

54 Cf. Babosov, pp. 14 f. and 16 f. (Note 53, above) and *K* 7, 1958, p. 22.

55 Cf. 'Materialy instituta marksizma-leninizma pri CK KPSS – Iz rukopisnogo nasledstva K. Marksa' (Materials of the Institute for Marxism-Leninism: From the Manuscripts of Marx), *K* 7, 1958, pp. 19–23.

56 Reproduced in *K* 7, 1958, pp. 22–23.

57 Babosov, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

58 Cf. A. A. Kusin, *Karl Marx und Probleme der Technik*, Leipzig, 1970, pp. 70 f.

59 Marx, *Kapital*, Berlin, 1961, p. 513; also p. 509.

60 *Ibid.*, pp. 512 f.

61 Kusin, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

62 Heinrich Stork, *Einführung in die Philosophie der Technik*, Darmstadt, 1977.

63 *MEW*, vol. 21, p. 274 (Engels' *Ludwig Feuerbach*); cf. Stork, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

64 Stork, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

65 Cf. F. V. Konstantinov (ed.), *Osnovy marksistsko-leninskoj filosofii* (Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy) (*OMF*), M., 1971, pp. 435 ff.

66 *OMF*, p. 423.

67 *OMF*, p. 255.

68 Stork, *op. cit.*, p. 126. On *opereženie* see also *Kratkij slovar' po filosofii* (Short Dictionary for Philosophy), M., 1979, p. 212 (*obščestvennoe bytie i obščestvennoe soznanie*).

69 Cf. Stork, *op. cit.*, pp. 110 f. and p. 127. Also, H. Dahm, *Die Dialektik im Wandel der Sowjetphilosophie*, Köln, 1963; especially Chapters 4, 5 and 11.

70 Cf. H. Dahm, *Der gescheiterte Ausbruch*, Baden-Baden, 1982; Chapter Two, 'Philosophische Probleme der Kybernetik'.

71 Cf., Stork *op. cit.*, p. 113. Further, *MES 2*, t. 3, pp. 31 f. and 68; *MEW* vol. 3, 1959, p. 33 (*The German Ideology*) and p. 68 (*Ludwig Feuerbach*) and p. 68 (*Grundrisse*).

72 Cf., Stork, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

JAMES J. O'ROURKE

SOVIET PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES

In Soviet Marxism, the methodological structure of the relationships among the various sciences has traditionally been conceived as hierarchically ordered, at the top of which stands dialectics, taken in the broad sense as including both dialectical and historical materialism. In fact, the claim is still being made that the fundamental methodological principles of all the sciences are provided by dialectical materialism. B. S. Ukraincev recently wrote that "dialectical materialism as a world view has universal methodological significance for science", insofar as it "orients scientists in their choice of the theoretical and methodological assumptions of their research".[1] Historical materialism performs an analogous function, in a more specified sense, for the social sciences. B. M. Kedrov designates historical materialism as the "general method of the Marxist social sciences",[2] in which class he includes most of the sciences dealing with man or the products of human culture – history, economics, law, the history of literature and art, and others. However, he cannot claim that the social sciences are the only ones that deal with man, or that historical materialism provides the methodology for every science of man. Psychology, which in one of Kedrov's classifications is listed as a social science, in another scheme is located at an intermediate point between the natural and the social sciences. And though human physiology and anthropology both deal directly with man, they are grouped by Kedrov with the natural sciences. If one turns to Marxist-Leninist philosophy, which is alleged to provide the basic principles and methods for the special sciences, a similar lack of clear-cut boundaries is found. One cannot say that dialectical materialism provides, in addition to certain principles relevant to all sciences, the philosophical orientation for the sciences of nature, while historical materialism does the same for the sciences of man. The difficulty is that fundamental theses relating to the nature of man and the mode of study of human phenomena are found in both dialectical and historical materialism. Human consciousness and knowledge are topics treated in dialectical materialism, while freedom, the person, the nature of man, practice, and others have usually been addressed in the context of historical materialism.

In the late 60s, B. G. Anan'ev, a leading Soviet psychologist, bemoaned the fragmented approaches to the study of man and called for a new

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integration of all the disciplines into a single theoretical human science.[3] He claimed that contemporary Soviet science had created the necessary groundwork for a new synthesis, one which would unify natural and social scientific knowledge. Dualism would have to be transcended – not only the old psycho-physical dualism, but also the more recent bio-social dualism. The latter trend is identified as characteristic of Western sociology, but Anan'ev makes it clear that he is not content with the frequently employed Soviet definition of man as a 'bio-social being'. He calls for an interdisciplinary, systemic approach, which would take special pains to show the mutual inter-relationships of physical, organic, psychic, social, and cultural factors in human life. Though he indicates that the main body of this new science would consist of concrete, empirical investigations, its theoretical basis is to be provided by philosophy. But Marxism-Leninism, in his view, had until then overly restricted itself to a few questions concerning man and had addressed these with an overdependence upon the categories of historical materialism. In an effort to avoid naturalistic anthropologism – the non-historical view of man typical of Feuerbach – Soviet philosophy had also neglected much that was valuable in its own tradition, such as the "monist understanding of man" in the philosophy of Černyševskij.[4]

Over the last decade Soviet philosophy has increasingly turned its attention to a serious reflection on man. Until the mid-60s there was little else than the work of Tugarinov, the highly conventional treatments of humanism by Petrosjan and Šiškin, and scattered articles in collective works. Soviet philosophers themselves now admit that this was a sadly neglected area.[5] But from about the time of the publication, in 1967, of Batiščev's groundbreaking article on the essence of man, there has been a sharp rise in interest in constructing a philosophy of man. One Soviet scholar counted 141 publications just in the first half of 1973 that dealt with various theoretical problems of man, a substantial number of which were philosophical.[6] Books that seek to lay out a more or less comprehensive conception of man have been published by A. G. Myslivčenko, M. S. Kagan, B. T. Grigorjan, Z. M. Kakabadze, A. T. Bočorišvili, and others. Some of these philosophers endorse Anan'ev's call for a new, comprehensive science of man. And many quote Marx's claim that "Natural science will in time subsume under itself the science of man, just as the science of man will subsume under itself natural science: there will be one science."[7] However, while supporting the ideal of a more adequate and comprehensive Marxist treatment of man, they are quick to admit that there is as yet no general consensus on the nature of the philosophical theory that might provide its basis.

One of the most frequently discussed issues is that of the autonomy of philosophical anthropology itself as a special branch of philosophy. Until recently, the very term 'philosophical anthropology' was an ideological term of abuse. It was used to refer to 20th century trends such as German phenomenology, especially the philosophy of Max Scheler, but more generally was applied to any attempt to understand man that did not proceed from the premises of historical materialism. It is now argued that the term is merely descriptive of a type of philosophical discipline and is neutral with regard to the question of idealism or realism.[8] The opposition to this seemingly innocuous terminological claim comes from those who fear that this usage implies the legitimacy of a new, separate philosophical discipline within Marxism-Leninism, similar in status to ethics and aesthetics. Indeed, M. S. Kagan, A. T. Bočorišvili and others wish to endow it with such a status.[9] It is interesting to note the various objections to admitting philosophical anthropology into the family of philosophical disciplines. They are principally three. First, that it ignores the social essence of man. T. I. Ojzerman argues that any philosophical anthropology takes as one of its assumptions "a concept of the isolated human individual as complex of characteristics which are peculiar to the individual and not to society".[10] Secondly, that the analysis of human nature is impossible without taking into consideration the totality of all the social relations which condition this nature, and this is appropriately done in historical materialism.[11] Thus a separate discipline is unnecessary. And thirdly, that philosophical anthropology has neither its own characteristic categories nor its own logical apparatus, as do ethics and aesthetics.[12]

What lies behind these objections, especially the first two, is a presumption that all fundamental accounts of man should take the form of historico-social explanation. Man is to be treated always in his particular social context and always from the standpoint of the historical development of that context. Psychology is partially exempted from this restriction because of its close ties with physiology. Not even Ojzerman would claim that the nervous system is different under socialism than under capitalism! However, this critique of philosophical anthropology is based upon a long-term misconception, now admitted by many Soviet philosophers, of the thesis that human nature is a socio-historical concept (drawn from Marx's sixth thesis on Feuerbach). This could be taken to mean that since man's social relations are constantly changing, he has no generic essence. Or it could simply mean that his essence, whatever it is, always involves relationships with the social conditions. It is the latter interpretation which is now more widespread

among Soviet philosophical anthropologists and which is also defended by other leading philosophers, such as I. S. Narskij. In defense of the notion of a generic essence of man, they refer not only to the relevant texts in Marx's early writings, but also (and especially) to *Capital*, where Marx distinguishes between human nature in general and human nature as it is modified in each historical epoch. Consequently, given the premise of a generic human nature, and given the fact that neither dialectical materialism nor historical materialism can treat it in its integrity, the advocating of a separate branch of philosophical investigation seems justified. S. S. Batenin sees the uniqueness of a philosophical investigation of man to be constituted by three facets of its approach. It studies man *comprehensively*, in all aspects of his being. It conceives man *monistically* – not as a sum of different features, but as an integral system. And it directs its attention to the *essence* of man, to the deepest levels of man's being.[13] Neither dialectical materialism nor historical materialism can provide such a comprehensive and integrative approach. Even those who dispute the separate status of philosophical anthropology are willing to state that the problem of man is the most important problem in contemporary Marxist philosophy. This group prefers an approach such as that embodied in the work of A. G. Myslivčenko, where he examines a series of traditional philosophical problems – man's essence and existence, freedom, creativity, the meaning of life, etc. – from a Marxist point of view without pretending to construct a systematic philosophical anthropology.

The call for a new, unified science of man – mentioned earlier in this paper – which was issued by Anan'ev in the late 60s does not yet seem to have been answered by any actual work or group of works that represent such a new synthesis, at least as is indicated by the philosophical literature. In fact, Anan'ev's original work is the one usually referred to as an example of the integrative approach. Also, there is considerable scepticism about the project itself. P. N. Fedoseev doubts that much can be expected of such an attempt; because of the highly diverse character of man, many different sciences must be involved, each employing its own characteristic and sovereign method. Any integration of knowledge, in his view, must seek not the dissolution of the special sciences but merely their co-operation and interaction in the solution of the complex problems of man.[14] On the other hand, Anan'ev's hope for a more substantial philosophical study of man seems to have been met. Also, the goal that philosophy provide the theoretical basis for the other sciences of man is still enthusiastically affirmed. In a comprehensive survey published in 1975 covering the philosophical and sociological literature on the problems of the person, the authors designate

the philosophical conception of man as the basis for the complex study of the person, to the extent that it provides both the general conception of the nature of man and the formulation of the "idealized object" of each special science (i.e., marking out the boundaries of the sciences).[15] The order in which the authors present the various disciplines is significant: first, the philosophical contributions; then the sociological theory, of which historical materialism is considered to be the most general level; and finally the special sociological disciplines and social-psychological studies. What is interesting here is that the basic philosophical theory of man is thought to provide the foundations for the treatment of man in historical materialism, and not the other way around. This indicates a recognition that historical materialism has clearly not been able to provide a coherent theory of man, since its categories are too narrow.

In recent publications in the area of philosophical anthropology, as well as in other disciplines such as psychology and sociology, much attention is being given to new approaches to the study of human phenomena. One of these is the so-called 'system-structural method', earlier employed in sociology but now also used to formulate a philosophical conception of the nature of man (a complex system of various constitutive sub-structures). A second approach focuses on the category of 'activity' as a paradigm for explaining the nature of man as well as the variety of his properly human functions. I would like to say something about this second approach, because it now seems to be at the center of attention in most Soviet philosophical treatments of man, as well as a major concern of psychologists, and because the controversy about it raises a rather central problem with regard to the Marxist theoretical framework for the study of man.

For some time now the category of activity has been used to characterize the generic nature of man. Batiščev's article in 1967 was one of the first such attempts. Now almost every philosopher dealing with the problems of man assigns an important or central role to this notion. A. G. Myslivčenko rejects the definition of man as a bio-social being in favor of the designation 'socially active being'; man is defined by him as "the subject of social and cultural activity".[16] Activity is hailed by V. S. Švyrev as "the human mode of relation to the world",[17] and by V. N. Sagatovskij as "man's proper mode of being" and "the universal feature of man's being".[18] Though some Soviets conceive this category in a somewhat restricted fashion, as designating only objective, material activity – practice, taken as a form of transformation of the material world – its principal exponents endow it with a much wider extension. M. S. Kagan, who defines man as *homo agens*, has developed a theory of activity

that embraces cognitive, moral, artistic, and social activity, as well as productive activity. He has worked out what he calls a 'morphology' of human activity, as opposed to a simple description (Batiščev's approach); in this he segregates and structurally inter-relates the necessary and sufficient components of human activity.[19] Others have argued that the so-called 'activity approach' (*dejatel'nostyj podxod*) is the only one which permits an integral theory of man.[20] And N. F. Naumova employs the notion to distinguish between the sociological approach to man and the philosophical approach: while in the former man is treated as an object of social process determined by the social system, in the latter man is considered as the subject of history, since his activity constitutes "the final cause and source of historical and social process".[21]

There is no doubt that this increasing use of the paradigm of 'human activity' for developing philosophical, psychological and sociological theories of man represents a special challenge to the domination of the kind of historical-social analysis required by historical materialism. And indeed it has produced its critics. M. Ja. Koval'zon takes the activity theorists to task for 'absolutizing' this category and claims that their position is indistinguishable from that of the Yugoslav *Praxis* group or the American pragmatists.[22] In general, he finds that their approach neglects the dialectic of history in favor of a narrowly conceived psychological analysis. If activity is to be properly understood, he maintains, the starting point of the analysis must be "not man, but the given socio-economic period".[23] Koval'zon rejects the use of this 'psychological' category to define man's essence or even to characterize his general social type. The latter can be properly done only with social-historical categories. Koval'zon's critique indicates that what is at issue here is more than just a difference of opinion about a particular problem in philosophical anthropology. If indeed human activity is considered the fundamental category for the explanation of human phenomena, and if activity is admitted to be the ultimate cause of the social process, then many long-held assumptions will have to be re-examined – social determinism, the importance of the class as the primary entity in social explanation, and even the historicist principle.

The dispute between the more traditional Marxist-Leninists like Koval'zon and all those who would like to see a special philosophical analysis of man serve as the basis for the human sciences is a dispute which may have its roots in the source from which they both take their principles, the works of Marx himself. It is no accident that the more recent writings in philosophical anthropology increasingly draw their inspiration from Marx's early

works, especially the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, now quoted by many as an authoritative text. As is well-known, it is here that Marx tries to ground socio-economic categories in anthropological categories; the discussion of the forms of alienation is the most noteworthy example. Other texts also frequently referred to are the first thesis on Feuerbach concerning *praxis* and the passages in the *German Ideology* which stress the importance of individuals and their productive activity. On the other hand, philosophers like Koval'zon and Ojzerman, who are sceptical about the new philosophical anthropology (and about any new science of man), consider the early writings an immature form of Marx's position and refer rather to Marx's characteristic mode of analysis of history, which gives little importance in its explanatory apparatus to the actions of individuals. The interpretation of history in terms of modes of production, types of exchange, struggles of classes and laws of accumulation represents history not as deriving from human activity; the basic explanatory models are those of social structures. There is no doubt that there is a real continuity in Marx's thought and that certain fundamental notions pervade his work. Ojzerman himself admits this. But the dispute over the proper approach to the study of man cannot be settled by simultaneously affirming the methodological principles of the *Manuscripts* and *Capital*. Soviet philosophers will ultimately have to come to terms with their now expanded body of canonical Marxist texts if they wish to resolve their differences and provide a theoretical basis for all the sciences of man.

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NOTES

[1] B. S. Ukraincev, 'Marksistsko-leninskaja filosofija i metody obščestvennyx nauk', *Voprosy filosofii* 7, 1977, p. 85.
[2] B. M. Kedrov, 'Nauka', in *Filosofskaja éncyklopedija*, vol. 3, M., 1965, p. 575.
[3] B. G. Anan'ev, *Čelovek kak predmet poznanija*, L., 1968, p. 14.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 18.
[5] I. A. Gobozov, 'Marksizm i filosofskaja antropologija', *Filosofskie nauki* 1, 1978, p. 24.
[6] V. I. Dobrynina and V. A. Xorošilov, 'Marksistskoe učenie o ličnosti', *Filosofskie nauki* 2, 1975, p. 130.
[7] B. F. Kiktev and F. V. Cann, 'Čelovek kak problema marksistskoj filosofii', *Vestnik MGU* 1. 1977, p. 3.
[8] A. T. Bočorišvili and B. T. Grigorjan, quoted in Gobozov, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 24f.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 31.
[11] A. G. Myslivčenko, *Čelovek kak predmet filosofskogo poznanija*, M., 1972, p. 30.
[12] Gobozov, *op. cit.*, p. 31.
[13] Dobrynina, *op. cit.*, p. 134.
[14] P. N. Fedoseev, 'Problema social'nogo i biologičeskogo v filosofii i sociologii', *Voprosy filosofii* 3, 1976, p. 74.
[15] Dobrynina, *op. cit.*
[16] Myslivčenko, *op. cit.*, p. 36.
[17] In V. N. Sagatovskij, 'Dejatel'nost' kak filosofskaja kategorija', *Filosofskie nauki* 2, 1978, p. 47.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 48.
[19] M. S. Kagan, 'Opyt sistemnogo analiza čelovečeskoj dejatel'nosti', *Filosofskie nauki* 5, 1970, pp. 43–53.
[20] Kiktev, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
[21] Quoted in Myslivčenko, *op. cit.*, p. 52.
[22] M. Ja. Koval'zon, 'Filosofskij analiz čelovečeskoj dejatel'nosti', *Vestnik MGU* 2, 1978, pp. 7 f.
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

FRIEDRICH RAPP

TECHNOLOGICAL DETERMINISM AND REVOLUTIONARY CLASS WAR IN MARXIST THINKING

The basic ideas of historical materialism were conceived within the context of the political and social situation obtaining more than a century ago. Thus it may be legitimate to ask which of the views of Marx and Engels (who will henceforth be considered here as speaking with one voice) have turned out true in terms of the historical development which has taken place in the meantime. Clearly the present state of pauperization of the proletariat and the degree of class consciousness and of revolutionary activity in the *Western* countries do not correspond to the expectations of the classics. The same is true of the current situation in the *Communist* countries, where according to the ideas of Marx and Engels all kinds of power structure, social antagonism and alienation should have been abolished. On the whole, the actual political and social circumstances in our world hardly correspond to the state of affairs expected by Marx and Engels.

A different picture obtains, when we turn from the *political field* to philosophical foundations. The *materialist conception of history* appears to correspond more closely to reality. The fact that on a global scale and in all realms of life scientific and technological progress is one of leading forces of our time seems to support the historical-materialist interpretation of history. Some observers feel that there is a tendency towards a unified world civilisation, the dominant factor in which may turn out to be not the specific intellectual and cultural heritage but universally disseminated technological means and procedures and hence the process of production and the material basis of living. The appeal of Marxist-Leninist ideology to the developing countries must be seen along these lines. Since these countries want to achieve a higher standard of living by means of modern technology, it is natural that they should embrace a theory in which science and technology are treated as the leading variables of history. In addition to this, the schema of historical materialism offers a simple und universal explanation of history, provides a promise of a better world and at the same time assures its followers of definitely being on the side of historical progress.[1] The idea behind this is that this progress is necessitated by irresistible material factors (science and technology) and political forces (class war and revolution).

It is worthwhile to consider the two elements of Marxist theory involved

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here. First there is the idea of an inherent mechanism of historical development, rooted in the very relation of man to nature. In order to ensure satisfaction of his material needs he has to work and to co-operate with others. In the last analysis it is this state of man as a tool-making, social animal which gives rise to the dialectic between the forces and relations of production and hence to the course of history. The moving force of this process is the change in the forces of production. What results is a *technological determinism*. In this view history with its contingent and ever-changing combination of circumstances, rivaling and cross-acting interests, different cultural traditions and great personalities is reduced to a linear, over-all process, directed towards a higher state in the subjugation of nature, and by derivation also towards a higher form of society. Whatever the ideas and actions of men and the results arising from them, in this view they are ultimately only executing the immanent teleology of history.

This strict, naturalist, and determinist approach is complemented by the second element in Marxist theory, which offers scope for interference and spontaneity. In concrete historical situations the oppressed classes recognize their state of exploitation, articulate their interests, engage in revolutionary activity and shake off their chains. In this model the political state of affairs, class-consciousness and appeal to the free, voluntaristic choice of the individual to act in favour of the exploited class are decisive.

At present a sort of geographical division of labour seems to obtain in applying these two components of Marxism-Leninism. Roughly speaking, technological determinism is characteristic of the internal situation of the Communist countries, whereas the theory of revolutionary class war is used as an ideological weapon against the rest of the world. Clearly this is an oversimplification. As mentioned above, all over the world, and not only in the Eastern Bloc, technology today emerges as a leading factor; and the official ideology of the Communist countries and their own image of themselves are in fact also shaped by Marxist ideas. But on a closer inspection it turns out that in the countries of the Eastern Bloc technological determinism and Communist theory are not of equal relevance. To put it in a nutshell, in these countries technological determinism dominates revolutionary Communism. The key concept is technological progress and not abolition of the difference between social classes. Whereas the notion of unchaining the means of production, raising efficiency and stimulating scientific and technological innovation dominates actual practice, except for the abolition of the private ownership of the means of production the idea of a Communist society is displaced to the realm of ideology.[2]

There is an immanent consistency in this procedure. In contrast to the harsh and polemic criticism of technology nowadays often found in the West, in the Communist countries technology is basically regarded as a promise of a better form of life. The theoretical justification of science and technology by the classics and the practical desire for a higher standard of living combine to produce an optimistic attitude towards technological change. The relevance of the concrete need becomes most evident when we consider the theses of the Communist thinker W. Harich. In his book *Kommunismus ohne Wachstum?* he argues (1) that the limits of growth demand a strict reduction and control of technological change and economic growth[3] and (2) that the only type of government capable of carrying out this control is a dictatorial Communist state.[4] On the theoretical level this line of argument is in contradiction to the idea of orthodox Marxism-Leninism whereby social progress is to be achieved by unchaining the means of production, allegedly confined in a capitalist economy. It is highly significant that this book by Harich, who at that time lived in East Berlin (he is now in the West) and who otherwise conforms strictly to the Party line, was not allowed to be published in the East. It seems that the main defect of his idea of austerity was not ideological deviation (probably by means of an appropriate interpretation his arguments could in one way or another be reconciled with the teaching of the classics), but rather the fact that his programme is opposed to public opinion.[5] The prospect of controlling technological change and economic growth and thus stabilizing or even reducing the standard of living would not be at all welcome to the people in the Eastern countries – a situation by no means unfamiliar in the West.

It is worthwhile to look at the relation between the two competing elements in the teachings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. Without going into too much detail, for the purpose of an analytical distinction five points can be distinguished.

(1) The *foundation of historical materialism* is conceived as a reversal of Hegel's idealism. But Marx retains the dialectical method, i.e. the idea of the 'necessary' development of conflicting elements (contradictions) towards higher stages. He only replaces the content. Not the dialectic self-movement of the forms of consciousness, and hence ideology,[6] as with Hegel, but rather the process of the production of material goods and the relations resulting from it make up the historical process;[7] they constitute the very essence of man.[8] As Marx has it, this conception means mounting from earth to heaven, and not the other way round, as in the case of Hegel.[9]

(2) This general notion about the foundations is put into concrete terms

by specifying the *mechanism of progress*. According to Marx and Engels, in any stage of the development of the means of production men enter into certain relations of production, and it is the dialectical relationship between these two elements which gives rise to social revolutions.[10] As soon as the forces of production develop in such a way that the former relations of production turn out to be a restriction on further progress a revolution occurs.[11] In this explication the general foundation thesis of historical materialism is spelled out in a definite way.

(3) But this schema does not yet indicate precisely in what the *source of novelty* consists. When one turns to the relevant statements of Marx and Engels, one finds that they regard technological innovations as the final moving force. These innovations bring about changes in the forces of production and thus prove to be the decisive elements. It is in these terms that Marx writes: "Technology reveals the active relationship of man to nature, the immediate process of production of his life, and thereby also of his social conditions of life and the intellectual conceptions that flow out of them."[12] The *technological determinism* that emerges becomes most explicit in Marx's statement, "The hand mill produces a society with feudal lords, the steam mill a society with industrial capitalists."[13]

(4) The *theory of revolution* too is conceived in opposition to Hegel. The basic notion is that not intellectual theory, criticism and the movement of the mind but only revolutionary political practice can act as the moving force in history. It is in terms of this appeal to active interference instead of passive reflection that Marx formulated his famous 11th thesis on Feuerbach: "Philosophers have only *interpreted* the world differently; but what matters is to *change* it."[14] And Marx and Engels conclude

> that no forms and products of consciousness can be dissolved by intellectual criticism, by being sublated into 'self-consciousness' . . .; this can only occur through the practical overthrow of the real social conditions from which this idealistic humbug arose; not criticism but rather the revolution is the driving force of history as well as of religion, philosophy and other kinds of theory.[15]

The same idea is present in the apodictic statement of the *Communist Manifesto*: "The history of all previous society is the history of class struggle."[16] As a result, the teaching of Marx and Engels offers two competing moving forces of history, viz, technological progress and political revolution. It seems that the expression 'Scientific-Technological Revolution' (STR) is valued in present-day Marxism-Leninism precisely because it suggests a (verbal) synthesis of these two elements, a synthesis which in fact

restricts revolutionary activity to the field of scientific and technological change.[17]

(5) In Marxist theory the *oppressed class* constitutes the element in which technological determinism and revolutionary interference meet. According to Marx, at a certain stage in the development of the productive forces a class consisting of the majority of the members of society arises that has to bear the burdens of society without enjoying its benefits. It is this class from which "arises the consciousness of the necessity of a fundamental revolution, i.e., communist consciousness."[18] As usual, Engels is more straightforward. He characterizes the capitalist mode of production in the following way: "Overproduction and mass poverty, each the cause of the other – that is the absurd contradiction in which it ends and which necessarily calls for a liberation of the forces of production by a change in the mode of production."[19] In both statements the necessity of a political revolution is derived from the development of the means of production.

As is well-known, the expectation of Marx and Engels that eliminating the 'contradiction' between collective production and the private ownership of the means of production would eliminate all social conflicts has not been fulfilled. When faced with the concrete task of managing a state established in terms of Communist theory, Lenin turned to practical problems. He concentrated all his efforts on raising the productivity of work and fostered science, technology and public education in order to achieve these goals, which he summed up in the formula "Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country."[20]

In metaphysical terms, Marx replaced Hegel's notion of the self-movement of the absolute mind by the process of production of material goods. He did this because he wanted to refer to concrete reality instead of to mere speculative thinking. As mentioned above, prima facie, the present importance of science and technology seems to support the general notion of historical materialism. Yet this claim cannot remain unchallenged. It is not by chance that Marx and Engels based their thesis (a) on general considerations about man as a tool-making animal and on the division of labour, and (b) on the investigation of the capitalist mode of production. When we look at the abundance of historical phenomena in unbiased terms, it turns out that they fit into the scheme of historical materialism only after being distorted in a suitable way. Thus it is not astonishing that thinkers in the West who follow the general line of a materialist interpretation of history put the stress on prehistory (D. Ribeiro),[21] cosmic evolution (S. Moscovici),[22] and the utopian perspective (E. Bloch),[23] or introduce abstract, functional concepts (J. Habermas).[24]

The most serious problem arises when we consider the claim of Marx, that his conception reveals the process of history better than that of Hegel. Evidently historical materialism can act as a useful heuristic principle for historical research and analysis. But this does not imply that it is always possible to reduce ideas to material processes. Three points are of special relevance here. (1) Technological change does not stand by itself. When we turn from the structural analysis to the people involved in bringing about technological innovations, it becomes evident that they rely on a certain type of *knowledge* – in modern times of a scientific type – and that their actions are guided by certain *aims* which in their concrete form are not naturally given or self-evident, but rather mediated by the spirit of the times, such as, in our era, democratic egalitarism and striving for a higher standard of living. (2) A spontaneous *intellectual* creativity is needed to invent new devices or to discover new scientific principles. (3) In historical materialism the dominance of the theoretical is returning through a loophole. After all, Marxist thinking is also a process of the *mind*, and its result is a *theory*. But in contrast to the system of Hegel's idealism, which is open to integrate new experiences, in dialectical materialism theory must always dominate over practice, i.e., in speculative terms, the idea dominates over matter. Since Marx's practical aim was not to give a blueprint for a communist society, but to improve the concrete situation of the proletariat of early capitalism, this point of criticism applies especially to his orthodox followers.

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[1] An analysis of the components of Marxism-Leninism can be found in the Sovietological works of J. M. Bocheński, such as *Der dialektische sowjetrussische Materialismus*, Bern/München, 1962, esp. p. 47 f.; and *Marxismus-Leninismus*, München/Wien, 1973, esp. pp. 13–19.

[2] Cf., for example, V. G. Maxarov, 'Naučno-texničeskaja revoljucija i sozdanie material'no-texničeskoj bazi kommunizma', *FN* 4, 1971, pp. 11–18; and the review 'Naučno-texničeskaja revoljucija i formirovanie novogo čeloveka', *VF* 7, 1975, pp. 13–39 and 8, pp. 26–44.

[3] W. Harich, *Kommunismus ohne Wachstum?* Reinbek, 1975, pp. 15 and 106.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 112.

[5] *Ibid.* On p. 115, Harich states: "Der PKW [private motor-car] ist nach meiner Überzeugung ein natur- und gesellschaftsfeindliches Konsumtionsmittel, ein antikommunistisches (!) auf jeden Fall."

[6] Most explicit is Marx's statement in his epilogue to the second edition of *Das Kapital*, Karl Marx – Friedrich Engels, *Werke* [MEW], Berlin 1957–1967, vol. 23, p. 27: "Die Mystifikation, welche die Dialektik in Hegels Händen erleidet, verhindert in keiner Weise, dass er ihre allgemeinen Bewegungsformen zuerst in umfassender und bewusster Weise dargestellt hat. Sie steht bei ihm auf dem Kopf. Man muss sie umstülpen, um den rationellen Kern in der mystischen Hülle zu entdecken."

[7] K. Marx, F. Engels, *Die deutsche Ideologie*, MEW, vol. 3, p. 21: "Wie die Individuen ihr Leben äussern, so sind sie. Was sie sind, fällt also zusammen mit ihrer Produktion, sowohl damit, *was* sie produzieren, als auch damit, *wie* sie produzieren. Was die Individuen also sind, das hängt ab von den materiellen Bedingungen ihrer Produktion."

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 38.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 26 f. "Ganz im Gegensatz zur deutschen Philosophie, welche vom Himmel auf die Erde herabsteigt, wird hier von der Erde zum Himmel gestiegen. . . . Die Moral, Religion, Metaphysik und sonstige Ideologie und die ihnen entsprechenden Bewusstseinsformen behalten hiermit nicht länger den Schein der Selbständigkeit. Sie haben keine Geschichte, sie haben keine Entwicklung, sondern die ihre materielle Produktion und ihren materiellen Verkehr entwickelnden Menschen ändern mit dieser ihrer Wirklichkeit auch ihr Denken und die Produkte ihres Denkens."

[10] K. Marx, *Zur Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie*, MEW, vol. 13, p. 8.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 9: "Auf einer gewissen Stufe ihrer Entwicklung geraten die materiellen Produktivkräfte der Gesellschaft in Widerspruch mit den vorhandenen Produktionsverhältnissen oder, was nur ein juristischer Ausdruck dafür ist, mit den Eigentumsverhältnissen, innerhalb deren sie sich bisher bewegt hatten. Aus Entwicklungsformen der Produktivkräfte schlagen diese Verhältnisse in Fesseln derselben um. Es tritt dann eine Epoche sozialer Revolution ein."

[12] K. Marx, *Das Kapital*, MEW, vol. 23, p. 393. The decisive role of technology for the development of mankind (B. Franklin's "man as a toolmaking animal") is presented here on p. 194. When seeing in 1850 in London a model of an electric railway, Marx said: "Jetzt ist das Problem gelöst – die Folgen sind unabsehbar. Der ökonomischen Revolution muss *mit Notwendigkeit* die politische folgen, denn sie ist *nur deren Ausdruck*." (My italics.) (W. Liebknecht, *Mohr und General: Erinnerungen an Marx und Engels*, Berlin, 1964, p. 51). Marx's statement in a speech concerning the revolution of 1848 is in the same vein: "Dampf, Elektrizität und Spinnmaschine waren Revolutionäre von viel gefährlicherem Charakter als selbst die Bürger Barbès, Raspail und Blanqui" (MEW, vol. 12, p. 3).

[13] K. Marx, *Das Elend der Philosophie*, MEW, vol. 4, p. 130.

[14] K. Marx, *Thesen über Feuerbach*, MEW, vol. 3, p. 535.

[15] K. Marx, F. Engels, *Die Deutsche Ideologie*, MEW, vol. 3, p. 38.

[16] K. Marx, F. Engels, *Manifest der kommunistischen Partei*, MEW, vol. 4, p. 462.

[17] Cf. my review, 'Soviet-Marxist Philosophy of Technology', to appear in a volume edited by P. Kirschenmann and A. Sarlemijn, forthcoming in the *Sovietica* series (D. Reidel, Dordrecht).

[18] K. Marx, F. Engels, *Die deutsche Ideologie*, MEW, vol. 3, p. 69.

[19] F. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen Deutschen Philosophie*, MEW, vol. 21, p. 300.

[20] V. J. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 31, Moscow, 1966, p. 419.

[21] D. Ribeiro, *Der zivilisatorische Prozess*, Frankfurt/M., 1971. English edition: *The Civilisational Process*, Washington, D.C., 1968.
[22] S. Moscovici, *Essai sur l'histoire humaine de la nature*, Paris, 1968.
[23] E. Bloch, *Das Prinzip Hoffnung*, Frankfurt/M., 1959.
[24] J. Habermas, *Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus*, Frankfurt/M., 1976.

PHILIP T. GRIER

O. I. DŽIOEV: A SOVIET CRITIQUE OF STRUCTURALIST SOCIAL THEORY

I

The Soviet Georgian philosopher Otar Džioev has been writing for more than a decade on various problems in the philosophy of history. He has written on the concept of history, on the concept of a science of history, on the concepts of law, necessity, and determinism in history, and on the role of the individual as agent of history. More recently, in response to theories of certain of the French structuralists, he has also addressed the topics of historicism and humanism.[1]

Needless to say, all of Džioev's writings are in defense of a Marxist-Leninist conception of a science of history. At the same time, he has concerned himself with clarifying the treatment of a number of issues which have received less than satisfactory attention from other Soviet writers, and he has advocated positions which, though sometimes shared publicly by only a few other Soviet philosophers, go far toward sketching a more adequate and interesting philosophy of history than usually encountered in Soviet sources.

In general, Džioev's interpretation of a Marxist science of history could be characterized as an attempt to avoid the rigid social determinism and objectivism most often associated with Soviet Marxism. Instead, he wishes to accommodate a conception of the concrete individual as agent of history, one who transcends the bounds of social determinism, whose historically significant actions could in principle not be wholly explained by social psychology, whose being is in part explicable only in terms of the history of culture, who serves as an agent of creative thought, and whose judgments of value are shaped by his perceptions of his situation in the cosmos and not merely by his role in a particular social order.

At the same time Džioev professes an undiminished commitment to a materialist methodological monism, to a form of social determinism, and especially, to a notion of inherent necessity in the operation of laws of history.

It is this problem of the nature of historical necessity which has provided the focus for much of his work. In his first monograph on the nature of historical necessity,[2] he wrestled with the difficulties involved in defending

James J. O'Rourke et al. (*eds.*), *Contemporary Marxism*, 183–195.
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a Marxist thesis of historical determinism in which the material factor is viewed as monistically and necessarily determining the course of history,[3] and at the same time explaining how the actions of individual agents, as well as the course of history as a whole, could be seen to be governed by universal human values. Though seemingly fully alive to the attractions of Hegel's philosophy of history for anyone who wishes to explain how the course of history is governed by universal values, Džioev as a good Marxist attempts to point the way to the Hegelian realization of freedom at something less than the price of recognizing absolute spirit. He approaches the problem by insisting, plausibly, on a distinction between the meaning of 'necessity' in the context of physical theory, and the meaning of 'necessity' in the context of history.[4]

Continued insistence on the concept of 'necessity' in this latter context may well pose more problems than it can solve, and Džioev has continued to wrestle with some of them in a second monograph.[5] In this work he stresses a further distinction to which, I think it is clear his earlier views compelled him to resort, namely a distinction between historical necessity itself, and the *realization* of historical necessity.[6] As Džioev points out, on the usual Marxist (i.e. Soviet Marxist) interpretation of the operation of laws of history, the laws operate objectively, independent of human will or consciousness, and individual actors or groups are at most only able to accelerate or decelerate their operation. This however is an inadequate response to the problem, Džioev argues.

> If this acceleration or deceleration is just as necessary as the connection expressed by the law, in this case the law and its realization will be identically necessary. If this acceleration or deceleration of the operation of the law is conceived as the result of free activity, it would constitute a recognition of the fact that necessity and its realization are distinct.[7]

It is Džioev's view that the necessity expressed by historical-materialist laws of history can be realized in part only through the consciousness and will of concrete individuals, and hence that history must be conceived as constituted in part by the free, creative action of such individuals.[8]

It is not obvious that all these tensions between necessary laws of history and free, creative human action can be reconciled within a single internally consistent philosophy of history, and despite the publication of two books on the subject, it cannot be said that Džioev has adequately responded to all of them. On the other hand, his willingness to address a number of the more obvious difficulties is refreshing.

What gives particular force and interest to Džioev's treatment of these

problems is his unusually resolute refusal to reduce the individual subject to the status of a merely or exclusively social being, whose actions are determined through objective social conditions. He denies that Marxist historical materialism ever pretended to explain every historical event, the creativity of every artist, or the moral sense of every individual, from a single material factor,[9] referring instead to ideals and values "which cannot be reduced to concrete-historical conditions".[10]

For instance he explicitly rejects the common Soviet tendency to distinguish all human interests governing action into *objective*, i.e. authentic, social interests, and *subjective*, i.e. illusory, individual ones.[11] He points out instead that the distinction between objective, social or economic interests and subjective, illusory interests belongs properly to historical-materialist ideology, but does not operate at the more immediately descriptive level of social psychology. In describing the immediate motives of individual conduct, an "illusory" subjective interest is just as real a motivating factor as an "authentic" social one.[12] For this reason Džioev sees a certain gap in the explanations of human action available at the level of historical materialism, and advocates the pursuit of social psychology as a distinct and necessary level of discourse for the explanation of human action as a supplement to it. Speaking in the categories of historical materialism, human action is determined both by subjective and objective, by economic and non-economic factors, and neither can be reduced to the other.[13]

Džioev's determination to bring the concrete individual in as an agent of history requires him to go beyond the concept of the individual as a socially determined type; he asserts that "the structure of the determination of behavior of the concrete individual cannot be described in the form of a monolinear schema beginning with productive relations and ending with a system of values."[14] Such explanations of individual conduct must be supplemented with explanations employing a different order of discourse: namely the history of culture. "The concrete individual is a being in whom the history of culture is already condensed, and for that reason cannot be treated as a simple passive reflection of the social environment."[15]

More tellingly, the concrete individual which Džioev wishes to accomodate in his philosophy of history is not situated merely or exclusively in a social order:

> (Human) existence is not only the bustle of the day, and not only a given social order; that is, human existence does not consist only in the fact that he, man, is a member of a given society. The place of man in the world also comprises his existence. As we

explained in the preceding chapter, universal human values 'flow out of' this existence of man.[15]

The existence of Džioev's concrete individual thus transcends the bounds of his social situation: his values may reflect his individual perception of the situation of humanity in the universe as a whole, even perhaps of a universal human condition.

The nature of Džioev's conception of the concrete individual as historical actor is still more fully revealed by his use of the notion of *thought* in a sense very like that of Hegel. In his discussion of the appropriateness of social psychology as an explanation of human action, Džioev distinguishes three "layers of the human psyche" to which correspond three levels of explanation of human action. The first, most superficial level is that of ideology, or world-view. Explanations of human actions offered at this level may often turn out to be rationalizations of conduct, explanations offered in ideological terms which may account only very marginally for the conduct in question, or may falsely describe its motivation.

The second, deeper level of explanation belongs to social psychology, in which certain of the categories and distinctions of the ideology are set aside, and explanations are offered for human conduct in terms which immediately govern the behavior of individuals.

There is however a third type of explanation of conduct which simply refers that conduct to the conclusions of *critical thought*. "Only thanks to thought can humanity pose before itself the task of changing this or that society."[17] Džioev charges that theorists who confine themselves to the level of social-psychological discourse, such as Fromm and Marcuse, cannot see a way out of the present crisis of bourgeois society precisely because they view social psychology as the key to understanding social change.[18]

Undoubtedly, social psychology places a certain imprint upon thought, "grasps" its surface layers, but as a whole thought cannot be placed within the framework of social psychology; it is the epistemological mechanism for the creation of ideology. Thought is not reducible merely to the social-psychological, or to the socially conditioned in general, for it is impossible without the creation of the novel, the unforeseen, without creativity.[19]

Moreover, the creativity, in part artistic creativity, which Džioev sees as the special province of thought, can be understood only in the context of the history of culture. He grants that such forms of inquiry as psycho-biography can be of some value in the understanding of the creative laboratory

of the artist, but it cannot be the main condition for the understanding of the development of culture.

> But for a more concrete answer, it is necessary to study directly the development of culture, its various spheres, to study the interrelation of logic and creative freedom in this process. The problem of the distinctive characteristics of the development of culture is, if you please, one of the most topical in Marxist philosophy today.[20]

As if to confirm the Hegelian inspiration behind this use of the notions of thought and culture, for a slightly incredulous audience, Džioev asserts in another place that "we need to investigate how ideas are born, spread, and realized; we need to create a Marxist *Phenomenology of Spirit*".[21]

The various forms of culture must not be grasped merely as fulfilling a system of functions the structure of which is common to many societies, and which can be established by empirical investigations in the various special social sciences. Some of these forms of culture must be also viewed as an attempt to assess the situation of humanity in the universe, an assessment with universal human import.

It is philosophy, in the form of philosophy of history, which finally takes on this task of specifying the meaning, the significance of the system of social institutions as a whole for human existence. "The meaning and significance of social phenomena are impossible to understand without a philosophical analysis of human nature, of its essential motivating forces."[22]

> The concept of the nature of man and the essence of society cannot be realized by means of the inductive generalization of knowledge of the situation of man and the functions of culture in different societies; for their construction, a philosophical analysis of the place of man in the universe, his relation to this universe, and the essential human motive forces deriving from it, is necessary.[23]

The final project of Džioev's philosophy of history, then, is a philosophical definition of human nature in terms of the concrete individual as a product of culture, but also engaged in creative thought; partly determined by social conditions, but also instituting planned social change, and doing so in accordance with a conception of human nature developed through consideration of the situation of humanity in the universe.

II

Having arrived at this concept of the goal-directed practical activity of the concrete individual as the subject of history, Džioev notes that just such a

concept of the individual is systematically rejected by the movement known as structuralism, in the name of a "theoretical anti-humanism".

The structuralist theory which Džioev takes for his principal stalking-horse is that of Louis Althusser, with occasional references to the views of Godelier, Foucault, and Lévi-Strauss. He does not stop to argue the question of whether the appelation "structuralist" is acceptable to Althusser himself,[24] and it should be noted that Džioev's discussion is confined for the most part to the views which Althusser presented in the series of articles culminating in the publication of *Pour Marx* and *Lire le Capital* in 1965. Though his second monograph was published in 1974, Džioev does not consider the various "retreats", both strategic and forced, which Althusser carried out in his writings during the 1970s. Hence the "structuralism" which Džioev discusses is essentially the theory which Althusser advanced in his two earlier and most well-known works.

Generally speaking Džioev is determined to defend precisely that union of humanism and historicism which according to Althusser now represents the gravest temptation to error, because it allegedly has nothing to do with Marx's *problématique*.[25] It has rather to do with the voluntarist interpretation of Marx inspired by the Russian revolution and articulated in the postrevolutionary period by Lukács, Korsch, Gramsci, and later Colleti, all of whom were inclined toward a Hegelianized reading of Marx in one way or another.[26]

The intersection of historicism and humanism represents such a danger in Althusser's view because of its very attractiveness, and the fact that it leads to what appears to him an insoluble dilemma in explaining the role of humanity in history. The historicism Althusser has in mind would reduce all knowledge to a reflection of historically-determined social relations, and would moreover identify these social relations with the relations of production, viewing them as *human relations*, thus conceiving history as something designed by its human participants. The 'actors' of history are thus the authors of its text, as well as the subject of its production; concrete men are, in history, the actors of the roles of which they are simultaneously the authors. Althusser complains, "once the stage-director has been spirited away, the actor-author becomes the twin brother of Aristotle's old dream: the doctor-who-cures-himself".[27] The real stage-directors of history, according to Althusser, are not concrete individuals but certain *structures*, namely the relations of production.[28] On the historicist interpretation, once human nature has been endowed with the qualities of "concrete" historicity, history then becomes the tale of the transformation of human nature, which remains the real subject of the history which transforms it.[29]

The general outlines of Althusser's alternative to all this are by now very well known: the attack on an allegedly Hegelian concept of historical time as a single homogeneous continuum on which all the various moments of the dialectical unity comprising society at any point in time can be simultaneously located; the attempt to replace this with an allegedly Marxian conception of the social totality as composed of a plurality of relatively autonomous structures, each exhibiting its own constitutive time, distinct from the others, each structure constituted as a theoretical object in part by the distinctive time it exhibits (hence the impossibility of characterizing all of these structures as moments of a single dialectical unity), and finally the presentation of all this in the form of theory, which is itself, at least as regards its conceptual content, not a historically determined phenomenon. The development of this theory or science came about as a radical epistemological break or *coupure* from the preceding (philosophical or ideological) *problématique*. Marxism is held to constitute a scientific theory, distinguished by its problematic and method from all (preceding) ideologies.

In Althusser's view, once one has made this distinction between the theory of history, as theory, and the 'concrete determinations of historical time', then we see that the concept of history cannot itself be historical in the ordinary sense: as Spinoza put it, the concept dog cannot bite. "The knowledge of history is no more historical than the knowledge of sugar is sweet", asserts Althusser.[30]

From this Althusserian point of view, the entire problem of the relation between the logical and the historical in the method of Marx's *Capital* is a pseudo-problem.[31] To counterpose the logical and the historical as distinct but equally important components of Marxist method is a kind of category-mistake.[32]

Džioev takes up this problem of the relation between the logical and the historical in Marxist method, undeterred by Althusser's insistence that there is no such relation. He agrees with Althusser when the latter describes the method of *Capital* as "logical"[33] and also when he objects to the identification of the logical and the historical.[34] However, just as the reduction of Marxism to historicism would be mistaken, so too would be any attempt to oppose Marxism to historicism. "The argument with sweetened consciousness to which Althusser resorts in establishing anti-historicism", says Džioev, "is unconvincing."[35]

Historicism, as a principle of approach to social reality, of course, does not require that concepts reflecting revolution be revolutionary, and concepts characterizing reaction, be

reactionary. Historicism requires that with all the structural unity of such totalities, one must not forget the differences, the degrees of maturity, of these or those social systems. Historicism requires the establishment of not only the necessity of the functioning of structural systems, but also the necessity of the transition from one system to another. The repudiation of historicism creates insuperable difficulties for Althusser and his supporters in the comprehension of that transition.[36]

In terms of Althusser's conception of the social totality as comprised of a complex plurality of distinct structures, each possessed of a certain autonomy, each characterized by a distinct type of time and determination, the transition from one social totality to another cannot be a consequence of the functioning of any single structure within the social totality. Such a transition can only be the result of a "collision" or a "collusion" of the economic structure, class political struggle, ideological struggle, etc. In a period of transition the correspondence of the various aspects of society is replaced by non-correspondence. Moreover this period is characterized by the coexistence of a plurality of modes of production. Precisely at such moments the possibility of a synchronous, structural analysis of the social totality becomes doubtful. Althusser has attempted to deal with this difficulty by claiming that "the problem of the transition from one mode of production to another and its form represent a problem of a more general synchrony than is manifested in the mode of production itself. It comprises a plurality of systems and their interrelations."[37] However, Džioev observes that it is unclear in what this "more general synchrony" could consist, and notes that Althusser puts off the resolution of this particular difficulty for the future. Džioev attributes this apparent *cul de sac* in Althusser's analysis to his exaggeration of the distinction between the laws of functioning of social structures and the laws of the transition from one system to another.

III

Turning to the subject of "theoretical anti-humanism" in Althusser, Džioev notes its close connection with the anti-historicism just discussed, and indeed, it is clear that Althusser also sees the two as intimately connected. Džioev presents this aspect of Althusser's theory as an attempt to complete that critique of humanist ideology which was conducted intensively in the second half of the 19th century, culminating in Nietzsche's announcement of the "transvaluation of all values", and in Zarathustra's "revelation" of the death of God. Notwithstanding all the vehement polemics between existentialists and structuralists, Džioev characterizes them both as proceeding from this

Nietzschean declaration. The existentialists he describes as preoccupied with characterizing human existence in a situation where God is dead, struggling to find another foundation for values. The structuralists he describes as proclaiming the death of humanity as well, and loudly renouncing any search for values, abandoning that concept to the ideologues, counterposing ideology and science, as though the problem of values were alien to science.[38]

He characterizes the structuralists as subjecting humanism to criticism not for some particular solution of human problems, nor for insufficient theoretical grounding of its claims, but for posing these problems at all, i.e., problems which in their opinion are meaningless and unsolvable (problems of morality, value, the relation of humanity to the universe, problems of reality, the problem of the meaning of artistic creativity, happiness, etc.). The structuralists consider that humanism can be overcome only after liberating ourselves from these problems, by chasing the concept of humanity from the sciences.

> The structuralists, of course, don't deny that economic institutions, language, and culture are created by people. But they consider that if we proceed from the concept of man, his needs, his will, we will be able to understand neither economics, nor language, nor culture. In order to sort out these phenomena, it is necessary to turn away from the concept of man. Changes in economic life, language, and culture became comprehensible only as changes in definite structures. To that extent structures appear as genuine subjects.[39]

In response to this theoretical anti-humanism of the structuralists, Džioev addressed three questions posed by it: (1) who is the genuine subject of history? (2) what is the relation between humanism and historicism? and (3) what is the relation of humanism to science, or the relation of science and ideology?[40]

(1) Džioev first notes that the question of who is the authentic subject of history cannot be decided on a purely empirical level: it is a philosophical problem. History is in one sense simply a record of human activity, and hence any empirically discovered laws of history must in one sense turn out to be laws of human activity, but this would not solve our problem. What we need to know, according to Džioev, is whether the kind of necessity exhibited by laws of history implies the possibility of creative human choice between alternative paths for the realization of history.

(2) The concept of humanity as the subject of history is equivalent to the recognition that the historical process includes an element of creativity, in Džioev's view, and to understand human creativity it is necessary to know the

nature of human aspirations and values. But since these last may themselves be subject to historical determination, we seem to be threatened with arriving once again at a position of absolute historicism. Only if some element or elements of human nature transcend historical determination in some respects would it be possible to avoid such absolute historicism. The concept of alienation points toward one possible example of such a transhistorical feature of human nature. In criticizing abstract humanism, Džioev claims, one must not be led to the rejection of any philosophical concept of man. He argues that in the analysis of alienation, Marxism must proceed from a concept of the wholeness of the human individual. "Of course Marxism must not proceed from a wholeness, a harmoniousness of man as an historical given. . . . But the concept of such wholeness all the same expresses an innate tendency in man."[41] According to Džioev,

> Obviously there are some tendencies in man which have different conditions of realization in different societies, but which cannot completely disappear without man himself disappearing; they cannot disappear because society, however it distorts them, is founded on them. In this fashion just as society cannot eliminate labor, so it cannot eliminate also the tendency in man to creativity, to freedom.[42]

Thus Džioev explicitly rests his philosophy of history on a philosophical concept of humanity.

(3) Finally, on the problem of the relation of ideology to science, Džioev argues that the sharp distinction drawn between them by the structuralists cannot be supported. The distinction rests at bottom on a distinction between judgments of fact and judgments of value which cannot be accepted uncritically. Džioev claims, without detailed argument, that judgments of value are objective, susceptible of truth or falsity when taken in relation to a philosophical concept of human nature. Yet again, Džioev reaches the same conclusion: that the value-relativism inherent in the structuralists' rejection of any theoretical basis for humanism "can be overcome only in the event that we proceed on the basis of a concept of man, his essence, the clarification of his place in the world, the discovery of his fundamental tendencies."[43]

IV

The significance of Džioev's work in philosophy of history can be neatly illustrated by referring to Helmut Fleischer's description of the dominant tendencies in Soviet writings on the concept of history in the Preface to his

book *Marxism and History*. He there refers to "a highly material and sober view of history as a process of correlative development of productive forces and productive relations uninfluenced by human intentions. This latter view of history has become dominant in the historical materialism of the Soviet school, and with its logic of structures and processes sometimes reaches such a degree of abstraction that it is possible to say of it – as Marx said of Hobbes – that materialism has here become 'anti-human'."[44]

From this perspective it is evident that a number of the tendencies of the French structuralist movement which Džioev opposes are also characteristic of Soviet structuralism. That the dominant Soviet position has not received such a description is probably due more to the fact that the Soviet writers, unlike the French, seldom or never have the courage of consistency to draw the conclusions toward which their analysis inevitably moves, and to eliminate humanity as a significant term in the discourse. For instance Fleischer cites the example of one standard Soviet work by Kelle and Kovalzon in which the "objectivist" view of history as a process analogous to natural history and obedient to natural laws is enthusiastically expounded for more than 100 pages, only to reach the conclusion that actual history is "the result of the activity of men".[45]

The affinity between recent French structuralist Marxism and certain tendencies, less consistently developed, in Soviet historical materialism leads me to suggest that in criticizing the French work, Džioev may well be attempting to initiate a discussion within the Soviet Union which would renew the development of philosophy of history which has in many respects been arrested since the 1920s, when Lukács' attempt in *History and Class Consciousness* to provide Marxist philosophical underpinnings for Lenin's theory and practice of Party organization was vehemently condemned. Althusser is surely correct when he identifies his main opponent as the "historicist-humanist interpretation of Marxism" by the young Lukács and Korsch, which came to light in the wake of the 1917 revolution, laying claim to Hegel and the writings of the young Marx then available.[46] Džioev's writings take these developments into account more explicitly than any others of which I am aware by Soviet writers, and represent an attempt to chip away at an ice-jam which has prevailed in Soviet philosophy of history since the very period of the developments in question.

As Fleischer points out, a humanist reading of Marx may easily lead to sentimentalization and to sterile talk about alienation and man's "true nature".[47] However it is also true that a tradition of Marxist thought the development of which was arrested prior to the emergence of this humanist,

historicist interpretation, must be deprived of an essential leavening to the determinist objectivism of the late 19th century, and one of the chief sources of interest in Marx for the 20th century.

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NOTES

[1] O. I. Džioev, *Materialističeskoe ponimanie istorii i buržuaznaja filosofija* (The Materialist Conception of History and Bourgeois Philosophy), Tbilisi, Izd. 'Mecniereba', 1974; 'Problemy istoričeskogo poznanija v filosofii B. Kroce' (Problems of Historical Knowledge in the Philosophy of B. Croce), *Voprosy filosofii* 5, 1971; *Priroda istoričeskoj neobxodimosti* (The Nature of Historical Necessity), Tbilisi, Izd. 'Mecniereba', 1967; and ' "Sociologija poznanija" i social'noe poznanie' (' "Sociology of Knowledge" and Social Knowledge') (Georgian language), in the anthology *Kritika nekotoryx osnovnyx napravlenij sovremennoj buržuaznoj filosofij*, Tbilisi, 1963.

[2] See Džioev, *Priroda istoričeskoj neobxodimosti.*

[3] "Without the requirement of necessity, monism would not be monism", *ibid.*, p. 124.

[4] For a discussion of this problem see Helmut Fleischer, *Marxism and History*, trans. Eric Mosbacher, London, Penguin Press, 1973, Ch. 4 and Note 228.

[5] See Džioev, *Materialističeskoe ponimanie istorii i buržuaznaja filosofija.*

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 46 ff.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 47–48.

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] Džioev, *Priroda istoričeskoj neobxodimosti*, p. 124.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 135.

[11] Džioev, *Materialističeskoe ponimanie istorii*, p. 20.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 58.

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 57–58.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 60.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 59.

[16] Džioev, *Priroda istoričeskoj neobxodimosti*, p. 121.

[17] Džioev, *Materialističeskoj ponimanie istorii*, p. 69.

[18] *Ibid.*

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] *Ibid.*

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 66. (Džioev refers to *Filosofskie problemy istoričeskoj nauki*, Moscow, 1969, p. 137, as the source of this call for a Marxist *Phenomenology of Spirit*.)

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 84.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 85.

[24] See 'Foreword to the Italian Edition' in Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, *Reading Capital*, trans. Ben Brewster, London, NLB, 1970, 1977, second edition, p. 7.

[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 139–143.

[26] *Ibid.*

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 139.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 140.
[29] *Ibid.* Althusser is quite right to see a deep exegetical problem inherent in such a reading of Marx's texts, but whether it can be eliminated in any faithful reading of them is very doubtful. (For a detailed discussion of this problem see Philip Grier, *Marxist Ethical Theory in the Soviet Union*, Dordrecht, D. Reidel, 1978, pp. 173–180.)
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 106.
[31] "It should hardly surprise us that so many interpreters go round in circles in the question that hangs on this definition, if it is true, that all problems concerned with the relation between the logical and the historical in *Capital* presupposed a *non-existent* relation." *Reading Capital*, p. 115.
[32] *Ibid.*, p. 115.
[33] Džioev, *Materialističeskoe ponimanie istorii*, p. 98.
[34] *Ibid.*, p. 100.
[35] *Ibid.*
[36] *Ibid.*
[37] *Lire le Capital*, vol. 2, p. 323; quoted by Džioev, p. 101.
[38] Džioev, *Materialističeskoe ponimanie istorii*, p. 105.
[39] *Ibid.*, p. 107.
[40] *Ibid.*, p. 108.
[41] *Ibid.*, p. 111.
[42] *Ibid.*
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 113.
[44] Helmut Fleischer, *Marxism and History*, p. 8.
[45] *Ibid.*, p. 34 and note 65, p. 145.
[46] Althusser, *Reading Capital*, pp. 140–141.
[47] Helmut Fleischer, p. 8.

PART V

MARXISM IN CONFRONTATION WITH NON-MARXIST THOUGHT

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SOME CONTINENTAL AND MARXIST RESPONSES TO PRAGMATISM

Critical dialogue between different philosophical positions is as difficult to achieve as it is necessary. One must assume that the positions involved can be given a unified and consistent form of expression, and the whole enterprise presupposes a will to understand so that the discussion does not degenerate into a merely polemical exchange. A consideration of pragmatism, moreover, presents additional problems, first, because the classical representatives of the position, while sharing a core of common convictions, differ considerably in their emphasis and avenue of approach. Peirce's logical concerns play a major role in all of his thought, whereas James had definite reservations about the primacy of logic and laid great stress on direct experience and its interpretation from a psychological standpoint. Dewey's orientation was social and biological and, though like Peirce, he gave a central place to logic, that logic was more a structure of methodology than a formal system. The main consequence of this multiplicity in emphasis is that, although one may intend to be considering "pragmatism" as such, one may find that the focus is really on some dominant idea in one of the pragmatists. The difficulty is not, however, insuperable, especially if we are aware of its existence and are prepared to make the qualifications necessary for avoiding wholesale claims that are apt to be misleading. Secondly, until quite recently, the majority of European critics and interpreters of pragmatism have not been acquainted with more than a very small portion of the primary literature and many of their judgments have been based largely on the vivid and popular slogans of James, notably his reference to the "success" supposed to be the reward of holding certain beliefs. There existed, moreover, antecedent biases of various sorts so that Horkheimer, for example, could declare that no "philosophical pedigree" at all would be accorded to pragmatism were it not for the fact that Peirce derived his philosophy from Kant! This is a curious criterion indeed, and its consistent application might make philosophical mongrels of us all!

Another set of problems involved in the assessment of pragmatism, especially for Marxist interpreters, is an unavoidable *ambiguity* stemming from the pragmatists' emphasis on the intimate connection that holds between meaning, thought, knowledge and *action*, a connection that makes it

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impossible to claim, as one might against some rationalistic idealisms, that the demands of *praxis* have been ignored. In short, as we shall see, Marxists are somewhat disconcerted if not confused in the face of pragmatism because standard criticisms of speculative philosophy as something divorced from both primary experience and the social matrix of thought will not apply to the pragmatic philosophy. Hence for some Marxists there arose the need to deal with pragmatism either by identifying it with positivism, a position generally uncongenial to Marxists, or by claiming that the central place accorded to action by the pragmatists is something quite different from *praxis* as they understand it.

I must confess at the same time to some ambiguity and ambivalence on my part. While I believe that there are as yet untapped resources in pragmatism for dealing with current issues, I am not unaware of difficulties posed by the position and hence I do not find it necessary to defend it at all costs and in the face of every objection. Horkheimer and others have made some acute criticisms that can and must be taken seriously. But, again, it is necessary to be sure that such criticism is based on an accurate understanding of the position and not merely on selected phrases intended to illustrate foregone conclusions. This sort of *ad hoc* criticism is easily made as is so well illustrated in Russell's essay, 'Transatlantic Truth'. There he makes no effort to get "inside" the pragmatic position, as it were, but is content instead to cite some slogans from James supposed to show that for pragmatism, truth is "made" or manufactured and thus provides a philosophical justification for believing what one wishes and for propaganda of all sorts.

In order to deal with a large topic in a quite limited space, it will be necessary to concentrate on some focal points in the hope that they will introduce the most important issues. I propose to discuss three such points, basing what I have to say on the writings of Horkheimer, Kołakowski and Habermas. The first is that pragmatism fostered the development of what Horkheimer calls "subjective" or formalized reason, and at the same time contributed to the erosion of objective ontologically grounded reason. The second is the charge that pragmatism is a form of positivism because it identifies meaning with the outcome of a process of verification.[1] The third is the claim that pragmatists, in contrast to Marx, abandoned the classical theory of truth in favor of the view that truth is "made" in accordance with processes whereby we "adapt" to the environment. In some ways this charge is the most important of the three, but it is also the most difficult to deal with in a limited space because it presupposes that there is *a* pragmatic theory of truth to be set side by side with other theories, and I regard this as a

questionable assumption.[2] I regret, moreover, that space prevents me from dealing with Habermas' claim that pragmatism is essentially a reflective account of scientific inquiry in "transcendental" terms.[3]

The first charge, to be found in Horkheimer's book, *The Eclipse of Reason*, is explicitly defined by the author as a treatment of pragmatism intended only to describe its role in what he calls the "subjectivization" of reason.[4] To begin with, I understand and sympathize with Horkheimer's interpretation of the development of the conception of reason in modern philosophy. Reason, on the classical view, was seen as objective structure, a force operative throughout the cosmos, and as a determiner of ends so that the degree of rationality in anything was a function of its harmony with a totality. This conception eroded as the result of a number of factors, not the least of which, I would add, was Kant's opting for the priority of understanding over reason in the sphere of knowledge, and subsequently, reason came to be understood as no more than a subjective power of "reasoning", shorn of its former ontological reach and totally at the mercy of subjective aims. Such reasoning came, in turn, to be formalized in logic based chiefly on mathematical models with the almost inevitable result that reason came to be excluded from the discussion of social, moral and religious concerns. Horkheimer's account of the odyssey of reason seems to me essentially correct, and it has been reinforced in a recent book, *The Illusion of Technique*, by William Barrett in which the author astutely asks how it happens that three such divergent philosophical views as those represented by Russell, Whitehead and Wittgenstein could all have emerged from the same formal or symbolic logic. What is not so clear to me, however, is the validity of Horkheimer's interpretation of the way in which the pragmatists were supposed to have helped bring about the subjectivity of reason. There are focal points in Horkheimer's argument; one is the role played by the concept of *purpose* and the other is the question whether a technical or controlling reason can deal with the criticism of ends and goals.

As regards the first point, Horkheimer sees a total opposition between an "objective" reason whose concepts refer to objects, and a "subjective" reason that involves the relating of a concept or an object to a purpose. Relying entirely on the statement of James that an idea is "a plan of action", Horkheimer supposes that some private and purely personal interest or "purpose" on the part of the knower is going to determine the truth of an idea as contrasted with an "objective" concern for the "truth" of an idea in relation to an object apart from any reference to purpose. What he fails to see, however, is that for the pragmatists, *all* thought is guided by purposes,

and that *one* of these purposes is that of gaining the purely theoretical knowledge represented by science and objective reason.

Since the introduction of purpose was of central importance to the development of pragmatism and at the same time causes concern on the part of critics, something further needs to be said on the point. As I have already indicated, all the pragmatists recognized the legitimacy of the purely theoretical purpose of describing and explaining the world through processes of empirical inquiry. And they recognized the importance, the necessity in fact, of keeping this purpose free from all ulterior interests and purposes of individual investigators. *In principle*, this purpose is unlimited by any consideration other than the pursuit of truth and the acquisition of knowledge, although, as the history of science makes plain, the contingent conditions under which the purely theoretical purpose must be carried out have had their own role to play. Pure research is never independent of our ability to forge the necessary implements for experiment and it is no secret at present that what will become the subject of investigation, where and by whom is often dictated by the availability of funds, the interests of those who control them and public opinion concerning the relative importance of a line of inquiry.

Let me offer three examples of the appeal to purpose by the pragmatists, each of which is, in my view, entirely justified. First, James pointed out that in the attempt to answer a specific question or resolve a problem we must make judgments concerning the *relevance* of any information already available for dealing with the matter at issue. He was fond of pointing to an encyclopedia taken as a kind of model of pure knowledge about the world and asking, "*When* do I say the truths contained in these volumes?" I do not go about uttering true propositions starting with A and ending with Z, but rather I *select* from what is available just that information there is reason to believe is relevant or "counts" for answering the question. There can, of course, be no guarantee that our judgments of relevance will always be correct, but without them thought is without orientation and limitation, the sort of thing that happens on an examination when the specific question asked is ignored and the student attempts to record indiscriminately *all* he or she knows about whatever topic is mentioned.

A second form of appeal to purpose is to be found in Peirce's doctrine of vagueness. For Peirce, every idea we can frame is more or less vague and is subject to being made more precise depending on the purpose and context in which it appears. For ordinary purposes it will not be necessary to insist on a high degree of precision in meaning since "rough" conceptions will

suffice and yield the desired results. If, for example, a hostess were to invite a guest to be seated in the "loveseat" whereas in fact the intended object is a "sofa", the vagueness need cause no problem because the guest will know that he is not to sit in the "ladder-back" chair which is clearly neither of the two. On the other hand, if we consider an auction of antique furniture, it would be absolutely essential that a high degree of precision be attained in the use of the relevant terms. No confusion between a "loveseat" and a "sofa" could be countenanced in that context because vagueness would be in fact a form of misrepresentation. The purpose in view determines the degree of precision in meaning necessary for achieving our aim.

A third example appears in the writings of Royce who claimed affinity with the pragmatists precisely because of the central role accorded to purpose in his conception of thought. If we consider what we mean when we speak of representations "corresponding" to their objects, we must also consider what sort of correspondence we intend. A photograph, an oil portrait, a caricature, an X-ray film and a silhouette all "correspond" to their objects, but they do not all do so in the same way. A relation of one-to-one mapping is meant to obtain in the case, for example, of the X-ray film and the silhouette, but not in the case of the caricature or the oil portrait. In short, the accuracy and adequacy of the correspondence between the representation and its object depend on the purpose controlling the sort of correspondence we seek to achieve. We expect the photograph to "look like" its subject in a sense that is inappropriate in the case of the X-ray or the caricature. The latter, for example, fails in its intent if it turns out to be no more than a "literal" drawing corresponding in a one-to-one relation to its object.

I must insist, however, that in all these appeals to purpose – selective relevance, degree of precision required, and our intent in representation – there is nothing "subjective" in a sense that would preclude "objectivity" as regards knowledge and truth. Presupposed throughout their writings is the belief that the purpose of gaining purely theoretical knowledge remains intact, but that if such knowledge is not to be inert it must enter into all the contexts where it is used to shape belief and guide action.

Horkheimer (p. 46) is quite convinced that the pragmatists can have no place for such a theoretical interest, but this conviction is based largely on an exaggeration of James' "practicalism" or the demand for relevance in thinking and of Dewey's interest in closing the gap between scientific inquiry and technology. The fact is that Peirce thought of science as controlled inquiry into the "useless", and there can be no question that all three thinkers were careful to define the *context* of the theoretical knowing in terms of

impersonal and intersubjective norms that have no place for personal interests and predilections. The contrast, therefore, between purpose and objectivity is misguided. Peirce, James and Dewey each argued for the superiority of empirical inquiry in gaining truth (in fact some critics said they went too far in this direction), but they also saw that we confront reality with more than one purpose in view and that the standpoint of the theoretical knower is not our only access to what there is. Stated in classical language, Being is not identical with Being known.

Horkheimer, like many other critics of pragmatism, is misled by James' language, and in fairness it must be said that James is not without some responsibility for putting his readers on the wrong track. His use of terms like "success", "satisfactory" and "satisfaction" (a term to which Peirce vigorously objected as an "incomplete predicate") led many to suppose that for him truth is "nothing but" some sort of personal, individual advantage gained by a knower who "successfully" uses an idea. Despite these problems of language, however, there need be nothing "subjective" in the pejorative sense about what James and the other pragmatists were maintaining. Where they referred to truth as a matter of "expectations" being fulfilled (or disappointed in the case of falsehood), they were legitimately introducing into their account of knowledge the *process* whereby ideas, propositions, theories are tested. The expectations involved are not the "interests" of individual thinkers, but references to objective *states of affairs* that *would* eventuate if the idea being tested were true. To take a simple but perfectly adequate example, we have a beaker before us containing a quantity of liquid and we want to know whether it is *true* to say that the solution is alkaline. It so happens that in this case we literally have a "litmus paper" test to determine the answer. If it is true that the solution is "alkaline", i.e., that the predicate *truly* applies, and we understand the nature of the test, we *expect* that the paper when dipped in the solution *would* turn blue. If *in fact* this happens, then our expectation is fulfilled *in the object* and we are justified in saying that the idea in question is true. I see nothing "subjective" in all this; our expectation based on the meaning of the terms involved obviously does not bring about the effect and if our expectation had been disappointed, i.e., if the paper had *not* in fact turned blue, we would have to conclude that the nature of the *object* in question was other than we had thought.

Horkheimer objects to this analysis, apart from the charge of subjectivity, on the ground that for pragmatism, "meaning" and "effect" become identical and this he takes to be an error because *present* meaning and *future* verification are not the same (p. 44). I do not deny the element of truth in this

claim, but the issue is both ambiguous and too complex to be resolved satisfactorily here. All depends on whether the modalities – what Peirce called the "may-be's", the "would-be's", the "could-be's" – are taken seriously into account. Peirce rejected any theory of reality according to which it is reduced to the "is", "was" or "will be". These are all indicatives distinguished only by a temporal qualification and thus exclude all the conditional modalities that figure so largely in Peirce's thought. Thus, referring back to the previous example, Peirce would not say that the litmus paper "will" turn blue, but that under the circumstances it "would" turn blue if the objective character of the solution is of a certain kind. Peirce consistently refused to identify the meaning of a concept – "intellectual purport" – with any singular fact, and even less with an act (conduct) which was for him the most individualized reality there is. All concepts, on the other hand, embrace what is general and hence their "meaning" can never coincide with or be exhausted by singular instances. Horkheimer gives no indication that he is aware of this central point. Let us consider the familiar illustration of the diamond and what it means to say that it is "hard".[5] In accordance with what I call "dynamizing" the predicates, Peirce is asking how a given characteristic *manifests* itself in relation to other things encountered in experience. If something is "hard", it would have the *capacity* to affect other things in a certain way; that is, the diamond would scratch many other objects without being scratched by them in return. The central point, however, is that the meaning of "hard" is not identical with any particular occasion on which the diamond scratches something, nor even with a finite number of such occasions, but rather with the *habit* or general tendency of the diamond to behave in that way. As we shall see, it is characteristic of both nominalism and positivism to compress "meaning" into present, instantaneous and fully determinate fact. Whereas James had some tendency to fall in with that line of thinking, both Peirce and Dewey vehemently rejected it in favor of a more ancient tradition, according to which enduring objects are centers of continuing habits or potential behavior not exhausted by the singular occasions when their characteristics are manifested.

It is clear that what most troubles Horkheimer is the concern that the pragmatists reduced reason to an instrument serving "alien" ends and established not *rationality* but the "satisfaction" of the subject as the final criterion of thought. But surely there is a deep irony in the situation; the pragmatists were no less concerned than Horkheimer is to see that reason, thought, knowledge "make a difference" or have some actual bearing on the course of human affairs. The question is, of course, how reason is to exert

this influence if it manifests itself in no form save a contemplative or reflective one and can maintain its integrity only at the cost of removing itself from the continuum of experience and the interplay between means and ends.

The second criticism focused by Horkheimer comes in precisely at this point. On his view, an instrumental conception of reason taken over from experimental science must inevitably identify reason exclusively as a means, thus depriving it of the "depth" required for the selection and determination of ends. Here I agree with Horkheimer in principle; if reason is no more than formal, logical structure or an instrument for the expression of a purely "value-free", theoretical knowledge, then it is effectively cut off from the determination of values and ends, or what Whitehead called the sphere of "importance". There is, however, if the suggestion does not seem too paradoxical in the context of pragmatism, a decisive discrepancy between the theory and the practice. It cannot be denied that the course of technological development in America has revealed an overwhelming emphasis on means at the expense of ends. A recent history of technology has the apt, but alarming, title, *From Know-How to Nowhere*. And many observers, among them numerous scientists, have admitted that the larger, vaguer and more difficult questions about ends have either been postponed or ignored altogether in favor of "soluble" technical questions that place more means or instruments at our disposal. The paradox just mentioned has to do with the double-barrelled character of pragmatism, and leads us to consider whether its representatives in fact espoused a purely technical conception of reason. On the one hand, the proposal that ideas are operative and should be put to work does offer a basic rationale for a technological order, and there can be no question that the pragmatic outlook fostered the development of applied science. On the other hand, it is quite illegitimate to overlook the fact that Dewey, especially, regarded the "means-end continuum" as a major philosophical problem and he specifically rejected the widely held view that ends are intuitively grounded beyond rational scrutiny and that rational discussion must be confined exclusively to the selection of means. Whatever view we may take of the validity of his arguments for this position in *The Theory of Valuation*, we cannot reasonably ignore his insistence that not only are ends *not* "beyond disputing", but that they are what it is most important to argue about. Dewey repeatedly criticized the legitimacy of immediate desires and ends unconnected with knowledge of what would be required to achieve them, in favor of ends that are "approved by reflection". This approach to the appraisal of ends does indeed depend heavily on the relative merits of

different means, but the fact remains that Dewey did not seek to avoid the basic problem.

Peirce, moreover, in his account of the "normative sciences" – esthetics, ethics and logic – argued for an ideal of "concrete reasonableness" in human affairs, and opposed the "greed philosophy" fostered by American individualism and social Darwinism with his theory of evolutionary love according to which the values of cooperation, community and the mutual enhancement of human capabilities are to prevail. It is difficult to see how, in the face of these ideas, it can be maintained that pragmatism excludes rationality from the determination of ends. James' "Meliorism" provides another example to the contrary. He had a firm belief in the power of the energetic will of each individual to help make the world a "better place" than it was before. The ideals of freedom, personal integrity and self-realization are dominant in his basically humanistic philosophy. One may indeed argue that, as regards the socio-economic pattern of American society, the power of technology and of technical reason had become so great in this century that no counterforce could prevail against them. But it is manifestly incorrect to argue, as Horkheimer does, that the pragmatists did no more than contribute to the subjectivizing of reason. The truth is that no one of them accepted a formalized reason as the pattern of rationality. Dewey's concept of *intelligence* is shot through with norms; Peirce, though he had great faith in the resources of formal logic, nevertheless argued for rational self-control both in thought and action under the guidance of the "normative", and James frequently asserted that where life conflicts with logic, so much the worse for logic.

It is interesting to note that Horkheimer never asks to what extent freedom, equality and justice actually prevailed in those historical epochs when the ontological reason whose eclipse he laments was the dominant mode of thought. In fairness to him, however, I do not believe that he is proposing to turn back the clock, as it were, and if one considers the instructive comparison made at the end of *The Eclipse of Reason* (p. 183), it appears that Horkheimer is in fact closer to the pragmatists than he realizes. In a critique of positivism and skepticism on one side, and objective idealism and rationalism on the other, he claims that each side falls into error. The former positions are said to find no meaning in general concepts worth salvaging, while the latter hold to the eternal meaning of concepts and norms but overlook their historical relativity. These judgments express precisely what the classical pragmatists said about these philosophical positions!

We must turn now to the second charge, made especially by Kołakowski

and Habermas, that pragmatism is essentially a form of positivism. I shall not deal with this claim at great length because it is quite clearly mistaken, but the reason for the misunderstanding is not difficult to find. If one reads Peirce's original paper, 'How to Make Our Ideas Clear', and ignores the critical notes he added later (esp. to 5.402), one will suppose that, for Peirce, the diamond is "hard" only when actually put to the singular test and that the meaning of the predicate is exhausted in the one transaction.[6] But, as Peirce pointed out, the meaning of a general concept is never identical with any singular fact (or act), but rather with the conditional behavior (what *would X* do under *Y* circumstances?) of an object over stretches of time. His rejection of nominalism, his defense of the reality of what he called "generals" (*not*, as it often thought, the "existence" of universals), tendencies and potentialities, and his insistence on the "independent reals" as a necessary presupposition of science must all be cited as evidence that Peirce's pragmatism at any rate is no positivism.[7] Dewey's rejection, moreover, of the classical conception of experience underlying modern positivism and his attack on reductionism make it quite impossible to classify him as a positivist. While James did stand closer to traditional empiricism than the others, his religious humanism, theory of freedom and the self, and his "piecemeal" supernaturalism put him at odds with any form of postivism known to me.[8]

The best source for the Marxist critique of the pragmatists' theory of truth is Kołakowski's essay, 'Karl Marx and the Classical Definition of Truth'.[9] He begins correctly with the historical fact of the introduction at the end of the last century of *practical activity* into the theory of knowing, and he distinguishes two forms of this view represented respectively by Marx and James. As soon becomes evident, this initial distinction is interpreted as an *opposition* between the two conceptions. According to Kołakowski, Marx appealed to the *effectiveness* of human action as a criterion enabling us to *verify* the knowledge we need in order to undertake any sort of activity. James, on the other hand, is said to have introduced practical *usefulness* as a factor in the *definition* of truth, and he takes this factor not as a tool for establishing the truth of our knowledge independently of ourselves, but as something that *creates* the truth. The opposition previously mentioned is now clear: Marx adheres to the "classical" conception of truth where the relation between the judgment and the reality is independent of man's knowledge, whereas on James' theory it is man's practical activity that "creates" the truth or knowledge.

Whatever may be the case as regards Marx's view, Kołakowski is mistaken in his interpretation of James. Although he cites no specific passages from

James, it seems quite evident that Kołakowski is relying on those admittedly (by James himself) loose and unguarded statements that "truths are made", that the true idea is the one that "works", that truth has something essential to do with the "satisfaction" of the knower, and that the true is the "expedient" in the way of thinking – statements that made it necessary for James to restate his position in *The Meaning of Truth* and attempt to overcome misunderstanding. In support of my contention that Kołakowski misrepresents James' view, I shall advance three considerations, beginning with an ambiguity in the concept of "practical activity" that often goes unnoticed, passing on to the authority James accorded actual fact in his correspondence theory of truth, and ending with the role of critical testing in the process of discovering truths. Insofar as all the pragmatists regarded knowledge as issuing from a critical process, they paid attention to what an enquirer *does* in the way of intervening and manipulating subject matter for the purpose of testing hypotheses and possible answers to theoretical questions, but they manifestly did not maintain that this "activity" *creates* truth, but only that it is necessary for *discovery*. This activity on the part of the enquirer in the acquisition of knowledge, must not be confused with the "practical activity" involved in the subsequent *use* of the knowledge in a technological or engineering context. To obtain the gas laws, Boyle had to devise experiments and carry them out in practice; a knowledge of such laws might be essential for the "practical activity" of inventing a refrigerating unit, but there is nothing in James that permits us to regard our success or failure to produce such a unit as having anything to do with the truth or falsity of judgments, hypotheses, ideas being tested in theoretical inquiry and its "practical activity". We shall not, to be sure, succeed in producing such a unit if our ideas are false or our information incorrect. But for James at any rate the activity entering into the acquisition of knowledge is not to be confused with whatever activity goes into its use once it has been obtained. Kołakowski would have been on sounder ground in his interpretation of James and especially the emphasis he places on what James called "satisfaction", if he had shifted the focus to the properly "practical" sphere – the moral, religious and metaphysical – where theoretical verification, on James' view, is not possible and where we have to appeal to the consequences that would follow if we acted on a belief which we believe but do not *know* to be true. I cannot follow this line further, because I am chiefly concerned to set the record straight as regards James' theory of truth.

James repeatedly maintained that truth is correspondence between ideas and reality (not a "copy, as Kołakowski well understands) and he described

his epistemology as "realistic". A most telling example of such a view is to be found at the beginning of his essay, 'The Will to Believe'. A person in bed with a high fever may *say* that he is perfectly healthy, but, says James, he is *powerless to believe* that in the face of the manifest fact. James, in short, sided with Hume and against Descartes; belief is totally bound down by the datum and will is in abeyance. Citing the complementary character of matters of fact and abstract ideas in the knowing situation, James wrote:

> Between the coercions of the sensible order and those of the ideal order, our mind is thus wedged tightly. Our ideas must agree with realities, be such realities concrete or abstract, be they facts or be they principles, under penalty of endless inconsistency and frustration.[10]

I fail to see, in the face of such statements, how it is possible to maintain that, on James' theory, truth is being "created" by some sort of practical activity. It is most likely that this confusion stems from James' next step, which is to ask what "agreement" concretely means. James was quite right in seeing that to define truth in terms of some such universal relationship as that of agreement or correspondence is not the same as indicating how one would go about determining in individual instances what this relation means and when it obtains. Simple cases where an idea can be said to "copy" its object – we see the "2" on a watch dial and do not confuse it with the "5", and we distinguish the "long" hand from the "short" one – present no problems, but the vast majority of ideas, judgments, hypotheses do not copy their objects in that sense. To deal with agreement when it does not mean copy, James, like Peirce and Dewey, called for the *interpolation* of a controlled, critical process to be carried out by an enquirer seeking to determine whether some idea being tested *is* in agreement with its object. Here is where the possibly confusing ideas of "working", "leading", "fitting" enter the picture; they represent the structure of the process of *testing* or an order of operations intended to disclose whether in fact the idea being tested is true or false. If I want to test the simple proposition, "This car has front-wheel drive", the constituent ideas must direct me to the appropriate object and indicate what I am to expect to find if the proposition is true. When I make the inspection under this guidance and find that the driveshaft is in fact connected to the rear wheels, I conclude that the proposition does not "agree" with its object and is therefore false. But none of this activity "creates" any truth or falsity, and in fact James was more sanguine in his appeal to the authority of present fact than either Peirce or Dewey. "In the end and eventually," he writes, "all true processes must lead to the face

of directly verifying sensible experiences *somewhere* which somebody's ideas have copied."[11]

Had James been less concerned to shock his rationalist opponents and less inclined to a nominalism or particularism, he would not have obscured the quite realistic cast of his theory by going on to say that truth is only a collective name for verification processes and that truth is "made". The latter assertion does all the damage, even if it does not and could not consistently mean on James' view what it appears to mean, especially when connected with James' emphasis on "using" truths in contexts other than the purely theoretical. Facts, he says, simply are: they are not by themselves "true". "Truths emerge from facts" in the form of ***beliefs*** about them; and in calling Truth a "function" of beliefs that start and terminate among the facts, he is saying no more than that the ***true*** belief is the one that, should one wish to verify it, is seen to be in accord with its object. That none of this is meant to support the thesis that we "manufacture" truth in the course of discovering it, can be seen from what James said about knowledge and the past: "When new experiences lead to retrospective judgments, using the past tense, what these judgments utter was true, even though no past thinker had been led there."[12]

I return at this point to my previous claim that "practical activity" is ambiguous and that we must seek its meaning in accord with the context in question. The activity that figures in the context of knowledge is controlled by the purpose of theoretical inquiry and even if we were to follow James in his references to "satisfaction" and "usefulness" in this connection,[13] both would still have to be understood as describing ideas and beliefs that meet the test of verification. If, however, we move into contexts other than that of theoretical knowing, the picture changes and the focus shifts from truth to the ***relevance*** and the ***appropriateness*** of some belief or of some item of knowledge for realizing a desired goal. If we wish, as amateur botanists, to be able to identify plants as we come upon them in the field, we shall need just that information, selected from a great deal more, which we can use *under field, not laboratory, conditions*, for achieving our goal. Usefulness here concerns relevance and not truth, since we are assuming that all the information is "true". Kołakowski misses this and seems to think (p. 60) that the truth of a judgment for James is simply a function of the "usefulness" or advantage to the individual of accepting or rejecting it. As I have already pointed out, however, considerations of this kind enter only when we are not concerned with theoretical knowledge itself, but are guided instead by the purposes defining the moral, religious and metaphysical

contexts. In those contexts our aim is not the determination and explanation of facts, in James' phrase, "already in the bag", but rather to act, transform the world and interpret it in accordance with ideas that, in the nature of the case, cannot be a matter of prior knowledge, if of knowledge at all. We act on these convictions with faith and risk, and here, according to James, we do appeal to the consequences of such belief and action and to their "satisfactoriness" in enabling us to realize ourselves in the world. But even in these precarious contexts, it is *not* James' view that we can believe anything we wish, even what is manifestly contrary to all we know, if somehow such belief contributes to our success in life *à la* Henry Ford (p. 62)!

Kołakowski restates the original opposition between pragmatism and the classical conception of truth in the claim that the former is concerned primarily with an organic adaptation to the world, while the latter aims at an objective reflection of the world. This opposition, however, cannot stand as it is, and what Kołakowski himself says shows why this is so. He points out (p. 75) that both Marxism and pragmatism are alike opposed to the view that consciousness (knowledge?) is an ever more perfect imitation of an external world acting on the mind to produce a copy. And he notes that both positions conceive of consciousness as functional, a tool with which to master circumstances and not merely to mirror them. The crucial difference, however, between the two positions is once again said to be the difference between Marx's adherence to an "objective" conception of truth and James' criterion of subjective satisfaction, also described as "biological correspondence". The reason this simple opposition cannot stand (quite apart from the misrepresentation of James) is that Marx was not content to "reflect" the world in knowledge, but demanded that the world be transformed just as the pragmatists did. On the other hand, as I have pointed out, James was no less concerned than Marx to discover what is objectively true about the world and if this be described as "adaptation" to it, that can only mean being in *accord* with the facts and having a *knowledge* of the patterns or laws according to which things behave. In short, for James, an understanding or "what's what" about the world is a necessary condition for changing it. Moreover, as James argued in his critique of Herbert Spencer's theory of the mind,[14] a one-way "adaptation" of the mind to the world tells only half the story; the other half is the creative power of the mind to transform the environment in accordance with human needs and purposes.

Simple contrasts between the "objective" approach of Marx, and the "subjective" approach of the pragmatists will not "work", because both Peirce and James defended a form of *correspondence* in their theory of truth,

and even Dewey's *transform* conception of truth which represents a more radical break with the tradition than the thought of the other two, has a *conform* element in it at the stage of inquiry he called the "determination of the facts of the case". A more profound and fruitful exchange between Marxism and pragmatism can take place when there is a deeper understanding of pragmatism and one which is not derived primarily from the loose phrases and slogans of James which he himself came to acknowledge as such and sought to correct in his replies to critics.

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NOTES

[1] On this head, see esp. L. Kołakowski, *The Alienation of Reason*, trans. N. Guterman, New York, 1969, ch. 7. Cf. Horkheimer, *The Eclipse of Reason*, New York, 1947, p. 49, n. 29.

[2] I have discussed the problem at some length in *Purpose and Thought: The Meaning of Pragmatism*, London and New Haven, 1979, pp. 50–77.

[3] Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, trans. J. J. Shapiro, Boston, 1971, pp. 91–139. This discussion nicely illustrates what I pointed out previously about a treatment of pragmatism as such turning into an account of one aspect of the thought of one of its representatives, in this case Peirce's theory of scientific inquiry.

[4] Horkheimer, pp. 42 ff.

[5] Those who do not follow Peirce's writing too closely are apt to overlook the qualifications he made over periods of time. In the famous paper of 1878, 'How to Make Our Ideas Clear', Peirce had taken what he later rejected as a "nominalist" position with respect to the meaning of the predicate "hard". Earlier on he had maintained that, unless a test were actually made, it would make no sense to say that the diamond is hard. In footnotes, however, added later to 5.402 (*Collected Papers of Charles S. Peirce*, eds. Hartshorne, Weiss and Burks, Cambridge, Mass., 1934–1960, 8 vols.), Peirce rescinded the "nominalist view" just expressed in favor of the position indicated in the text here.

[6] In his account of "Peirce's positivism", Kołakowski takes note of the development in Peirce's thought (*The Alienation of Reason*, p. 153), but claims that it was his "earliest writings" that made him important in the history of "positivism"!

[7] Anyone still entertaining doubts on this head should study Peirce's critical review of Karl Pearson's *The Grammar of Science*, in *Collected Papers of C. S. Peirce*, Vol. VIII, ed. Arthur W. Burks, Cambridge, Mass., 1958, Sec. 132–143. There Peirce defends "the majesty of truth" and "reasonableness itself" as the only proper motivating force for scientists, as opposed to "the stability of society" or other utilitarian and Darwinian motives.

[8] It is both instructive and ironic that in his chapter, 'The Pragmatist Account of Truth and its Misunderstanders', in *The Meaning of Truth*, James cites as the first misunderstanding the thesis that "Pragmatism is only a re-editing of positivism".

[9] L. Kołakowski, *Marxism and Beyond*, London, 1968. It is important to notice that this discussion is based exclusively on James' views and does not reflect anything of James' responses to criticism contained in *The Meaning of Truth.*

[10] William James, *Pragmatism*, New York and London, 1907, p. 211. "The hundredth decimal of π, the ratio of the circumference to its diameter, is pre-determined ideally now, tho no one may have computed it." *Ibid.*

[11] *Pragmatism*, p. 215.

[12] *Pragmatism*, p. 223. Italics in original. This view is reinforced in *The Meaning of Truth* and it is difficult to see how it conflicts with Kołakowski's conception of the classical theory of truth, as he claims James' theory does (p. 61).

[13] I agree here with Peirce in not wanting to use this terminology since "satisfaction" is not normally understood to mean "satisfaction of the theoretical impulse".

[14] See 'Remarks on Spencer's Definition of Mind as Correspondence', *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* (1878), pp. 1–18; reprinted in *Collected Essays and Reviews*, New York, 1969.

THOMAS J. BLAKELEY

RECENT SOVIET EVALUATIONS OF AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY

It would, I suppose, not be good form to begin by saying there are no recent Soviet evaluations of American philosophy or, at least, none worth mentioning. The fact of the matter is, however, that Soviet mentions of American philosophy have been extremely rare over the past ten years. For example, of some 2700 items in *Voprosy filosofii* and *Filosofskie nauki* since 1968, only 60, or a little over 2%, have to do with American philosophy. And, none of these deal with classical American philosophy in the sense of Peirce, James and Dewey. Only three names occur more than once – Quine twice, Kuhn three times, and Marcuse twice – if the last can even be considered as belonging to "American philosophy". It is clear that in Soviet philosophic journals, at least, more attention is paid to "philosophy in America" than to "American philosophy" in the classical sense. This is in stark contrast with German interest in Peirce and the international interest in James and phenomenology.

We should note that the situation is roughly equivalent for other non-Soviet philosophic trends. The proponents of existentialism, phenomenology, Thomism, structuralism, etc., suffer from a similar lack of attention on the part of the Soviet authors of philosophic articles. This can probably be explained by the fact that contemporary Soviet philosophy is a "school philosophy" in the same strict sense as medieval Scholasticism and in sharp contrast to the "anti-school" stance of the vast majority of non-Soviet contemporary thinkers.

The general contours of the Marxist-Leninist historiography of philosophy are well-known from the works of Ballestrem and others. It will suffice for our present purposes to note that its main categories are derived from Engels and, therefore, from a critical posture that was current at the end of the 19th century. The six key terms are paired as follows: "materialism" versus "idealism"; "subjective" versus "objective"; and "dialectical" versus "metaphysical".

At least since Lukács' small eulogy to *Lenin as Philosopher*, the exact nature of Marxist-Leninist materialism has been the subject of much commentary both among its proponents and on the part of its critics. Many of

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the latter claim that this "materialism" is a "crypto-realism", although Dupré reduces it to what might be called "praxio-materialism". According to the standard Soviet presentation, "Marxist materialism" consists in a recognition of the primacy of matter over spirit or idea – without, by the way, noticing that the equation of the spiritual with the ideal is not without grave difficulties. Although philosophic Stalinists tended to stress the "recognition" in this thesis and thus to give it a mainly methodological or epistemological import, the Soviet mainstream – V. P. Tugarinov, for example – has taken it as an ontological assertion.

Nevertheless, when "materialism" is used by the Soviets as a touchstone for the classification of philosophic trends, an ambiguity remains – a "materialist" is sometimes a thinker with a certain set of philosophic attitudes, modelled, of course, on the "classics of Marxism-Leninism". At other times, being a "materialist" depends entirely on the ontological import of one's basic position. Aristotle, for example, and Roy Wood Sellars, are "objective" materialists while "subjectively" they are something else. In Aristotle's case, at least, this attribution of "materialism" seems based on his emphasis on "nature".

The very way in which this last example is couched shows that the terms "subjective" and "objective" – the second pair of historiographic categories – are applied by Marxist-Leninists in a unique way, at least in relation to the history of philosophy. Without digressing into the whole history of the notion of "subject" in Western thought, it is probably safe to say that "subjective" has come to mean what belongs intimately to an agent which is an individual with unique personal traits. Soviet usage is probably as much marked by Marx's *Theses on Feuerbach* – namely, the need to integrate into materialism the human activity which had been arrogated to itself by idealism – as by Marxist historicist holism which identifies species-being as the subject of history. Aristotle, therefore, and Roy Wood Sellars come out "subjectivist' ', despite their fundamental "materialism", because of their voluntary isolation from the subject of history, i.e. their maintenance of the "ahistorical" subject of Western philosophy that Marx devoted himself to overcoming.

However, the ultimate key to the Marxist-Leninist approach to the historiography of philosophy lies in their final pair of terms, "dialectical" and "metaphysical". Here, again, we are faced with terms which have a long and complicated heritage and which seem ill-suited for the role of classification of philosophic trends. In fact, were one to ask on a final exam a first-year philosophy student to line up all the thinkers he had met under the mutually

exclusive columns of "dialectician" and "metaphysician", one might expect a perceptive and bold student to ask why one wanted to force such a comparison between bananas and horses. One has to be both a "materialist" in the peculiarly Marxist-Leninist meaning and a radical anti-subjectivist in their sense of the term to see the dialectic and metaphysics both as competing philosophic accounts and as developmental-structural modes of the coming-to-itself of the subject of history – species-being, to call it by name.

The schema of classification for the history of philosophy which results from all this contains six general designations of philosophic trends: three forms of materialism and three forms of idealism. The mechanistic or metaphysical materialist, like Hobbes, holds an ontologically correct form of materialism but does not have an adequate epistemology because of lack of the dialectic. "Dialectical materialism" is, of course, *the* completely adequate account. "Vulgar materialism" – and Roy Wood Sellars is most often cited as example – is a reincarnation of mechanistic materialism occurring after the revelation of diamat, being somewhat comparable to the "vincible ignorance" of the theologians.

The corresponding forms of idealism are generally not as adequately defined; quite obviously because they are archaisms for a Marxism-Leninism for which the "ideal" has no intrinsic import. The "objective idealist" – ranging from Plato through Aquinas to Bertrand Russell – holds for the existence of entities which are self-sufficient, and need no grounding in matter. The "subjective idealist" – and Bishop Berkeley is the paradigm – recreates the whole world out of his individual head. Finally, the "masked idealist" is any post-diamat thinker who pretends to ignore or overcome the basic Marxist-Leninist distinction between materialism and idealism.

Whatever the intrinsic merits of this way of classifying philosophers and their thought, it is clear from Soviet practice in dealing with the history of philosophy that the schema is easier to apply retrospectively than prospectively – one might even be tempted to call it "retrogressive". Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Spinoza, for example, are easily handled. It is after Hegel that things get complicated. How are the varieties of neo-Kantianism to be classified? What about *Lebensphilosophie*? Bergson? Blondel?

It might seem strange to some that we use the term "prospective" in reference to Soviet historiography of philosophy or to any historiography of philosophy at all. After all, is not all "history" retrospective by definition? It seems not. When it is a question of a "school philosophy", the historiography of philosophy is governed by a principle which can be provisionally formulated as follows: "the stricter the adherence of a philosophic school

to the tenets of its founder(s), the greater the urge to view developments subsequent to the founders overwhelmingly in terms of the founders' own views, projected forward". A corollary to this would be that school philosophy tends to see philosophic development as terminated with the formation of that particular school.

Thus, Marxist-Leninist historiography of philosophy, anchored in the 19th century categories of Engels, sees Hegel – and German Idealism in general – as its quasi-contemporary. Everything that happens in philosophy – outside of the "school", of course – after Hegel is viewed prospectively and, therefore, as subject to *ex post facto* invalidation or confirmation. The "guilt by association" technique of Lenin turns out to be not just psychologically satisfying but also ontologically grounded in the subject of history having come to itself (in the school). The school is the apotheosis of the true thinking of the true leader of the true society – true because it cannot be overcome, for there is no future elsewhere.

Relative to recent Soviet evaluations of American philosophy, then, we should not be lulled by the superficial characterizations we find. Peirce, James and Dewey are assembled by Soviet historians of philosophy, it is true, under the umbrella of "pragmatism" which is specified as a peculiar mixture of subjective idealism and empiricism (itself a variety of mechanistic materialism). The melding together of two such designations is an involuntary recognition of the uniqueness of American philosophy. Further, Peirce is sometimes separated from the other two and allied with Royce, as evidencing strong traits of "objective idealism". Dewey's instrumentalism and reconstructionism are described by Bogomolov as "subjectivist" and "conservative". James is psychologistic and one-sided. But, all of these and many more Soviet characterizations of the classics of American philosophy could obscure the underlying argument which is that American philosophy – like all non-Marxist-Leninist philosophy since Hegel – is part of a gigantic misunderstanding: in a sense, "they have seen the truth and it has *not* set them free".

When we turn from the rare Soviet journal articles on the subject to the more substantial treatments of pragmatism in Soviet books on the history of philosophy, we find under way a distinct shift in emphasis. As late as 1960, Soviet historiographers of philosophy were seeing pragmatism's contribution to this gigantic misunderstanding almost exclusively in terms of its account of theory and practice. This was only natural since the "dialectical unity of theory and practice" is considered the cornerstone of the truth of diamat; and pragmatism is the only non-Soviet philosophic trend to make

this issue central to its world-view. There is here another involuntary Soviet recognition of the uniqueness of American philosophy.

It would be too painful to trace here the involuted maneuvers of the *diamatčiki* to distinguish their "authentic" practice from the subjectivism of the pragmatists. As is so often the case with Soviet philosophic discussions, one has the impression that, even as an outsider, one could more easily come to a resolution of the difficulty than do they. Be that as it may, the upshot of the earlier Soviet interpretation of and confrontation with pragmatism on the subject of practice is that:

(1) pragmatism's practice comes to knowledge from the outside while diamat's is an integral part of the flow of human experience;

(2) diamat's practice is historical through and through while that of pragmatism is "formal" and therefore "metaphysical";

(3) pragmatism's practice is "quietistic" and "conservative" while that of diamat is "transformatory" and "revolutionary".

What sets off more recent Soviet accounts of pragmatism – since, let us say, 1968 or 1970 – is first of all greater sophistication. For example, there is growing recognition on the part of the Soviets of the role of Bergson, Nietzsche and others in the formation of what is widely termed "pragmatism". Unfortunately, there persist efforts to put all Anglo-American philosophers into one "pragmatist-positivist" bag despite James' arguments against empiricism and Dewey's against Locke. Secondly, the range of themes has been significantly widened; Dewey's instrumentalism, for example, is still called "subjectivist" but there are efforts to see it as a species of "dialectical logic".

The third and most significant development in recent Soviet evaluations of American philosophy is a variation on a standard methodological rule of Soviet historiography of philosophy which, while not completely new, is novel enough to deserve attention here. This is the effort at discovering within classical "American philosophy" the harbingers of "philosophy in America". This can be seen as the combinatory refinement and extension both of Marx's dictum that the elements of a new society first develop in the womb of the old and of Lenin's "guilt by association" (if Mach is wrong, and Bogdanov essentially repeats Mach, then Bogdanov is wrong) and his thesis on the development of capitalism into imperialism. What this revised methodological dictum says, in necessarily over-simplified terms, is that just as Peirce, James and the early Dewey are (not "were"!) the theory of the practice of burgeoning capitalism in the U.S., so the later Dewey and his "pragmatist-positivist" epigones are the theory of the practice

of moribund capitalism in the general crisis that marks the end of its imperialist phase.

There is, thus, an emergent Soviet "micro-historiography of philosophy" which is penetrating below the Marxist-Leninist slogans to the essence of what classical American philosophy is with the conviction that one thereby gets at the "essence" of "philosophy in America" today.

To conclude, one could speculate on the reasons for this emergence of a micro-historiography of American philosophy, which – it should be pointed out – is far less emergent for other contemporary philosophic trends – perhaps, again, because of the uniqueness of American philosophy. It might simply be – as Bogomolov puts it in the introduction to his *20th Century American Bourgeois Philosophy* – that America is the largest and most powerful imperialist nation. It might also be due to détente, SALT, the Helsinki agreements, etc. Or, are the younger historians of philosophy in the Soviet Union simply developing more professional competence than their predecessors?

We can only hope that it is this last reason. And, I might add that I have myself been questioned in person on three occasions over the past two years by Soviet philosophic visitors, using a questionnaire from the "Institute for Foreign Philosophy" in Moscow on the current state of philsophy in the U. S. – possibly a harbinger of better things to come.

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JAMES P. SCANLAN

A. F. LOSEV AND THE REBIRTH OF SOVIET AESTHETICS AFTER STALIN

The emergence of aesthetics as a legitimate philosophical discipline in the U.S.S.R. in recent years has been powerfully aided by the rehabilitation of a number of theorists who provided a lifeline to the richer intellectual culture of an earlier age. Without the opportunity to read once again the writings of Mixail Baxtin, Lev Vygotskij, and others it is doubtful that Soviet aestheticians could have made the advances they have succeeded in making beyond the intellectual wilderness of the Stalin era. And among those voices from the past, none was heard sooner or has continued to be heard longer than that of the still active classicist and philosopher, Aleksej Fedorovič Losev.

Losev at 90 (he was born in 1893) is the acknowledged dean of Soviet aesthetics. Renowned for his erudition and for his independence of thought, he occupies a place of honor among Soviet scholars despite the fact that he has not been affiliated either with the Academy of Sciences or with one of the major universities of the U.S.S.R. and is not a member of the Communist Party. Since 1942 Losev has held a teaching position at the leading school of education in the Soviet Union – the Lenin State Pedagogical Institute in Moscow – where he has had an impact on many academic generations of students. Since 1953 he has published no less than fourteen books, most of them issued by major state publishing houses in substantial printings, including a massive, five-volume work on the history of ancient aesthetics that is the fullest and best documented study of the subject in world literature. Recognized as the Soviet Union's leading authority on the philosophy of Plato, Losev is no less respected for his own theoretical work in aesthetics. He was entrusted with writing the major articles on aesthetics in the five-volume Soviet encyclopedia of philosophy, and one of his more recent works, *The Problem of the Symbol and Realist Art*, is an important theoretical study of questions of representation and meaning in art. 'Our patriarch', is the designation frequently applied to Losev by leading figures in the Soviet aesthetics establishment.[1]

If it is surprising that Soviet aestheticians should claim a patriarch whose scholarly training antedated the revolution and whose interests are bound up with the even more remote past, it is astounding that the role should be played by A. F. Losev. For Losev is not simply a non-Party, prerevolutionary

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scholar: he is a former leader of the philosophical opposition to Soviet Marxism within the U.S.S.R. After the forced emigration of many dissident philosophers in 1921 and 1922, Losev almost alone continued throughout the 1920s to develop, in a series of books legally printed within the U.S.S.R., a plainly non-Marxist and even anti-Marxist position. When he was finally silenced in 1930, it was under the most formidable barrage, culminating in his public denunciation by L. M. Kaganovič at the Sixteenth Party Congress on charges of promoting philosophical obscurantism, representing the hated *kulak* class, and even belonging to the Black Hundred.

Yet in 1953, after nearly a quarter century of silence, this same A. F. Losev began to publish once again and to acquire an enviable scholarly reputation among his former Marxist detractors. How does a leading class enemy become a respected patriarch in a Marxist intellectual community? The way in which the mind and the learning of A. F. Losev became available again to Soviet culture – along with the adjustments in "official" theory and in personal convictions that were required for it to take place – is a case study in the rediscovery of the past in Soviet philosophy.

LOSEV'S EARLY AESTHETIC VIEWS

Losev's aesthetic philosophy was first expounded in two books published in 1927. One, entitled *Music as a Subject for Logic*, consists of a series of papers read by Losev at the State Academy of the Artistic Sciences and the State Institute of Musical Science in Moscow over the years 1920–1925.[2] The second work, entitled *The Dialectic of Artistic Form*, is a more comprehensive examination of questions in the theory of the arts, not confined to music.[3] Both works show the general influence of Losev's overall philosophical orientation, which has been called by George Kline 'dialectical phenomenology'.[4] Its terminology and some aspects of its methodology come from Edmund Husserl; behind this phenomenological approach, however, lies a complex metaphysics compounded of selected themes from the philosophies of Plato, the Neoplatonists (especially Plotinus), and Hegel. Without attempting an exposition of Losev's philosophical outlook as such, we may nonetheless note briefly a few features of its application to aesthetics that set Losev in clear opposition to the developing Marxist outlook of the 1920s.

First, there is the very approach to art that is implicit in the titles of the two books. Losev stresses the formal side of art – not the content of a work but its structure or "logical skeleton", as he likes to call it. In a prudential

introduction to *The Dialectic of Artistic Form*, Losev disclaims any intention to *limit* aesthetics to formal analysis:

> Besides the logical stratum [he writes], art has a material stratum in the broad sense of that term, which includes physical, physiological, and psychological reality. However, this, too, is for me an abstraction. To forget logic for the sake of physics is just as stupid as to forget physics for the sake of abstract logic.[5]

It is the latter abstraction, however, on which his book is based: he addresses himself exclusively to the *formal* stratum, in contradistinction to the content orientation of Marxism.

A second noteworthy feature of Losev's early writings in aesthetics is an almost fanatical insistence on the self-sufficiency and independence of art and the aesthetic experience. He proclaims over and over his concern with "pure art" – in the case of music, specifically, his concern with "absolute" music, which he defines as music that is "devoid of all visual, verbal, and other non-musical images".[6] Flying in the face of any attempt to pose ideological or political standards for art, Losev argues that art is its own standard, a law unto itself. Speaking, again, of music, he writes:

> Pure musical being is absolute *self-affirmation*, which is in need of no other foundation but itself alone. This means that musical truth is equal to musical being, and musical being is equal to the musical norm. . . . A musical work itself speaks of itself. It is itself a law and a norm for itself.[7]

The implied opposition to Marxist analysis, which has always rejected the notion of "art for art's sake", is evident.

A third salient and equally non-Marxist feature of Losev's early view of art is the distinctively *mystical* coloration of his analysis of artistic symbolism. The following brief passage will suggest the flavor of this aspect of Losev's aesthetic thought:

> We often seek to communicate the "content" of music by means of . . . *symbolic* images which point to a certain ineffable mystery that is hidden beneath these images. This mystery is the subject of music. It is unanalyzable and undisclosable, it stirs the heart with poignant sweetness and seethes in the soul. It is the eternal chaos of all things, their primordial, primeval essence . . . [and so on].[8]

In such passages Losev's Neoplatonic metaphysics is mobilized to provide an account of the mysteries of "musical being" – an account that is in no way compatible with either the basic principles of dialectical materialism or the soon-to-be formulated canons of socialist realism.

THE SILENCING OF LOSEV IN 1930

In view of the plainly non-Marxist tenor of the philosophical and aesthetic views advanced by Losev in his books of the late twenties, it is remarkable that he was able to publish them at all. Clearly the opportunity could not long continue in the increasingly totalitarian atmosphere of the first Five-Year Plan (1928–1933), given Stalin's demand to proceed from the "confinement and displacement" of the class enemy to its complete "liquidation".[9] On the ideological front Losev made an easy target, and the evidence suggests that with the publication of his 1930 books, in which his opposition to Marxism became more outspoken, a concerted plan was devised to feature Losev in a campaign to eliminate philosophical opposition entirely.

The first gun to be fired, on May 14, 1930, was a *Pravda* review of Losev's first seven books in which he was condemned for writing that a proletarian state cannot permit the existence of a free art and in general for the "clerical-idealist", "mystical Christian", and even "anti-Semitic" character of his outlook. Reactionaries such as Losev, the article concludes, are "extremely dangerous" and must be given a "merciless rebuff".[10] Just one week later, on May 21, 1930, a detailed analysis of Losev's thought was presented in an address to the Institute of Philosophy of the Communist Academy in Moscow by a certain X. Garber, who calls Losev a "consummate mystic" and the "most prolific" of the remaining champions of idealist philosophy in Russia. "Never", Garber contended, "has idealism been advanced in so reactionary, pretentious, and militant a form."[11] Still another lengthy attack, written by the prominent Party ideologist G. Bammel', was published in the same month of May in the leading Soviet theoretical journal of the day, *Pod znamenem marksizma* (Under the Banner of Marxism). After cataloguing the anti-materialist and anti-scientific elements in Losev's philosophy, Bammel' not only concludes that it is "an instrument of black reaction and obscurantism" but suggests that it is the last, distilled essence of the philosophical opposition to Marxism in the U.S.S.R. "Such is the kulak philosophy of our day", he writes in conclusion. "Such is the 'fate' of Russian bourgeois and petty-bourgeois philosophy after the October revolution. Such is the 'inner' front opposing Marxism."[12]

To rally the Party to destroy this front completely by the total withdrawal of its access to print was Kaganovič's task at the Sixteenth Party Congress, which began on June 26, 1930, and predictably Losev was the centerpiece of Kaganovič's performance. The printing of Losev's *Dialectic of Myth* in 1930 provided Kaganovič with his principal ammunition, for in that work

Losev had thrown caution to the winds, and had written that "dialectical materialism is a crying absurdity".[13] After quoting this and other shockers to the assembled Party throng, Kaganovič went on to suggest a remedy. The transcript of the stormy meeting is eloquent in its directness:

> And this is published in the land of the Soviets [Kaganovič lamented]. What does this tell us? It tells us that we are not yet exercising sufficient vigilance. (Voices: "Who is the publisher? Where was it published?") It was authorized by Glavlit. (Voices: "Whose edition?") It was published by the author himself. And that's just the point. Here in our Soviet land, in the land of the proletarian dictatorship, the private author should be under the yoke of the proletarian dictatorship. Yet here no yoke was in evidence. It is a pity. (Voices: "That's right.")[14]

Distribution of Losev's book was halted, and in the reorganization of the Soviet publishing industry that followed the Sixteenth Party Congress, the possibility of private publishing was entirely eliminated. To Losev went the distinction – a distinction he still possesses after half a century – of having been the last person openly to condemn dialectical materialism in a book legally printed in the U.S.S.R.

THE VOICE FROM THE PAST

Losev was silent for 23 years.[15] He did not, apparently, suffer imprisonment or professional ostracism after 1930, though his employment did change. The State Academy of the Artistic Sciences, in which he had headed the sector of aesthetics, was abolished in 1931, and at that time he also left his teaching post at the Čajkovskij Conservatory of Music and began teaching at the Krupskaja Regional Pedagogical Institute in Moscow. In 1942 he left that school and assumed a teaching position at the Lenin State Pedagogical Institute in Moscow – the position which he retains to the present day. He also traveled widely – particularly in the 1930s – as a visiting professor and lecturer. Thus the 1930 attacks did not destroy his academic career, despite keeping him from publishing.

When Losev did reappear in print in 1953, the event was made possible not by the death of Stalin which took place in that year but by the minor revolution in Soviet thought that had been precipitated in 1950 by Stalin's letters on linguistics. Losev's first publication in 1953 made clear this indebtedness to Stalin and also demonstrated the great gulf that separated the Russian intellectual world of the 1920s from the Stalinized postwar world. Consider, by way of contrast, the taunting personal wit with which Losev ended his last work of 1930, *The Dialectic of Myth:*

The reader understands me very badly if he thinks that I lay upon him an obligation to think dialectically at any cost. I insist on quite the reverse. What I am saying is that *if* you wish to think dialectically, then you *must arrive* at mythology in general and at absolute mythology in particular, and hence at all of the concepts which have just been outlined. But whether you *need* to think dialectically or even need to think at all – that is up to you. If you want my personal opinion, in the first place it is none of your business – the opinion of an individual commits one to nothing – and in the second place I am profoundly convinced that pure thinking plays a highly insignificant role in life. Are you satisfied?[16]

What must Losev's generation have endured, to account for the difference between those playfully cynical lines and the opening lines of Losev's essay of 1953, so remote in style and so contradictory in thought:

June 20, 1950 is a remarkable date, which has put an end to all vulgarism, troglodytism, and proletkultism in every science, and above all in the social and historical sciences, and which opens up new and unparalleled perspectives for the development of science and literature in general. It is the date of the appearance of J. V. Stalin's work of genius, "Marxism and Questions of Linguistics". Here for the first time linguistics and consequently everything connected with language, including of course mythology, is placed on a firm footing and receives a clear and intelligible methodology for its development. J. V. Stalin brilliantly shows the true place of language and thinking in the history of human culture. . . . J. V. Stalin has presented in the clearest form. . . .[17]

and so on and so on.

In appealing to the authority of Stalin, Losev was showing his willingness at last to adopt the ultimate strategy of Soviet philosophers from the 1930s to the present day: to justify one's subject or position by showing it as a logical requirement or extension of some accepted classical text or other authoritative pronouncement. Stalin's letters on linguistics, by providing a new and different set of such pronouncements, did indeed present "new and unparalleled perspectives" – i.e., fresh opportunities for justifying subjects and issues previously avoided. One of the least likely candidates for this treatment, however – especially at the hands of Losev – would seem to be mythology, the very subject of Losev's ill-fated last book of 1930. But mythology is just the subject to which the first works of Losev's philosophical renaissance are devoted.

The justification Losev presents for his work in 1953 is suggested in the above quotation. Stalin had insisted, in opposition to the views of Academician N. Ja. Marr, that language is not a superstructural feature of society, or in other words not a class product that reflects the views and interests of the dominant class; rather language is the creation of an entire people in its

progressive march through the ages.[18] It was a natural step from this "declassification" of language to the view that the literary productions of a society in which its language is embodied – "including, of course, mythology", as Losev is quick to point out – should not be regarded simply as repositories of the interests of the oppressing classes which dominated their production but rather could be studied from a broader historical standpoint as expressions of the aspirations and struggles of an entire people – as an approach, in Losev's words, to "the living struggle of man for a better life, oriented toward a bright future based on the elimination of all exploitation of man by man". Thus ancient mythology could be looked at "in a Stalinist manner" (*po-stalinski*), Losev asserted, by stressing its connection with man's progress toward "the future classless society" – particularly when such an enterprise could be carried out, as Losev did it, with continual reminders that it was thus "the social history of the ancient world" that was really under investigation, and with loudly trumpeted opposition to the errors and distortions of bourgeois mythological science as conducted by "lackeys of Anglo-American imperialism".[19]

The formula was a successful one, and it allowed Losev to proceed to substantive and original studies in mythology, in which the struggle of mankind for a bright future was not always in immediate evidence. The formula was also quite clearly generalizable, with appropriate modifications, to other areas as well, and as early as 1954 Losev was publishing studies of Greek aesthetic terminology based on investigations of Homer, Hesiod, and the classical lyric, grounding his approach not only on the connections of these linguistic monuments with "the productive and every other activity of man and with the entire history of the corresponding people" but on the need to delve deeply into the Greek literary ***language*** in view of the intimate bond posited by Stalin between thought and the language in which it is expressed.[20] From that time on, questions of aesthetics were a major continuing interest in Losev's philosophical work.

LOSEV AND CURRENT SOVIET AESTHETICS

Although a comprehensive presentation of Losev's theoretical contributions to contemporary Soviet aesthetics is beyond the scope of this paper, it is possible here to examine some of the ways in which Losev has succeeded since 1953 in producing relatively independent philosophical work while still satisfying the minimum requirements of Marxism-Leninism. A significant factor in meeting those requirements is undoubtedly Losev's scrupulous and

even at times seemingly slavish adherence to accepted Soviet authorities and slogans. There is, however, widespread if generally unwritten recognition among Soviet philosophers of the fact that this seeming orthodoxy is entirely *pro forma* and does not really transform Losev into a Marxist aesthetician. A writer for *Literaturnaja gazeta* did proclaim in 1969 that "Losev is a Marxist", but the statement functions more as a benediction than a description, and its author is more concerned with Losev's "complex path to Marxism" than with specifying the Marxist elements of his current outlook.[21] Neither of the two recent reference works in which Losev's biography appears calls him a Marxist; each, with careful and almost identical choice of words, speaks of him as "making the transition" (conspicuously using the present continuous tense of the verb) not to Marxism but to "Marxist positions".[22] Losev's positions are clearly Marxist with a difference; indeed they manage to incorporate significant elements of his pre-1930 views, as a brief examination of some prominent features of his work since 1953 will show.

(1) First, Losev legitimizes and continues his lifelong study of ancient idealist philosophy and aesthetics, and above all the thought of his beloved Plato, not simply on the general socio-historical grounds initially provided by Stalin's writings on linguistics but on the basis of what he calls the "elemental materialism" of classical thought. Drawing on Marx's and Engels' favorable attitude toward Greek culture and alluding to Engels' contention that all the Greek thinkers were "elemental dialecticians", Losev argues that the philosophical idealism of the ancients is fundamentally misread and exaggerated by those who do not observe the powerful materialist bias that is inherent not only in Greek philosophy but in the very language in which it is expressed. Already in the second essay of his renaissance, published in 1954, Losev presents this interpretation of classical thought as a major discovery behind his own philosophical reorientation:

> The consclusiona at which the author arrived . . . were genuinely striking in their singularity and their unexpected character.
>
> Of course, on the basis of Marx's and Engels' general judgments of ancient culture the author already knew even before this study that the basic orientation of the ancient world view was what might be called elemental and at the same time integral materialism. But what became evident to him, after the analysis of a great number of different terms and texts, completely transcended any ideas he had had up to that time concerning ancient artistic materialism. . . . Only after [this] work of many years . . . could the author understand . . . , to what degree the Greek language itself is permeated by the same elemental and integral materialism and realism of which the monuments of Greek literature and art speak to us.[23]

The etymology of the Greek words for 'beauty', 'the beautiful', 'harmony', 'art', and related notions, Losev contends, are manifest indicators of "the absolute and undivided significance of artistic and plastic materialism" for the Greek mind.[24]

Individual Greek thinkers such as Plato, then, are redeemed by the true *materialist* cast of their thought and are rendered worthy objects of study on that account. Losev's summary of the philosophy of Plato in a recent textbook shows the application of this approach. No doubt Plato was an idealist, he writes; but more importantly he was an *ancient* idealist:

> He attributes great significance to matter, which he calls the "nurse" and the "receptacle" of ideas and from which real things come. Plato values material, bodily beauty very highly. . . . It is no accident that 'idea' in Greek means nothing other than 'the visible'. . . . The philosophy of Plato is evidence of the elemental bias of Greek thinkers for a material, a substantial, a concrete, a tangible representation of what might seem to be the most abstract concepts.[25]

In Losev's own case, this "unexpected" discovery that Plato was a materialist at heart has permitted him to proceed to detailed and substantial studies of the Greek philosopher; the second volume of Losev's *History of Ancient Aesthetics*, for example, includes a 500-page treatment of Plato's aesthetics that would be a monumental credit to the scholarship of any nation.[26] Soviet authorities cannot object to such outstanding devotion to materialism, though they might be nonplussed by some of its consequences. A recent and very sympathetic book on Plato for children by Losev and his wife, Aza Taxo-Godi, concludes with these words: "Least of all was Plato dogmatic. His philosophy is the path of the sharpest criticism and of never-ending dialectic."[27] It may not be coincidental that a popular recent Soviet play concerning Socrates ('Talks with Socrates' by E. Radzinskij) closes with the same thought.

(2) A second way in which Losev has contributed to Soviet aesthetic theory in recent years, over and above the legitimization of important bodies of historical material, has been by employing, in his analyses of that material, a deviant or unorthodox conception of art. This conception, though it is only implicit in Losev's historical work, is sufficiently close to heresies encountered in other regions of Soviet aesthetic thought – and particularly in industrial design, or what is called "technical aesthetics" – that it has come to be viewed with apprehension by more orthodox Soviet aestheticians who see it as a significant competing view.

In the orthodox view, art is identified as a form of social consciousness in

which, as in scientific cognition, reality is reflected or represented, but is reflected not through concepts as in the sciences but through images. This conception of art as a reflection of reality through images gives art a dependent or relational character – its content is always the reality which it reflects – and furthermore attributes to art a cognitive role as a more or less adequate grasping of that content through its images. It is then only a short step to the contention that good art is realistic art, or art that more adequately and faithfully reflects the reality to which it is bound. On this view even the most primitive art is a form of cognition of the objective world, an appropriation in consciousness of the structure of surrounding reality, however distorted.

Although in the Soviet philosophical literature, competing views are rarely advanced openly by their creators or acknowledged openly by their critics, there is general recognition among Soviet philosophers that the orthodox view of art has at least two major competitors. One is the semiotic interpretation which is implicit in the work of the Moscow-Tartu school of linguists and literary theorists, whose approach to works of art as sign systems appears to orthodox critics to be a denial of the fundamentally dependent or relational character of art: so much attention is given by the semiotician to the nature and the inter-relations of the artistic signs, it is contended, that their relations to reality are overlooked.[28] The second heresy appears at first closer to traditional Marxist analysis, for it links art with industrial design and focuses on the work of art as a product of labor. In doing so, however, this "so-called practical productive conception" – as it is dubbed by one critic, Avner Zis' – tends to view the work of art as forming a second nature, a produced world of its own, and hence again failing to refer to, much less cognitively reflect, the primary nature around it.[29]

It is this second deviation that critics find in Losev. The fact that Losev attributes the view to the ancient world rather than offering it as a general definition of art is not enough to excuse it in the eyes of Zis', who says of the writings of Losev and of Ju. N. Borodaj that "their ideas in a number of cases may be viewed as a conception of art pretending to disclose the nature of art in other epochs as well."[30] The character of the offending view is best seen in Losev's analysis of the art of ancient slave-holding societies as interpretable only on the model of the production of material entities in general. Men in these slave-holding societies, Losev contends, saw the world exclusively in terms of *things* – inert physical bodies and living physical beings – and of the *production* of things; for they had no experience beyond the production and generation of the material world and no conception of personality. All productions of the ancients, then, must be viewed according to

the model of the physical origin of the physical thing, and Losev's summary statement explicitly includes art among these productions: "*Veščevizm* ['thing-ism', 'reification']", Losev writes, "productive-technical *veščevizm* and corporeality – such is the method of formation of the entire ancient worldview, the mode of construction of religion, philosophy, art, science, and all socio-political life."[31]

Critics of Losev's view, objecting to the absence from it of any cognitive role for art, accuse him of "vulgar sociologism" in linking ancient art and mythology too directly with the productive process. Also they do not overlook the fact that Losev points to man's subjection to the power of the thing in ancient society as a way of explaining the prominence of irrational and mystical themes in ancient art and mythology. Such "fantastic conclusions" on the part of Losev, I. F. Smoljaninov contends, result from ignoring the insight into ancient culture provided by Marx, who speaks "not of *veščevizm*, but of the reflection in popular fantasy and by means of artistic fantasy of the phenomena of actual, real life". The foundation of ancient art, Smoljaninov contends, is "not mysticism and *veščevizm*, but a majestic and optimistic understanding of life that affirms human wealth and beauty".[32] Another orthodox critic, Avner Zis', contends that in rejecting the "cognitive significance" of art and locating its distinctive properties entirely in its "practical, productive side", Losev is allied with the old defenders of the conception of art as "life-building" – the conception of *žiznestroenie* advanced by Bogdanov, Čužak, and others in the 1920s – as well as with those in the present day who uphold the "practical, productive conception" which seeks to equate art with design and "the fashioning of things".[33]

Zis' comparisons are in fact quite apt, and they point to the fact that the unorthodox view of art implicit in Losev's studies of ancient society is not an idiosyncratic one in Soviet society but finds support in other quarters, and in particular among those writers associated with the journal *Texničeskaja estetika* (Technical Aesthetics), published by the All-Union Research Institute of Technical Aesthetics. This institute was founded, coincidentally, in 1963 – the year of publication of the first volume of Losev's *History of Ancient Aesthetics*, in which he first uses this modern-day constructivism in the analysis of ancient art.

(3) A third way in which the thinking of A. F. Losev has enriched Soviet aesthetics since 1953 has been through his directly theoretical, non-historical works, dating from the later 1960s and the 1970s. Although it cannot be said that these more recent writings contain an explicit and comprehensive alternative theory of art – or of aesthetics generally – they do present fairly

obvious alternatives to specific orthodox views. In his most ambitious theoretical study, *The Problem of the Symbol and Realist Art* (1976), Losev finds it possible, indeed, to assert that "the customary definition [of art] as thinking in images can in no way be considered satisfactory" and also that "the definition of realism as the reflection of reality is outmoded and has lost its meaning".[34] By way of illustrating Losev's development of alternative positions in the book, let us examine briefly his insistence on distinguishing the *artistic* from the *ideological*.

Among orthodox Soviet aestheticians, no doubt a prime motivation for requiring a cognitive dimension in art is that such a dimension provides a basis for grounding ideology in the nature of art – for making the ideological function an essential constituent of art. Even in Losev's historical work of 1963 the implications of the *non*-cognitivist view were present – and noted by critics. Though Losev did not there *deny* that art could be put to ideological uses, Avner Zis' was much disturbed that Losev made the ideological not "a distinctive characteristic of art" but rather something that merely "relates art to other forms of the spiritual life of society".[35]

Despite such criticism Losev has been able to maintain the disjunction between the ideological and the artistic in his original theoretical writings, and in *The Problem of the Symbol and Realist Art* he gives the distinction an explicit – if very cautious – development. The concrete work of art in its socio-historical setting, he declares, is a complex entity:

> By no means is any real, historical work of art simply a pure work of art. It is always endowed with enormous historical freight, which is evident both in its content and in its form. It is always freighted likewise with enormous ideological content.[36]

In this very listing of *different* dimensions, however, Losev is distinguishing them in such a way as to make it possible to establish their independence. And it becomes clear that he is particularly concerned to establish the independent reality of the pure artistic dimension:

> Just as the cylindrical shape of a drinking glass, extracted from the glass itself in a situation in which we are oblivious of the fact that what we have before us is a glass, is nevertheless something real, so too the purely artistic character of the real, historical work of art, extracted from the work, and with all the work's other aspects – such as, for example, the realistic and the ideological – thrust aside, is also something real and something that belongs to the structure of the work, though its reality is an abstract one.[37]

The distinction of the artistic character of the work not only from its ideological but from its realistic dimension as well indicates the degree of purity

which Losev attributes to it. In language very reminiscent of his pre-1930 insistence on the complete independence of the aesthetic, he speaks of our attention to "the artistic image" in itself, freed from the "burden" (*nagruzka*) of "this or that real life . . . this or that ideology, this or that morality, this or that sermonizing, these or those exhortations and appeals, and from the intention to reflect life and to remake it".[38] The "pure artistic image" is, Losev states, the subject of "pure, disinterested, and self-contained contemplation".[39] Losev does not characterize this pure artistic contemplation in any detail, though his use of Kantian terminology in some of his seemingly offhand statements about it no doubt suggests the directions he would wish to take; thus he speaks of "pure art" as the object of "a special contemplation, which has self-contained significance, which is devoid of vital self-interest, which is interested in nothing, and which has as its subject purposiveness without any real purpose".[40] And lest it be charged that he is speaking of something that is appropriate only to decadent or modernist art, Losev proceeds to cite manifestations of "pure art" in every major Russian writer of the nineteenth century.[41]

Losev is not alone among Soviet aestheticians in seeking to distinguish the artistic from the ideological, but he is perhaps the most respected and the one who goes the furthest. That the distinction itself remains a heretical one may be seen by examining the views advanced by leading establishment aestheticians in recent textbooks. M. F. Ovsjannikov, for example, writes as follows: "Inherent in art are various properties: figurativeness and expressiveness, a theme, a 'point of view', and an ideological orientation that permeates all aspects of the created artistic image."[42] By contrast with so organic a connection between art and ideology, Losev's view is a manifest effort to establish the independence of the artistic dimension. At the same time, however, in his book on symbols Losev is also able to put to good use the orthodox Soviet biases toward both ideology and realism. Seeking to make *the symbol* again a respectable category of Soviet aesthetics, Losev justifies his own exhaustive and highly sophisticated analysis of symbolism on the grounds that although art *per se* does not require symbolism, both realistic art and ideological art are impossible without it.

Many other ways could be identified in which the work of A. F. Losev has entered the world of Soviet aesthetics in recent years, but enough has been said to indicate the character and import of his contributions. Through them an older and richer philosophical heritage continues to operate within Soviet philosophy, despite the appearance of docile orthodoxy that frequently marks Losev's introductory or ceremonial pronouncements. The

importance of this heritage, in substance and in hope, is, I believe, inestimable. And if I were forced to choose, on grounds of more beneficent impact on contemporary Russian culture, between the anti-Marxism of an uncompromising Solženitsyn and the "Marxist positions" of a compromising Losev, I should unhesitatingly choose the latter.

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NOTES

[1] Basic though sketchy biographical information concerning Losev may be found in the following recent Soviet works: *Filosofskaja énciklopedija*, vol. 3, M., Sovetskaja énciklopedija, 1964, p. 255; I. Mixajlov, 'Akme', *Literaturnaja gazeta*, no. 26 (June 26, 1969), p. 7; *Bol'šaja sovetskaja énciklopedija*, vol. 15, M., Sovetskaja énciklopedija, 1974, p. 29; A. A. Taxo-Godi and I. M. Naxov (eds.), *Voprosy klassičeskoj filologii VII, Obraz i slovo*, M., Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1980, pp. 5–8. The latter work also contains a lengthy bibliography of Losev's writings.

[2] A. F. Losev, *Muzyka kak predmet logiki*, M., izdanie avtora, 1927.

[3] A. F. Losev, *Dialektika xudožestvennoj formy*, M., izdanie avtora, 1927.

[4] George L. Kline, 'Dialectical Phenomenology: A. F. Losev and G. G. Shpet', a paper read at the conference 'La Philosophie Idéaliste en Russie', in Aix-en-Provence, France, 25–29 March, 1968; and George L. Kline, 'The Dialectical Phenomenology of A. F. Losev', a paper read at the Eleventh National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, in New Haven, Ct., 10–13 October, 1979. Discussion of Losev's early philosophical views may also be found in V. V. Zenkovsky, *A History of Russian Philosophy*, trans. by G. L. Kline, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953, vol. II, pp. 833–839; and in D. Čiževskij, 'Filosofskie iskanija v Sovetskoj Rossii', *Sovremennye zapiski*, vol. XXXVII, 1928, pp. 510–523.

[5] *Dialektika xudožestvennoj formy*, p. 5.

[6] *Muzyka kak predmet logiki*, p. 237.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 72–73.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 56f.

[9] G. Bammel', 'Ob idealističeskoj filosofii posle Oktjabra', *Pod znamenem marksizma*, 1930, no. 5 (May), p. 51.

[10] A. Saradzev, 'Protiv popovsko-idealističeskoj reakcii', *Pravda*, May 14, 1930, p. 6.

[11] X. Garber, 'Protiv voinstvujuščego misticizma A. F. Loseva', *Vestnik Komakademii*, nos. 37–38, 1930, pp. 124–144.

[12] Bammel', *op. cit.*, p. 54f.

[13] A. F. Losev, *Dialektika mifa*, M., izdanie avtora, 1930, p. 147.

[14] *XVI s'ezd Vsesojuznoj Kommunističeskoj Partii (b)*. Stenografičeskij otčet, 2-e stereotipnoe izdanie, M.-L. OGIZ-Moskovskij rabočij, 1931, p. 75.

[15] The only entries in Losev's bibliography for the period between 1930 and 1953 are an annotated translation of Nicolas of Cusa and some notes on literary sources appended to D. S. Nedovič's book on Polycleitus. See Taxo-Godi and Naxov, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

16 *Dialektika mifa*, p. 263.
17 A. F. Losev, 'Olimpijskaja mifologija v ee social'no-istoričeskom razvitii', *Učenie zapiski MGPI im. V. I. Lenina*, vol., LXXII, 1953, vyp. 3, p. 9.
18 Stalin's pronouncements and other relevant texts are reprinted in *The Soviet Linguistic Controversy*, trans. by J. Murra, R. Hankin and F. Holling, N.Y., Kings Crown Press, 1951.
19 'Olimpijskaja mifologija', p. 9f.
20 A. F. Losev, 'Estetičeskaja terminologija rannej grečeskoj literatury (epos i lirika)', *Učenie zapiski MGPI im. V. I. Lenina*, vol. LXXXIII, 1964, vyp. 4, p. 43.
21 Mixajlov, *op. cit.*, p. 7.
22 *Bol'šaja sovetskaja énciklopedija, loc. cit.; Filosofskaja énciklopedija, loc. cit.*
23 'Estetičeskaja terminologija', p. 43.
24 *Loc. cit.*
25 A. A. Taxo-Godi (ed.), *Antičnaja literatura*, 2-e izd., M., Prosveščenija, 1973, p. 186.
26 A. F. Losev, *Istorija antičnoj estetiki. Sofisty. Sokrat. Platon*, M., Iskusstvo, 1969.
27 A. F. Losev and A. A. Taxo-Godi, *Platon: Žizneopisanie*, M., Detskaja literatura, 1977, p. 223.
28 For a study of this group's leading spokesman, see Ann Shukman, *Literature and Semiotics: A Study of the Writings of Yu. M. Lotman*, Amsterdam, North Holland Publishing Co., 1977.
29 A. Zis', *Iskusstvo i estetika: Tradicionnye kategorii i sovremennye problemy*, 2-e izd., M., Iskusstvo, 1975, p. 29.
30 *Ibid.*, p. 28.
31 A. F. Losev, *Istorija antičnoj estetiki (rannjaja klassika)*, M., Vysšaja škola, 1963, p. 35f.
32 I. F. Smol'janinov, *Problema čeloveka v marksistsko-leninskoj filosofii i estetike*, L., Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1974, p. 131f.
33 Zis', *op. cit.*, p. 28f.
34 A. F. Losev, *Problema simvola i realističeskoe iskusstvo*, M., Iskusstvo, 1976, p. 307f.
35 Zis', *op. cit.*, p. 28.
36 Losev, *op. cit.*, p. 143.
37 *Ibid.*, p. 143f.
38 *Ibid.*, p. 145f.
39 *Ibid.*, p. 143; see also p. 202.
40 *Ibid.*, p. 146.
41 *Ibid.*, pp. 146–148.
42 M. F. Ovsjannikov (ed.), *Osnovy marksistsko-leninskoj estetiki, Učebno-metodičeskoe posobie*, M., Mysl', 1978, p. 53.

GUIDO KÜNG

THE MARXIST CRITIQUE OF RAWLS

Rawls' theory of justice should be of special interest to orthodox Marxists, and this for at least three reasons: (a) Rawls strives to integrate his philosophy with the empirical social sciences and economics, something which for Marx too had been a chief aim. (b) Despite the intimate collaboration between philosophy and the empirical sciences which Rawls proposes, he claims to develop a genuine *ethical* theory, and ethics is something which is lacking in Marxian philosophy. (c) The Rawlsian ideal of a just society has at least in some respects a strongly socialist flavor: Rawls' Difference Principle states that in a just society somebody's being better off than others can be justified only as far as his being better off simultaneously improves the lot of the worst off.

However, up to now Soviet and East European philosophers have done very little to come to terms with Rawls' theory. The only meeting I know of where the name of Rawls came to the fore has been a joint British-Polish Symposium that took place in Warsaw, in October, 1979. And even there the criticism of Rawls' philosophical ideas was left mainly to a young assistant.[1] If one is looking for a serious Marxist response to Rawls' ideas, then one has to turn to Western authors such as Milton Fisk or Richard Miller.[2] In what follows I will therefore refer to their writings.

As I see it, the Marxist objections can be summarized by the following four major claims:

(1) Rawls prizes *stabilization, equilibrium* and *fairness*, and this is incompatible with a revolutionary socialism.

(2) Rawls makes use of a contractarian model where the individuals behave like *capitalistic egoists* and not like good socialists (or good Christians, for that matter).

(3) The gap between the Rawlsian theoretical model and practical reality is so great that it defeats Rawls' own purpose.

(4) Rawls' *conservative logic of rational choice* rules out the view that in the realization of the ideal of justice one may accept the risks of a violent revolution.

Let us examine each of these claims in turn.

(Ad 1) It is true that Rawls praises the merits of a *stable* society. However

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what he thereby wants to claim is merely that *if* his ideal of a just society is being realized, *then* the social and political situation is becoming more stable. And this is quite similar to the Marxist claim that once a society has attained the socialist level, then serious antagonistic conflicts will no longer occur. It does not say that an unjust social order should not be changed.

But what about the fact that Rawls recommends that one strive for a reflective *equilibrium* and observe the rules of *fairness*? Is it not wrong to recommend such an attitude when the actual situation is one of class conflict? Is it not so that in a situation of great injustice the oppressed cannot seek an equilibrium, a fair agreement with their oppressors? In my view it does not follow from this that in such a situation a balanced reflection can play no rôle at all. Rawls' notion of a reflective equilibrium is basically that of a *philosophical* evaluation where competing propositions are weighed by the reflecting individual until he arrives at a considered conviction; such a philosophical reflection can be recommended even when in the interactions of real life a dialogue is not possible. And Rawls' model of a fair social contract too, must not be confused with a balance of powers in real life. Calculations in the abstract model of a fair social contract can be recommended at all times, even in situations where a balance of powers in real life would result in an oppressive alliance of evil forces.

In actual fact it is quite possible that, with respect to a situation of oppression, balanced philosophical reflection and a fair appraisal which tries to give to everyone his due may recommend a basic social change. The notion of a just revolution is not a contradiction in terms and, despite appearances to the contrary, revolutionary spirit and fairness are not necessarily incompatible. In fact, if philosophical reflection shows that the actually existing social order is unfair, then a Rawlsian is committed in principle to work for a change.[3] Thus in its basic aim Rawls' theory is not a conservative theory at all. We will have to see, however, whether on the level of prudence, i.e. in its recommendations concerning the *realization of the ideal*, Rawls' logic of rational choice will not condemn as irrational a decision that accepts the risks of a violent revolution.

(Ad 2) If the first objection argued that the Rawlsian man was much too bent on fairness, on giving his due even to the class enemy, the second objection runs in the opposite direction and complains that in Rawls' contractarian model the individuals behave like mutually disinterested egoists, and thus like capitalists and not like good socialists.[4]

But this objection is based on the same misunderstanding as the previous one: it fails to distinguish Rawls' calculations in an abstract model from what

happens in real life. It is all-important to notice that the individuals in Rawls' contractarian model are *not* meant to be *real* persons: they are only ingenious constructs that make logical calculations concerning fairness possible. Real persons may very well refuse to calculate and may prefer to act purely out of brotherly love. However, with his theory of justice Rawls does not want to describe all aspects of real actions; he merely wants to capture one aspect, namely the quality of fairness, and fairness *is* a matter where calculation is appropriate. Rawls has the great merit of having sketched a strategy by which one can hope to find a way to such calculations: he proposes to construct "persons" which calculate exactly their egoistical interests, and at the same time to neutralize the egoism of these calculating persons with the help of the ingenious device of a "veil of ignorance". Both the "calculators" (computers!) and their "veils" are entirely artificial, but because of the ingenious way in which the calculators are programmed, each of them will be able to represent the real interests of mankind by simultaneously caring about the interests of everyone.

There is nothing in Rawls' most basic ideas which would rule out in an a priori fashion the optimistic belief that at some point in the historical development of mankind people will cease to be motivated by selfish interests. Empirical evidence seems not to confirm such a hope, but the basic framework of Rawls' theory is not set against it.[5] Furthermore, fairness is only a minimum requirement in the moral evaluation of a given society. If a society can measure up to the more demanding standards of brotherhood then all the better. But will fairness not become irrelevant once brotherhood is attained? Can such a society not dispense with the calculations of what is fair? Is it not better if everybody is taught to treat everybody else with generosity? But generosity is by definition the virtue of giving more than fairness demands. And thus the recognition of generosity will always presuppose a certain grasp of the notion of fairness.[6]

(Ad 3) In my previous remarks I have pointed out how the Marxist objections to Rawls' theory are due to a confusion between the level of philosophical reflection and the level of real life. But is it not precisely the virtue of Marxism to "confuse" these two levels and to refuse any divorce between philosophical theory and the practice of real life? To this one can reply that to distinguish is not yet to divorce. As a matter of fact Rawls too tries to achieve a unity between theory and actual practice, and this in at least two ways: (a) the abstraction due to the application of the "veil of ignorance" is progressively reduced until in the end the "veil" is completely withdrawn and all empirical facts are taken into account; (b) the theory claims to be

verifiable with respect to our real sense of justice, just as linguistics and logic are verifiable with respect to the verdicts of our real sense for grammatical and logical correctness.

However, Richard Miller believes that if certain Marxist theses are correct, then the gap between the abstract levels in Rawls' theory and actual reality is so great that it is unacceptable even on Rawls' own terms. Miller (p. 213) argues that according to Rawls' own words the calculators in the original position "cannot enter into agreements that may have consequences they cannot accept", but that they will insure that they will be able to keep their agreement "in actual circumstances". Now Marxists hold that the mentality of people is so strongly class-dependent that in real life most capitalists will simply not be able intellectually to accept the loss of their privileges.

I believe that this is indeed a point that Rawls has not sufficiently clarified. But it is a point that can be raised by a non-Marxist too, because it is clear that in real life there will always be some hardheaded people that will refuse what others accept as reasonable. Therefore Rawls can only require of the calculators in the original position that they cannot enter into agreements that may have consequences that *they* (the calculators) cannot accept. Applying this to the case of the capitalists: Rawls can only require that the calculators cannot enter into agreements that may have consequences which the capitalists, even *if they were so perfectly rational as the calculators are programmed to be*, would not accept. Of course this "*even-if*" clause is a counterfactual condition; real people are never perfectly rational in their behavior. Thus there will always remain a gap between the Rawlsian model and actual reality.

However this is as it must be, because Rawls' model is intended to be an ethical model and not a sociological model. The *ought* can never simply be reduced to an *is*. The gaps between the Rawlsian model and reality would only be unacceptable, if the ought would manifest itself nowhere in reality. But in fact the Marxists too believe in an ideal that manifests itself in history: they believe that a time will come when class interests will no longer distort the argumentations of mankind, and they already seem to possess some insights now concerning the workings of such communication free of domination (*herrschaftsfreie Kommunikation*, to use the term of Habermas).

As a matter of fact Rawls' ethical theory is meant to be empirical not in the sense of predicting the complete behaviour of real people, but only in the sense of predicting the enlightened response of our actually existing sense of justice, of our already existing belief in a not yet realized ideal.

(Ad 4) The fourth objection says that Rawls arbitrarily adopts a conservative logic of rational choice and that this logic cannot explain how, in the realization of the ideal, a rational individual may accept the risks of a violent revolution.

This objection is the most serious one. As non-Marxists too are pointing out, Rawls' choice of a conservative logic is indeed somewhat arbitrary: it is justified only *ad hoc* by the fact that it is precisely with the help of this logic that we can obtain principles of justice that best fit our modern sense of democratic fairness. *Per se* other logics of rational choice seem to have an equal if not a higher degree of plausibility. Furthermore, as Rawls himself knows, the logic chosen by him is limited in that it can only be applied to situations where a total loss is avoidable. But there are situations where the occurrence of total losses for some people cannot be avoided. And there are other situations where the possibility of total losses can only be avoided at the cost of cementing an extremely unsatisfactory *status quo*. In the first type of situation, Rawlsian logic is inapplicable; in the second type of situation, it may give the wrong answer.

Is this objection fatal to the Rawlsian enterprise? Some think so, and indeed it is possible that in the end no satisfactory account of rationality as a whole will be found; that it will turn out to be impossible to capture the logic of rational choice in one comprehensive calculus. But it may also be that today the logic of rational choice is merely too young a discipline, that in the future we will get a better grasp of how the different aspects of the complex phenomenon of rationality fit together. Actually, why should there not be different logics of choice corresponding to the plurality of possible attitudes (conservative, daring, etc.), and this without a procedure which would assign to each given situation exactly one preferred attitude? Maybe a plurality of strategies with different results might all deserve the predicate "reasonable", and perhaps there could then also be different types of fairness, for instance liberalist fairness, Marxist fairness, etc. Only further analytical work can shed more light on these questions.

Conclusion. So far, the tenor of the Marxist objections to Rawls has been to claim a basic incompatibility between the fundamentals of Rawls' theory on one hand and Marxian thinking on the other. But I am not so convinced by these claims. As we have seen, many of the objections are due to a misunderstanding of the workings of Rawls' theory. It might therefore be a promising strategy for Marxists not to condemn right away the Rawlsian approach, but to explore first whether it could not be adapted to their own convictions. Such explorations, regardless of whether in the end they succeed

or fail, could do much to remove the discussion between liberalism and Marxism from the level of sterile ideological disputes and to bring it down to a level of more fruitful investigations in a more analytical and empirical vein.

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NOTES

[1] J. Hołówka, 'Contractarian Justice' *Dialectics and Humanism*, vol. 6, no. 4, 1979, pp. 63–71. Cf. also Z. Zwoliński 'Justice and Equality: Comments on the British-Polish Philosophical Symposium', *ibid.*, vol. 7, no. 1, 1980, pp. 161–166.

[2] M. Fisk, 'History and Reason in Rawls' Moral Theory', in N. Daniels, *Reading Rawls*, New York, Basic Books, 1975, pp. 53–80; M. Fisk, 'The State and the Market in Rawls', paper read at the Second World Congress on Soviet and East European Studies, Garmisch, Sept. 3 to Oct. 4, 1980; R. Miller, 'Rawls and Marxism', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 3, 1974, pp. 167–191, reprinted in Daniels, *Reading Rawls*, pp. 206–230.

[3] In his paper of 1975, Fisk voices the opinion that the maximin rule of the Difference Principle allowed the least-advantaged group only to struggle for a maximum share, but not to unseat the privileged majority (p. 77). But this is clearly a mistake. The error is probably due to a misinterpretation which confuses the Difference Principle, where the operation of maximizing the minimum is a timeless calculation of the optimal allotment, with a "historical" principle, where the operation of maximizing the minimum would be a *historical* operation of bettering the lot of those individuals who at present are the least advantaged. Furthermore, when calculating the ideal allotment, it is quite possible that certain privileged positions which occur in the actual world will not occur at all in the ideal; in this sense, an unseating of the privileged majority is in no way precluded.

[4] Cf. Fisk, 1975, p. 64: "mutual disinterestedness is not a logically weak assumption, but it excludes many social alternatives to liberal institutions".

[5] Thus Fisk, 1975, p. 64 is mistaken when he believes that Rawls' rejection of socialist alternatives is derived from the mutual disinterestedness of the individuals in the contractarian model. In fact these alternatives are only ruled out on secondary, empirical grounds. For instance, a marketless society is only ruled out because factual experience seems to teach that the absence of a market leads to an enormous waste of resources; and according to Rawls such a waste is unfair, because the wasted resources could be used to improve the living conditions of the less well off. If a Marxist can disprove this empirical argument then the Rawlsian has no longer any objection against a marketless economy. Fisk, 1980, p. 13, raises against this "argument from waste" the objection that efficiency (and thus also non-efficiency, i.e. waste) is not definable independently of the market. But though it is true that an *exact measure* of efficiency presupposes an objective system of prices, which in turn presupposes the existence of a market, it would seem to me that great waste or inefficiency can be noticed *intuitively* even when no exact measure is at hand.

[6] Fisk, 1980, believes that Rawls' principles of justice (and thus fairness) only make

sense in the context of a market society. But we have just seen that the notion of generosity involves that of fairness. Furthermore, there is still another consideration which shows that fairness transcends the situation of a market economy: as a matter of fact there are not only the exchanges on the economic level that should be ruled by fairness, but there are also the exchanges of ideas in a pluralistic society where fairness matters. An orthodox Marxist may argue that in a marketless society antagonistic ideological disputes will no longer occur. But this is again an empirical claim of social psychology. And if it could be substantiated, one would only have substantiated that in a marketless society the demands of fairness will be fulfilled.

THOMAS J. BLAKELEY

OUT FROM UNDER THE RAILROAD BRIDGE: SARTRE AND THE SOVIETS

More than one of the former students of Professor J. M. Bocheński remembers his seminars, in particular those on Sartre with their sessions at the café under the SBB bridge which spans the Gotteron Valley. In my case, the object of the seminar was *Being and Nothingness* of Sartre, and I can remember both hating Sartre and being incensed that we arrived at the end of the semester having read only the *Introduction*! The time since then has been spent both in reading the rest of *Being and Nothingness* and in coming to the realization that that reading of the *Introduction* contained all that one needs to understand Sartre.

What follows can be taken as evidence of one student's emergence out from under the railroad bridge, travelling from *Being and Nothingness*, through the *Critique of Dialectical Reason* and into *The Idiot of the Family*. This involves examining Sartre's indictments of Soviet Marxism-Leninism, and the Soviet replies, to end with some conclusions on the nature of this intra-Marxist debate.

1. SARTRE ON "MARXIST IDEALISM", "LAZY MARXISM", AND OTHER "UNBEATABLES"

Sartre is quite unrestrained in his condemnations of Soviet Marxism-Leninism. It is almost as if in 1960 Sartre regretted the restraint he had practiced since his 'Matérialisme et Révolution'[1] in 1946. At that time he had already seen the contradictions in Stalinism; now, he sees these as native to and inherent in what he calls "Marxist voluntarism", for which

> Analysis consists solely in getting rid of detail, in forcing the signification of certain events, in denaturing facts or even in inventing a nature for them in order to discover it later underneath them, as their substance, as unchangeable, fetishized "synthetic notions".[2]

This is "Marxist formalism" which "is a project of elimination",[3] and "lazy Marxism" that "puts everything into everything (and) makes real men into the symbols of its myths . . .".[4] Worst of all, this is "abstract Marxism" which is impelled to "affirm the constant progress of materialism (and to) describe

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a certain idealism"[5] and is done by "sterilize(d) Marxist intellectuals".[6] "Stalinist idealism"[7] is the work of "certain pseudo-Marxists".[8]

To clarify the deviation that turns Marxism from the "unsurpassable philosophy of our era" to "materialist idealism",[9] Sartre describes a series of steps – systemic as well as historical – which constitute the "ideological genealogy" of Marxism.

First of all, a dialectical materialism cannot be a priori; for, otherwise, the dialectic would have an origin other than the matter, of which it is the "dialecticity". Whence, the dialectic of knowledge and the dialectic of the motion of the object are one; i.e. the world is rational, and Hegel tells us that knowledge is in and of the object.

Marxism, according to Sartre, established against Hegel that History is in motion, that being is not reducible to knowledge. In this way, the classical dualism was overcome through the "monism of practice". However, the modern tradition's dualism of being and thought seems to have been replaced – in Marxism, that is – by that of being and truth; and this absorption of truth into being leads to a destruction, in various Marxisms, of both the veracity of thought and the authenticity of man. Man is reduced to the status of a natural object.

"Materialist idealism", which consists in "talking about the idea of matter" (à la Engels), stands over against the "realist materialism" of Sartre who discusses "situated praxis".

It is thus clear that Sartre does not find much to praise in contemporary Marxism-Leninism. However, his critique is aimed less at a revision of contemporary versions of Marxism than at establishing a foundation for a "new departure", namely, the syncretic association of existentialism with Marxism.

This foundation is Sartre's "dialectical reason" that must explain itself and do this on the basis of situated human praxis ("we begin with men because we are men!"). This dialectic has to be found in immediate experience, where there is a unitary dialectical movement as basis. The dialectic is non-analytic, based on the individual, and constitutes both result and cause. Because of its "permanent *engagement* with the real", the dialectic is materialist. Finally, the dialectic is nominalist – a totalization of concrete totalities produced by singular totalizers. In short, dialectical reason is how history thinks and does itself.

Since the *Critique of Dialectical Reason* has already been summarized in a number of ways,[10] and we would like to pay more attention here to *The Idiot of the Family*, we will limit our present account of the *Critique* . . . to a basic counterposition of Marx and Sartre on four central problem-areas:

Man, for Marx, concretizes himself through productive work; can achieve, under capitalism, only quantitative perfection; is subject, under capitalism, to a four-fold alienation (where all qualities are reduced to quantities and alienation is the same as "false mediation"), against which reformism (which is merely quantitative) is ineffective, and individual revolt is hopeless. For Sartre, man makes himself by coproducing his milieu; is convinced of the ultimate imperfectibility of his own production; is suffering the alienating effect of the production of others; is searching for but remaining dissatisfied with mere reciprocities; and generates mediating thirds.

Society, for Marx, is the concrete universal (the proletariat); social alienation is caused by capitalist contradictions; the latter, in turn, generate the conditions for socialism, which grows out of capitalism via proletarian revolution. For Sartre, society is the interplay of groups and collectives, the spinning reciprocity of mediating thirds, the alternation of totalization and detotalization, via roles, institutions, oaths, etc.

Method, in Marx, is the critique of all that exists by exposing contradictions. For Sartre, it is the dialectic of existential biography and Marxian social theory.

History, for Marx, is the account (over time) of class conflicts, where species-being (*Gattungswesen*) is the culmination of history. For Sartre, history is the totalization of all totalizers of all partial totalizations, and seems not to have an ultimate totalizer.

The combination of the last two occupies the bulk of the *Critique of Dialectical Reason* and leads into *The Idiot of the Family*. Sartre here is agreeing, at least implicitly, with Habermas' view that the epistemological departure from the ontological tradition, in failing, gave rise to the Hegelian reontologizational identification of thought and being which – failing, in its turn – was corrected by Marx's praxiology; which can be made workable only by a "turn to methodology".

History and method, then. How to do it? Stepping back from his long-standing fascination with Baudelaire, and following up on a wager with Garaudy, Sartre undertakes an extensive historical-methodological account of Gustave Flaubert. While the *Critique of Dialectical Reason* argued that Marx's followers uncritically transformed his masterful theory of society and history into a natural philosophy (dialectical materialism) without a viable "Marxist anthropology", *The Idiot of the Family* takes up the challenge of applying the *Critique*'s "Marxisto-Sartrean anthropology" to a particular instance – for only so can "history-method" be shown to make sense.

The Idiot of the Family began as 2136 pages in two volumes and was to be followed by a detailed reading of *Madame Bovary*. Instead, 1972 saw the publication of 665 pages on the social-historical context; and this was to be followed by the reading of *Madame Bovary* – which never came. The "progressive-regressive method" is applied to Flaubert, his family, his works, his era, etc. Flaubert turns out to be a "being-of-class". He totalizes the seriality, collectivity and group-ness of a 19th-century bourgeoisie which thinks it finds its spokesman in writers like Leconte de Lisle. However, the representativity of Flaubert is nothing apparent or superficial: it is anchored in Gustave Flaubert's most intimate biographical details. Here is one way Sartre has of expressing this:

> Through his hate-filled rejection of any public, the artist gives himself readers, despite himself. It is true that he finds them *other*: he began to write under Louis-Philippe in order to remove himself from his class, from his class-being, from his commonality. Unable to declassify himself, he chose literature because in its abstract autonomy – and obliged by this very abstractness to posit itself for itself, independent of all content – it had transmuted into an inhuman End; it stood for Alienation as an absolute demand. To choose Art and to reject his class (his "natural public") were one and the same act. The neurosis occasioned a triple break: with the social milieu, with the artist himself, and with reality. In this sense, Neurosis-Art – i.e. Failure-Art – could just as well have been called Rupture-Art, because the Artist obliges himself to fail even in his art, in order no longer to coincide with himself.[11]

In other words, Sartre agress with Ezra Pound's observation that "Flaubert saw *'L'art industriel'*; he created the real Marxist literature and the Marxist (alleged Marxist) didn't discover it."[12]

Whether he succeeds or not – and the jury definitely is still out – Sartre has undertaken what a 20th-century Marxist has to undertake if he wants Marxism to be relevant; namely, to show how the categories of historical materialism not only are not imposed tyrannically on the individual "from on high" but also are derived from and relevant to the most intimate structures of the real creator of history, i.e. the practicing person.

2. SOVIET PHILOSOPHY ON SARTRE'S ERRONEOUS WAYS

Naturally enough, the contemporary Soviet philosophers who deal with Sartre and other "bourgeois" philosophers do not appreciate the way Sartre describes their enterprise. In fact, their reaction to Sartre is even more violent than their reactions to phenomenology, analytic philosophy or neo-Thomism,

seemingly because Sartre's works – especially the *Critique of Dialectical Reason* – can be seen as an effort to outflank Soviet Marxism-Leninism from the Left.

One would expect – for this last reason – to find quite a few Soviet critiques of Sartre. That one does not is due as much to the originality of Sartre's thought as to a certain "international division of labor" among Marxist philosophers. The Soviets simply assume that the main critique of Sartre is the task of French Marxist philosophers, to whose works they generally refer.[13]

> . . . study of the latest philosophic works of Sartre shows that a sincere desire to be a Marxist and creatively to develop Marxism is by far not enough to make one a genuine Marxist, capable of bringing something new to Marxism.[14]

That is in the first place. Further, even the Marxism that Sartre does practice is tainted by fatal defects:

> All we have seen shows that Sartre's 'Robinsonade' in *Being and Nothingness* is only occasionally overcome in his praxiological notions. Preservation of a Hegelian viewpoint on alienation, along with formalism in structural anthropology, lead to a picture of historical progress where there is no inkling of the real historical process. The formation of unitary groups in the course of totalization and their disintegration into detotalized totalities as a result of restoration of serial relations only means that from a formal viewpoint nothing new ever occurs in history. At the same time, the unitary group – the subject of universal praxis – is like the "useless passion" of phenomenological ontology.[15]

What is worse, there is "psychologism":

> The existentialist understanding of man is based on the recognition of the primary and decisive role of human existence, and of individual activity and practice, not paying attention to that real system of objective laws, in which it is necessary to include man and which determines him in the final analysis.
>
> Here appears the profoundly subjective character of the Sartrean conception of man, presupposing that all social phenomena, relations between classes and different social groups are determined by internal, individual experience, i.e. ultimately by psychological factors.[16]

And,

> Obviously, if there were no individuals, there would be no society; but, Sartre is profoundly wrong to attribute to the single individual the role of initial cell of society. With all his internal richness and individual peculiarities, the individual is always somehow a grouping of social relations, i.e. a social product. The dialectic of individual development consists in the fact that the individual is never subjected to "material inertia", is not

dissolved into society or changed into a "faceless thing", but changes and creatively transforms this inertia.[17]

To sum up:

Summing up what has been said, we have to stress that despite their differences, both the religious-mystical existentialism of Marcel and the existentialist anthropology of Sartre are objectively opposed to the Marxist understanding of man and history. While Marcel does not conceal his anti-Communist sympathies and openly declares himself an opponent of Marxism, Sartre, who declares Marxism to be the "unbeatable philosophy of our era", often veils his anti-Communism but has been less ambiguous lately (with his openly anarchistic views). He has in fact abandoned the basic theses of the Marxist-Leninist understanding of the person: the historical determination of man; his social importance; the scientific treatment of human freedom; optimistic humanism, inseparable from social transformations and revolutionary war, where the social ideals of man coincide with his individual interests; recognition of the highest moral criteria for man and faith in progress and scientific knowledge.[18]

There is here, quite obviously, a conviction on the part of the Soviets that there is a total incompatibility between Marxism and existentialism, and between Sartre and Marxism-Leninism. There is also a quite obvious increase in the quality of how Sartre is handled over what we saw previously from Byxovskij, Mamardašvili and Saxarova.[19]

3. NEMO IUDEX IN CAUSA SUI

An objective comparison between these "brothers in Marxism" – if either will allow it – is fascinating since the contrast runs through all aspects of philosophy and deals with some issues that have been central to Western thought since Descartes.

While Sartre and other existentialists take philosophy to be an expression of existence and therefore to change over time, for the Soviets it has a "basic question" which leads to "laws of the dialectic" which are – Sartre is correct! – totally a priori.

Sartre uses a phenomenological method which later emerges as "progressive-regressive", while the Soviets have something called the "Marxist dialectical method".[20]

Knowledge, for Sartre, is dialectical reason (the "reinteriorization of exteriorized interiority"); for Soviet philosophy, it is a "reflection" (which Sartre calls "abstract").

Sartre is doing a "meta-anthropology" while the Soviets are following Engels in doing a metaphysics of matter.

Instead of the "matter in motion" of the Soviets, we find in Sartre the "practico-inert" – whereby one has a choice between materialized sociality and socialized matter.

Human activity, or praxis, is exteriorized interiority in Sartre and also originary and constitutive. In Soviet thought praxis remains problematic since it is always unclear whether praxis is that of the individual (which is lived and empirical) or that of the Communist Party (which is History).

When this activity comes to have significance beyond the limits of the individual agent, there is for the Marxist a question of classes – a notoriously ambiguous notion. For Sartre, the social class is a matter of serial and/or common praxis, with neither having primacy; while for Soviet thought classes are a matter of "best interests", however these are determined.

Finally, Sartre presents history as a sequence of serial and common totalizations (making for institutionalizations), whereas Marxism-Leninism tries to remain faithful to the Enlightenment ideal of "progressive human emancipation".

The differences between Marxism-Leninism and Sartrean Marxism have to do, to a great extent, with some central issues which the Enlightenment bequeathed to Western philosophy and to which these "fraternal Marxists" give widely divergent interpretations.

There is, first, the question of *totalization*: if there is no "privileged" knower, in what consists the evident nature of all this non-privileged knowledge? Both Sartre and Soviet philosophy know the proletariat as a "non-privileged but nevertheless privileged" knower; the apparent contradiction seems solvable through "totalization"; but, giving this totalization an ontological status would recreate the old dogmatism.

Which forces the second question, that of *ontology*: if there is no ontological answer to the first question, then is there a methodological answer which avoids the old dogmatism? Both of our "brotherly Marxists" join the quasi-totality of contemporary philosophy in finding an affirmative answer at least plausible if not absolutely obligatory. Both also feel trapped by the fact that methodology is the private preserve of what they see as "idealism".

If this method includes (or is reduced to) praxis, whose praxis is this? – the question of *praxis* (and of intellectual intuition). Obviously, the agent has to be either individual or collective, and has to be a methodologist. How this last is the case is the subject of the "Marxist dialectical method" of the Marxist-Leninists and explains why Sartre's *Critique of Dialectical Reason* has

'Questions of Method' prefixed to it, but also opens its first volume with a long methodological disquisition.

Then there is the *social* question – important for all Marxists: if the praxis is of the group, how can one preserve the "dignity" of the (mortal) individual? Both Sartre and the Soviets are clear that this is a very important question. Each is also convinced that the other is absolutely wrong on this question – more so than on all the others.

Finally, the crucial question of *history* reads: is there a history which creates me (us) to the same extent that I (we) create it, and which constitutes my (our) happiness? The Marxist-Leninist answer to this nominates the Communist Party as both agent of history and knower of history in all its generality and all its detail. Sartre's rejection of this "tyranny of dogmatism" issues in what the Soviets see as relativism (because, according to the *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, the "totalization of all partial totalizers" has itself no necessary totalizer).

"Do we ever get out from under the railroad bridge?" might be a pointless question if the modes of analysis we learned there have perdured – even if we cannot get, in our own seminars, beyond a careful and conscientious account of the *Introduction.*

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NOTES

[1] *Temps modernes*, 1946, 9 (cf. also *Situations III*, Paris, Gallimard, 1949, pp. 135–225).
[2] Jean-Paul Sartre, *Search for a Method*, transl. by Hazel E. Barnes, NY, Vintage, 1968, p. 27.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 48.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 53. Cf. also p. 133.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 54.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 103.
[7] Jean-Paul Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, transl. by Alan Sheridan-Smith, London, NLB, 1976, p. 50.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 66.
[9] What follows is freely summarized from *Search for a Method* and *Critique of Dialectical Reason.*
[10] Cf. Thomas J. Blakeley, 'Sartre's *Critique de la raison dialectique* and the Opacity of Marxism-Leninism', Studies in Soviet Thought VIII, 1968, pp. 122–135.
[11] Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Idiot of the Family*, Paris, Gallimard, 1972, Vol. 3, p. 333.

[12] *New Democracy*, October 15, 1935.

[13] "French philosopher-Marxists have adequately shown the interpretation by existentialists and other bourgeois philosophers of the dialectic to be significantly impoverished. . . . Already in the 1930s, French Marxists began to fight against such a falsification of the Marxist dialectic. They asserted that without a dialectic in nature there would be no dialectic in thought since the latter is the summit of the dialectic that is present throughout the Universe." (T. A. Saxarova, *Ot filosofii suščestvovanija k strukturalizmu* (From the Philosophy of Existence to Structuralism) M., Nauka, 1974, p. 99).

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